Les conséquences socio-économiques du handicap dans les pays en développement by Simeu Keumoe, Natalie Julie
 UNIVERSITÉ DE SHERBROOKE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Les conséquences socio-économiques du handicap dans les pays en développement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Natalie Julie Simeu Keumoé 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thèse présentée en vue de l’obtention du grade de  
Philosophiæ Doctor (Ph.D.) en économie du développement 
 
 
 
 
 
 Juillet 2018 
 
 © Natalie Julie Simeu Keumoé, 2018 
 
 
 UNIVERSITÉ DE SHERBROOKE 
 
École de gestion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Les conséquences socio-économiques du handicap dans les pays en développement 
 
Natalie Julie Simeu Keumoé 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cette thèse a été évaluée par un jury composé des personnes suivantes : 
 
 
 
Luc Savard Président du jury 
 
 
 
Valérie Vierstraete Codirectrice de recherche 
 
 
 
Kim Lehrer Codirectrice de recherche  
 
 
 
Franque Grimard                                              Examinateur externe 
 
 
 
Jonathan Goyette Représentant de l’UdeS
 RÉSUMÉ 
 
La présente thèse traite des conséquences socio-économiques de la survenue du 
handicap (deux premiers articles), ou d’une variation de sa sévérité (troisième article), 
sur les ménages en général et les enfants en particulier dans le contexte des pays en 
développement. Elle se compose de trois articles. Le premier article se penche sur 
l’impact de la survenue du handicap chez les parents sur le travail et le capital humain 
des enfants. En effet, le handicap peut constituer un frein à la participation au marché 
du travail et de ce fait priver les parents des ressources nécessaires pour investir dans 
le capital humain de leur progéniture. Par ailleurs, les enfants de personnes 
handicapées pourraient être appelés à soutenir financièrement la famille; ceci les 
expose au travail des enfants qui peut affecter leur santé et représenter un obstacle à 
leur éducation. Dans la mesure où le capital humain détermine le bien-être à long 
terme des individus et joue un rôle clé dans le développement socio-économique 
d’une société, tout facteur susceptible de compromettre l’accumulation dudit capital 
chez l’enfant mérite une attention particulière. Les données utilisées dans ce premier 
article proviennent de l’Ethiopie. Les résultats révèlent que l’effet intergénérationnel 
de la survenue du handicap varie suivant le sexe du parent handicapé. Une 
comparaison entre filles et garçons indique que la survenue du handicap chez le père 
est beaucoup plus préjudiciable à l’accumulation du capital humain chez les filles car 
les ménages jugent plus rentable d’investir dans l’accumulation du capital humain des 
garçons que celui des filles. Cependant la survenue du handicap chez la mère favorise 
la participation au marché du travail des garçons. Ceci s’explique par la 
substituabilité entre la main d’œuvre de l’enfant et celle de la mère et par la division 
des tâches entre les filles et les garçons qui conduit ces derniers à être plus 
susceptibles de participer aux activités économiques que leurs sœurs. 
 
Notre deuxième article traite de l’impact de la survenue du handicap sur l’offre de 
travail des adultes en Ouganda. Les résultats des estimations nous amènent à conclure 
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que la survenue du handicap réduit le temps consacré par les hommes aux activités 
économiques. Pour ce qui est de la marge extensive de l’offre de travail, les résultats 
indiquent que la survenue du handicap ne détermine pas la probabilité de prendre part 
aux activités économiques.  
 
Alors que les deux articles précédents s’intéressent au rôle de la survenue du 
handicap sur l’allocation du temps des membres du ménage, le dernier article se 
focalise sur l’effet de la variation de la sévérité du handicap sur l’allocation des 
ressources du ménage. Nous nous appuyons sur des données indonésiennes qui 
couvrent 17 ans pour conduire notre analyse. Les résultats de nos estimations révèlent 
qu’une augmentation de la sévérité du handicap pénalise le ménage dans la mesure où 
elle le contraint à réduire sa consommation (non médicale). Les dépenses d’éducation 
constituent le poste le plus affecté par ce choc sur la santé; ceci indique qu’au sein 
des ménages, un accroissement de la sévérité du handicap chez les adultes compromet 
l’accumulation du capital humain chez les plus jeunes générations. 
 
Mots clés : allocation des ressources, capital humain, handicap, travail 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Si certains problèmes de santé ont des conséquences négligeables sur la vie des 
individus, tel n’est pas toujours le cas du handicap. En effet, la survenue d’un 
handicap est susceptible de bouleverser le cours de l’existence de l’ensemble des 
membres d’un ménage en raison de ses répercussions néfastes qui peuvent s’étendre 
sur une très longue période (Anderson, Huth, Garcia et Swezey, 2014). Selon la 
classification internationale du fonctionnement du handicap et de la santé (WHO, 
2001), le handicap correspond aux limitations fonctionnelles dont l’individu peut être 
victime. Il est important de mentionner ici que cette définition du handicap adoptée 
par l’Organisation Mondiale de la Santé ne fait pas de distinction entre un 
handicap  “permanent” et un handicap “temporaire”.  
 
Les personnes handicapées constituent la plus grande minorité au monde (Bristo, 
Blauwet, Frontera, Tolchin, Stein, Hoppe et Kirschner, 2014; Laddha, 2016); elles 
représentent 15% de la population mondiale et 80% d'entre elles vivent dans des pays 
en développement (WHO, 2011). Malgré le fait qu'elles forment l'un des groupes les 
plus marginalisés et vulnérables de la société (Mulligan et Gooding, 2009), les 
personnes handicapées ont longtemps été ignorées dans l’agenda du développement. 
Leur inclusion dans les objectifs de développement durable (2015-2030) concrétise 
ainsi l'engagement des Nations Unies à inverser cette tendance. 
 
Plusieurs facteurs peuvent être responsables du handicap dans les pays en 
développement. Il s'agit notamment des catastrophes naturelles, des conflits armés, de 
la malnutrition, du manque d'accès aux soins de santé et de l’ignorance concernant le 
handicap (causes, prévention, traitement). Il convient de noter que, tandis que 
l’attitude vis-à-vis du handicap a évolué dans les pays occidentaux au fil du temps, les 
croyances superstitieuses concernant le handicap restent profondément enracinées 
dans les pays du Sud. En fait, dans cette partie du monde, une multitude d’individus 
continue de croire que le handicap résulte d'une malédiction, d'une punition divine ou 
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de la sorcellerie. Par ailleurs, les personnes handicapées peuvent aussi être 
considérées comme des sorciers (Tekalign, 2007).  
De telles croyances incitent les familles à cacher leurs membres qui souffrent d’un 
handicap; et dans certains cas extrêmes, ces derniers sont tout simplement tués 
(Etieyibo et Omiegbe, 2016). La honte associée au handicap expliquerait ainsi la 
tendance des individus à sous-déclarer la prévalence du handicap au sein de leur 
ménage lors des enquêtes (Maart, 2015). 
 
L'exploration des bases de données réalisées dans les pays en développement révèle 
qu'elles contiennent très rarement des informations sur le handicap. De plus, la 
section dédiée au handicap a tendance, au fil du temps, à être supprimée des rares 
enquêtes qui l’intégraient habituellement dans leur questionnaire (ex.: Uganda 
National Panel Survey).  
 
Compte tenu de ce qui précède, les études qui traitent du handicap dans les pays en 
développement sont assez rares (WHO, 2011). Or, la démystification du handicap 
ainsi que l'amélioration des conditions de vie des personnes handicapées et de leurs 
familles demeureront des objectifs difficilement réalisables si la littérature afférente 
n’est pas approfondie et étoffée. En effet, la multiplication des travaux de recherche 
est essentielle pour une prise de conscience à l’égard des personnes handicapées, ainsi 
que pour l’élaboration et la mise en œuvre des politiques visant l’amélioration des 
conditions de vie des personnes handicapées (WHO, 2011; Zimmermann, 2014). 
 
Le handicap peut avoir des effets pernicieux non seulement sur la vie de la personne 
handicapée, mais également sur l’existence des autres membres du ménage en 
général, et des enfants en particulier. En plus des coûts médicaux auxquels il peut être 
associé, le handicap peut empêcher sa victime directe (ainsi que les aidants familiaux) 
de participer au marché du travail ou encore l'obliger à réduire son offre de main-
d'œuvre. Par conséquent,  le ménage peut observer une diminution de son revenu de 
travail en raison du handicap d’un de ses membres (Adioetomo, Mont et Irwanto, 
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2014; Mitra, Palmer, Mont et Groce, 2016). Cette perte de revenu peut d’une part 
contraindre le ménage  à restructurer l’emploi du temps de ses membres et, d’autre 
part, à redéfinir son budget. 
 
En raison de cette réallocation du temps faite au sein du ménage, les enfants peuvent 
être amenés à sacrifier d’autres activités, telles que l’éducation, pour s’engager dans 
la vie active. Comme le soulignent Haile et Haile (2012), pour pouvoir joindre les 
deux bouts, les familles pauvres sont parfois contraintes de pousser leurs enfants à 
rejoindre le marché du travail. Or, le travail peut nuire à la santé de l’enfant et 
compromettre son éducation (ILO, 2015). 
 
Pour ce qui est de la redéfinition du budget, il s’agit de stratégies concernant les 
dépenses et les revenus que le ménage peut adopter pour atténuer les répercussions 
négatives du handicap. Il s'agit notamment de la diminution de sa consommation, de 
la vente de ses biens, de l'augmentation de son offre de travail, de l'emprunt et du 
recours aux transferts reçus des proches ou des organisations gouvernementales et 
non gouvernementales (Yilma, Mebratie, Sparrow, Abebaw, Dekker, Alemu et Bedi, 
2014). La figure 1 résume les conséquences socio-économiques du handicap qui nous 
intéressent dans le cadre de cette thèse. 
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Figure 1 
Conséquences socio-économiques du handicap 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : auteure 
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Un examen de la littérature révèle que les travaux sur les conséquences socio-
économiques du handicap dans les pays en développement sont assez rares. En outre, 
les études existantes ont tendance à ignorer l'éventuelle endogénéité qui peut exister 
dans ce type d’analyse (par exemple, Mizunoya et Mitra, 2013; Raccanelo et 
Garduno, 2012). De ce fait, les recommandations de politique économique qui en 
découlent sont peu fiables dans la mesure où les résultats reflètent une corrélation et 
non une relation causale entre les variables d’intérêt : ceci renforce l'idée que la 
littérature  afférente devrait être étoffée.  
 
Notre thèse se compose de trois articles et son objectif général est d'analyser certaines 
conséquences socio-économiques du handicap. Nous nous focalisons sur les pays en 
développement dans la mesure où cette partie du monde est la plus touchée par le 
handicap. Notre travail se construit autour de trois hypothèses. Alors que les deux 
premières hypothèses traitent de l'allocation du temps des membres du ménage, la 
troisième s’intéresse à l’effet du handicap sur la définition du budget du ménage.  
 
Notre première hypothèse est que la survenue du handicap des parents est susceptible 
de provoquer le travail des enfants et entrave l'accumulation du capital humain chez 
ces derniers. Nous testons cette hypothèse en analysant l'effet de la survenue du 
handicap du père et de la mère sur le travail, la santé et l’éducation des enfants en 
Éthiopie. La deuxième hypothèse est que la survenue du handicap chez l’adulte réduit 
son offre de main-d'œuvre. Cette hypothèse est vérifiée en analysant l'effet de la 
survenue du handicap sur les marges extensive (probabilité de travailler) et intensive 
(temps de travail) de l’offre de travail en Ouganda. La troisième hypothèse concerne 
les stratégies d'adaptation des ménages mentionnées plus haut. En d’autres termes, 
nous supposons que l'augmentation des dépenses de santé combinée à la baisse des 
revenus que connaissent les ménages suite à une augmentation de la sévérité du 
handicap, les empêche de maintenir leur consommation. Par ailleurs, ils sont 
contraints de vendre leurs biens d’une part et compter sur les transferts venant de tiers 
pour pouvoir joindre les deux bouts. Afin de vérifier cette hypothèse, nous évaluons 
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l'effet d’une variation de la sévérité du handicap au sein des ménages indonésiens sur 
les dépenses de santé, les dépenses non médicales en général et les dépenses 
d’éducation en particulier, le revenu du travail, les actifs du ménage et les transferts 
reçus.  
 
Bien qu'ils ne soient pas représentatifs d'autres pays en développement, ces trois pays 
(voir la figure 2 pour leur localisation géographique) ont été choisis en raison de leur 
forte prévalence de handicap et parce qu'ils possèdent des bases de données 
appropriées pour notre analyse. 
 
Figure 2 
 Carte du monde
 
Légende: Ethiopie (vert), Ouganda (rouge), Indonésie (bleu) 
Source : https://www.worldmapmaker.com 
 
 
Compte tenu du fait que le handicap peut déclencher un effet boule de neige, il est 
important, du point de vue des politiques économiques, d’appréhender la vulnérabilité 
des ménages vivant avec une personne handicapée. En analysant les conséquences 
socio-économiques de la survenue du handicap ou d’une variation de sa sévérité, 
notre thèse vise à informer les pouvoirs publics sur les mesures à adopter pour d’une 
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part favoriser le bien-être des handicapés, et d’autre part améliorer les conditions de 
vie des membres de leurs ménages en général et des enfants en particulier.  
 
La contribution de cette thèse, dont l'objectif principal est d'analyser les conséquences 
socio-économiques de la survenue du handicap ou d’une variation de sa sévérité, peut 
être considérée sous différents angles. En analysant l'impact de la survenue du 
handicap chez les parents sur la santé, l'éducation et le travail des enfants, notre 
premier article vise à étoffer la littérature sur les effets intergénérationnels du 
handicap qui est peu abondante à l’heure actuelle. En fait, à notre connaissance, cet 
article est le premier à s'intéresser à l'effet de la survenue du handicap des parents sur 
une composante importante du capital humain de l'enfant et pourtant ignoré par les 
études antérieures: la santé. Par ailleurs, les travaux existants se servent de la 
probabilité d’inscription à l'école comme mesure de l'éducation des enfants. Un tel 
indicateur de l'éducation des enfants peut être trompeur car être inscrit à l'école ne 
signifie pas forcément assister aux cours. Or, l'absentéisme joue un rôle majeur dans 
l'échec scolaire (UNICEF, 2010). C’est pourquoi, dans le premier article, en plus de 
l'inscription scolaire, nous considérons également l'absentéisme comme indicateur de 
l’éducation. 
 
En ce qui concerne le deuxième article, la littérature qui traite de l'effet du handicap 
sur la participation au marché du travail tend à se focaliser sur la marge extensive de 
l’offre de travail. La marge intensive de l'offre de main-d'œuvre est ainsi négligée 
alors qu’elle détermine les revenus et par conséquent le bien-être de l’individu. Par 
ailleurs, à notre connaissance, il n'existe qu'une seule étude publiée concernant l'effet 
du handicap sur l’offre de travail qui tienne compte de l’endogénéité en s’appuyant 
sur des données d'un pays en développement. Notre deuxième article contribue donc 
à la littérature existante en s’intéressant à la marge intensive de l'offre de main-
d'œuvre d'une part, et en utilisant une méthodologie (modèle à effet fixe) qui n'ignore 
pas les problèmes potentiels d'endogénéité d'autre part. 
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Pour ce qui est du troisième article, les rares études existantes qui portent sur les 
mécanismes d'adaptation des ménages vivant avec un handicapé dans les pays en 
développement, se limitent au court ou au moyen terme. Les effets observés à long 
terme demeurent donc un mystère à élucider. Notre étude vise à combler cette lacune 
observée dans la littérature. 
 
Le reste de la thèse est organisé comme suit : dans un premier temps, nous 
présenterons une brève revue de la littérature1 ainsi que la méthodologie utilisée pour 
mener notre analyse. Ensuite, nous développerons les trois articles qui composent 
notre thèse; ils seront suivis d'une discussion générale et de la conclusion de la thèse. 
 
REVUE DE LA LITTÉRATURE 
Dans cette section, nous présentons successivement la revue de la littérature associée 
respectivement aux première, deuxième et troisième hypothèses qui guident notre 
thèse. On a peu d’informations concernant les répercussions du handicap sur le travail 
des enfants, leur santé ou leur éducation. Ceci s'explique certainement par le fait que 
la littérature sur l'effet intergénérationnel du handicap se focalise généralement sur la 
situation des mères ayant des enfants handicapés (Stabile et Allin, 2012). À notre 
connaissance, seuls trois articles (Raccanello et Garduno, 2012; Mont et Nguyen, 
2013; Alam, 2015) s’intéressent à l'effet du handicap des parents sur au moins une 
des variables qui font l’objet de notre premier chapitre (travail des enfants, éducation, 
santé).  
 
Le premier est celui de Raccanello et Garduno (2012); les auteurs utilisent des 
données mexicaines et constatent que les enfants de parents handicapés sont plus 
enclins que leurs pairs à abandonner l'école pour devenir oisifs. Leurs résultats les 
amènent à conclure que le travail des enfants n'est pas le canal à travers lequel le 
                                                        
1 Voir les articles pour une revue de la littérature plus complète.  
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handicap des parents compromet l'éducation des enfants (puisque c’est l'oisiveté et 
non le travail qui prédomine chez ces enfants).  
 
En ce qui concerne le deuxième article, il est de Mont et Nguyen (2013) qui, 
contrairement aux auteurs précédents, ne traitent pas du travail des enfants. Leurs 
résultats, basés sur des données vietnamiennes, révèlent que le handicap des parents 
diminue la probabilité, pour un enfant, d'être inscrit à l'école et de terminer ses études. 
Par ailleurs, l'effet est plus prononcé lorsque c’est la mère qui est handicapée. Pour sa 
part, Alam (2015) utilise les données tanzaniennes et son étude montre que seul le 
handicap du père a un effet sur la probabilité pour l’enfant d’être inscrit à l’école, ce 
qui s’explique par la baisse du revenu que connait le ménage suite au handicap du 
père qui en est le chef. C’est pourquoi, les trois articles s’accordent sur le fait que le 
handicap des parents a des effets négatifs sur la vie de leurs enfants. Dans cette thèse, 
nous ne nous limitons pas aux effets intergénérationnels du handicap; nous explorons 
également l’effet du handicap sur le comportement d’offre de travail  de ses victimes 
directes.  
 
Un passage en revue de la littérature révèle que les articles portant sur l'impact du 
handicap des adultes sur leur offre de travail (notre deuxième chapitre), concluent 
généralement que la première variable a un effet négatif sur la seconde. Il convient 
cependant de noter que les travaux existants ont tendance à se focaliser sur les pays 
développés (Campolieti, 2002, Jones, 2008, Jones et Latreille, 2011, Polidano et Vu, 
2015). À notre connaissance, il n'y a qu'un seul article publié, parmi les rares études 
qui s’intéressent aux pays en développement, qui n'ignore pas les problèmes 
d'endogénéité. C'est l'article de Schultz et Tansel (1997), qui montre que le handicap 
réduit le temps dédié aux activités économiques. Les auteurs se servent des données 
ghanéennes et ivoiriennes et ont recours aux doubles moindres carrés  (les prix des 
denrées alimentaires sont utilisés comme variables instrumentales).  
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Bridges, Gaggero  et Owens (2015) utilisent les données collectées à Kampala, 
capitale de l'Ouganda, et constatent que le handicap réduit la probabilité de travailler 
mais n'a aucun impact sur le temps consacré aux activités économiques. 
Contrairement à l'étude de Bridges et al. (2015), notre deuxième article a une portée 
plus large puisque nous considérons les handicapés ougandais à l’échelle nationale. 
L’étude de Mizunoya et Mitra (2013) est basée sur 15 pays en développement2. Les 
auteurs constatent que, dans la majorité de ces pays, les personnes handicapées 
présentent un taux d'emploi inférieur à celui de leurs pairs non handicapés. Ils 
remarquent également que l'écart entre les taux d'emploi est plus élevé chez les 
femmes que chez les hommes. Le lien négatif entre le handicap et l'offre de travail est 
également confirmé par les travaux de Trani et Loeb (2012) en Zambie ou de Mitra et 
Sambamoorthi (2008) en Inde.  
 
En résumé, les rares études existantes concernant les pays en développement 
concluent que le handicap entrave la participation au marché du travail. Cependant, 
comme l'ont souligné Mizunoya et Mitra (2013), les limites que présentent les bases 
de données contraignent les chercheurs à ignorer les éventuels problèmes 
d'endogénéité dans leur analyse. Le handicap peut ainsi constituer un obstacle à 
l'épanouissement professionnel de l’individu qui en est victime; il peut aussi nuire au 
bien-être du ménage dans son ensemble. 
 
Étant donné que la survenue du handicap ou un accroissement de sa sévérité au sein 
du ménage peut être associée à une augmentation des dépenses de santé couplée à une 
baisse du revenu, il convient de comprendre comment les ménages affectés gèrent 
leur budget pour faire face aux difficultés financières auxquelles ils sont exposés. Une 
exploration de la littérature sur les stratégies d'adaptation des ménages affectés par le 
handicap, révèle que le débat tourne autour de la capacité du ménage à maintenir sa 
consommation. Des études basées sur des données américaines (Stephens, 2001, 
                                                        
2  Afrique : Burkina-Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Ile Maurice, Zambie, Zimbabwe ;  Asie : 
Bangladesh, Laos, Pakistan, Philippines ; Amérique : Brésil, République Dominicaine, Mexique, 
Paraguay. 
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Meyer et Mok, 2013) révèlent que les ménages touchés peuvent maintenir leur 
consommation à court terme en raison de la faible baisse du revenu du ménage. 
Cependant, l'hypothèse du maintien de la consommation est invalidée à long terme, 
reflétant ainsi la vulnérabilité desdits ménages. 
 
Les études basées sur les pays en développement sont rares et ne s’appuient pas sur 
des données qui couvrent le long terme. Les trois articles (Gertler et Gruber, 2002; 
Gertler, Levine et Moretti, 2009; Genoni, 2012) qui portent sur les données 
indonésiennes sont présentés ci-dessous. La première étude est de Gertler et Gruber 
(2002) qui observent une diminution des revenus des ménages suite à la survenue du 
handicap. Par ailleurs, ces ménages ne sont pas capables de maintenir leur 
consommation et les effets négatifs observés augmentent avec la sévérité du 
handicap. Il convient de noter que l'hypothèse du maintien de la consommation est 
également invalidée par l'étude de Heltberg et Lund (2009) qui s’appuie sur des 
données pakistanaises. 
 
Contrairement à l'étude de Gertler et Gruber (2002), les deux autres études qui portent 
sur l’Indonésie (Gertler et al., 2009; Genoni, 2012) constatent que les ménages 
peuvent maintenir leur consommation malgré le handicap d’un de leurs membres. En 
effet, selon Gertler et al. (2009), l'accès aux institutions de microfinance, en raison 
des opportunités de prêts et d'épargne qu’elles offrent, peut aider les ménages affectés 
à maintenir leur consommation. Le rôle joué par les établissements de microfinance 
est également présenté dans l'étude d'Islam et Maitra (2012). Ces auteurs s’intéressent 
au Bangladesh et concluent que l'accès au microcrédit joue un rôle important dans le 
maintien de la consommation en empêchant les ménages d’être contraints de vendre 
leur bétail. La dernière étude relative à l’Indonésie provient de Genoni (2012) qui a 
constaté que les transferts provenant des membres de la famille (non co-résidents), 
aident les ménages à maintenir leur consommation.  
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Contrairement aux auteurs mentionnés ci-dessus, Bales (2013) ou encore Mitra et al. 
(2016) se servent de données vietnamiennes. Ils s’accordent sur le fait que les 
ménages vietnamiens maintiennent leur consommation malgré une augmentation des 
dépenses de santé. Si dans le premier article, ce sont les transferts reçus qui 
permettent aux ménages de maintenir leur consommation, dans le second, les 
stratégies adoptées sont: la vente des biens du ménage, l’emprunt et la diminution des 
dépenses d’éducation. En résumé, les travaux existants qui s’appuient sur des 
données collectées dans des pays en développement se limitent à une analyse de court 
terme, laissant ainsi le soin aux recherches futures d’explorer les mécanismes 
d’adaptation de long terme. 
 
Notre revue de la littérature révèle que le handicap a des effets négatifs sur le ménage 
dans son ensemble. Dans le contexte des pays en développement, la rareté des études 
sur les conséquences socio-économiques du handicap, d'une part, et les lacunes 
observées dans les rares articles existants d'autre part, s'expliquent principalement par 
les limites des bases de données disponibles. La méthodologie utilisée pour analyser 
nos données est présentée ci-dessous. 
MÉTHODOLOGIE 
 
Le problème auquel est confronté le chercheur qui analyse les conséquences socio-
économiques du handicap est l'endogénéité qui provient de trois sources: les erreurs 
de mesure, la causalité inverse (ex: le handicap peut affecter le travail et le travail 
peut causer le handicap) ou le problème de variable omise (ex: un individu peut 
simuler un handicap afin de bénéficier des transferts venant des proches ou de l’Etat, 
sa «vraie motivation» est une variable omise). Les expériences randomisées, les 
expériences naturelles et la méthode des variables instrumentales sont des outils que 
le chercheur peut utiliser face au problème d'endogénéité.  
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Les expériences randomisées sont coûteuses et peuvent être difficiles à réaliser pour 
des raisons d’ordre éthique (par exemple on ne devrait pas provoquer un handicap 
chez un individu juste pour les besoins d’une étude). Pour ce qui est des deux autres 
approches,  les limites des bases de données constituent un obstacle à leur mise en 
œuvre (Levinsohn, McLaren, Shisana et Zuma, 2013). En fait, les événements qui 
peuvent servir d’ « expérience naturelle » sont rares, d'une part, et il est difficile de 
trouver des variables instrumentales valides d'autre part (c'est-à-dire une variable qui 
influence la variable dépendante uniquement par le canal de la variable endogène). 
Lorsque les données de panel sont disponibles, une alternative est de recourir au 
modèle à effets fixes qui permet de contrôler les effets fixes individuels 
(caractéristiques individuelles non observables qui ne varient pas au cours du temps 
telles que les dotations génétiques) ainsi que les effets temporels (facteurs non 
observables par le chercheur, qui influencent toute une population à un moment 
donné, telles que les catastrophes naturelles ou la législation). Cependant, le modèle à 
effets fixes présente des inconvénients. Premièrement, il ne contrôle pas 
l'hétérogénéité liée aux facteurs non observables qui varient selon l’individu et à 
travers le temps (ex: goûts et préférences). Deuxièmement, il ne permet pas d’estimer 
l’effet des variables qui ne varient pas au cours du temps. Par exemple, soit D une 
variable binaire qui indique si l’individu est handicapé ou non et Y l’offre de travail. 
L’identification de l’effet de D sur Y n’est possible que si des individus changent de 
statut (ex: de non handicapé à handicapé) entre les vagues de l’enquête longitudinale. 
Dans notre thèse, nous appliquerons les moindres carrés ordinaires sur un modèle à 
effets fixes.  
La spécification 1 ci-dessous sert à estimer l'effet du handicap des parents sur les 
enfants (chapitre 1): 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1  𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2  𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡  + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (Spécification 1) 
 
Dans la spécification présentée ci-dessus, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 est la variable dépendante (travail des 
enfants, éducation ou santé des enfants) et représente la situation d’un enfant donné i 
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au temps t3.  𝛽0  est la constante, 𝛽1 et 𝛽2  sont les coefficients associés au handicap 
du père et de la mère respectivement. 𝛾 est le vecteur des coefficients associés aux 
variables de contrôle. DF=1 si le père est handicapé et 0 sinon. De la même manière, 
DM=1 si la mère est handicapée et 0 sinon. X représente un ensemble de variables de 
contrôle: la taille du ménage, le groupe d’âge de l’enfant et une variable muette pour 
les chocs naturels. Cette dernière variable indique si, au cours des 12 mois précédant 
l’enquête, le ménage dans lequel vit l’enfant a été affecté par une catastrophe 
naturelle susceptible d’affecter la production agricole (sécheresse, inondation, 
glissements de terrain/avalanche, fortes pluies empêchant le travail, autres destruction 
des récoltes) . 𝜇𝑖 représente les effets fixes individuels (associés à l’enfant) tandis que  𝜆𝑡 correspond aux effets fixes temporels. 𝜀𝑖𝑡  est le terme d’erreur idiosyncratique, 
c’est-à-dire les caractéristiques non observables qui changent au cours du temps et 
selon l’individu et influencent  𝑌𝑖𝑡. 
 
Nous avons également recours aux doubles moindres carrés comme méthodologie 
alternative. Les instruments utilisés ici sont inspirés de l’article de Mont et Nguyen 
(2013); il s’agit de la prévalence du handicap dans le district d’une part et de l’âge 
des parents d’autre part. Il est cependant important de noter que la validité de ces 
instruments peut être remise en question. Par exemple, le handicap n’est pas le seul 
canal à travers lequel l’âge du parent influence le capital humain de l’enfant. Il serait 
possible que les parents les plus âgés aient une forte préférence pour le présent et ne 
jugent pas nécessaire d’investir dans le capital humain des enfants. Si tel était le cas, 
l’âge ne serait plus un instrument valide.  
 
                                                        
3 Il est possible que la variable dépendante souffre également d'erreurs de mesure; par exemple, il peut 
y avoir une tendance à sous-déclarer les heures travaillées par les enfants. Comme l'indiquent 
Davidson et Mackinnon (2004), l'erreur de mesure de la variable dépendante ne pose pas un grand 
problème. En fait, lorsque la variable dépendante est mesurée avec erreur, ceci entraine une 
augmentation de la variance des termes d'erreur; ce qui n’est pas un problème grave. Par contre, 
l'erreur de mesure d’une variable explicative entraîne à la fois une augmentation de la variance du 
terme d'erreur et la corrélation entre la variable indépendante et le terme d'erreur. 
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Pour analyser la relation entre le handicap des adultes et leur participation au marché 
du travail en Ouganda (chapitre 2), nous nous servons de la régression suivante: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (Specification 2) 
 
Dans la spécification présentée ci-dessus, i représente un adulte donné de notre 
échantillon, tandis que t correspond à la vague du panel qui est considérée. Y 
représente l’offre de main d’œuvre. Plus précisément, il s’agit de la probabilité de 
travailler pendant les sept jours précédant l’enquête quand on s’intéresse à la marge 
extensive de l’offre de travail, et du nombre d’heures travaillées durant cet horizon 
temporel quand on s’intéresse plutôt à la marge intensive de l’offre de travail.  D est 
une variable binaire qui prend la valeur 1 si l’individu est handicapé et 0 sinon. 𝛼 
représente la constante,  𝛽 est le coefficient associé à la variable explicative tandis 
que 𝛾 représente le vecteur de coefficients associés aux variables de contrôle. Les 
variables de contrôle sont le statut matrimonial, le statut au sein du ménage et la taille 
du ménage. 𝜇𝑖  et  𝜆𝑡  sont respectivement les effets fixes individuels et les effets fixes 
temporels. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 est le terme d’erreur idiosyncratique.  
 
Nous avons dans ce deuxième article utilisé deux méthodologies alternatives; ce sont 
les doubles moindres carrés et les doubles différences avec appariement. Les 
instruments utilisés dans la première méthode sont l’âge de l’individu et la prévalence 
du handicap dans le district (Mont et Nguyen, 2013). Pour ce qui est de la deuxième 
méthode, elle consiste à combiner la méthode d’appariement par score de propension 
à celle des doubles différences.  
 
L’idée derrière la méthode d’appariement par score de propension est de 
« reproduire » une expérience randomisée en s’appuyant  sur des données secondaires 
(Khandker, Koolwal et Samad, 2010). Elle se base sur la similarité des 
caractéristiques observables pour apparier les personnes handicapées avec leurs pairs. 
Par ailleurs, elle ne fait pas d'hypothèse sur la forme fonctionnelle et permet donc 
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d'éviter le biais de spécification. L'un des problèmes auxquels sont confrontés les 
chercheurs qui utilisent la méthode d'appariement est celui de la diminution du 
nombre d’observations après l’appariement qui les contraint très souvent à se 
contenter d'un échantillon de petite taille4. En effet les individus qui n'ont pas pu être 
appariés sont écartés de l'analyse. 
 
La méthode d'appariement s'appuie sur une hypothèse assez forte (la probabilité d'être 
handicapé dépend uniquement des caractéristiques observables) que l'on peut relâcher 
en lui associant une approche en doubles différences. L'avantage des doubles 
différences avec appariement est qu'elles permettent de contrôler l’hétérogénéité liée 
aux effets fixes individuels et aux effets temporels. 
 
La spécification 2 est également utilisée dans notre troisième article, cependant ici, i 
représente un ménage donné (chapitre 3). Y représente la valeur mensuelle des 
éléments suivants: revenu du travail, transferts reçus des proches, biens du ménage, 
dépenses de santé, dépenses non-médicales. Cette dernière variable inclut les 
dépenses alimentaires, les dépenses d’éducation et toute autre dépense non-
alimentaire. D est l’indicateur de la sévérité du handicap au sein du ménage; en 
d’autres termes D est l’indice des Activités de la Vie Quotidienne (AVQ) au sein du 
ménage. X est un ensemble de variables de contrôle: taille du ménage, proportion des 
individus de moins de 15 ans dans le ménage, proportion des adultes de sexe 
masculin au sein du ménage (plus de 14 ans) et les caractéristiques du chef de ménage 
(âge, statut matrimonial, niveau d’éducation). Nous avons également eu recours à un 
modèle à variable retardée comme méthodologie alternative face au problème 
d’endogénéité.  
 
Compte tenu du fait que les méthodologies sur lesquelles s’appuient nos analyses ne 
sont pas susceptibles d’éliminer complètement le problème d’endogénéité, dans 
                                                        
4 La méthode d’appariement n’a pas été utilisée dans le premier article du fait du faible nombre 
d’observations sur le support commun.  
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chacun de nos articles nous discutons de la direction des biais potentiels susceptibles 
d’affecter nos résultats. Il est important de noter que l’indicateur du handicap que 
nous utilisons dans les trois articles présente des limites. En effet, le module des 
questionnaires d’enquête qui est dédié au handicap n’est pas nécessairement formulé 
de manière à distinguer le handicap permanent d’une limitation fonctionnelle 
temporaire causée par un problème de santé. Le questionnaire Ougandais est une 
exception car on y demande aux individus d’indiquer l’année de survenue du 
handicap; et nos calculs indiquent que 62% des personnes handicapées de 
l’échantillon ont un handicap qui dure depuis deux ans ou plus. Ainsi, lorsque 
l’analyse est faite à l’aide d’un modèle à effets fixes, nos résultats peuvent refléter 
l’effet de la survenue d’un handicap temporaire dû à des problèmes de santé (plutôt 
que d’un handicap permanent) sur nos différentes variables dépendantes. L’utilisation 
de notre indicateur du handicap et du modèle à effets fixes constitue une limite de 
notre étude. Toutefois, nous utilisons ce modèle et cette mesure faute d’une meilleure 
alternative.  
 
Nous allons à présent exposer successivement chacun de nos trois articles. Le 
chapitre 1 présente notre premier article, tandis que  les chapitres 2 et 3 correspondent 
respectivement au deuxième et au dernier article.   
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 PREMIER CHAPITRE  - 
PARENTAL DISABILITY, CHILD LABOUR AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN 
ETHIOPIA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Whereas disability was invisible in the Millenium Development Goals (2000-2015), a 
growing awareness of the vulnerability of disabled people and their families has 
advocated for disability-inclusive Sustainable Development Goals (2015-2030) 
(United Nations, 2014). People with disabilities represent 15% of the world 
population and they are exposed to socioeconomic disadvantages that affect their 
wellbeing as well as their children’s lives (World Health Organization and World 
Bank, 2011). Disability may deprive parents of resources necessary to invest in their 
children’s human capital (education and health). Moreover, sons and daughters of 
disabled people may be exposed to child labour, an activity that could be detrimental 
to their schooling and health. Since children’s human capital lays the cornerstone for 
their future life and plays a crucial role in the socioeconomic development of a 
society, any factor likely to compromise human capital accumulation must be paid 
careful attention.  
 
Using panel data from Ethiopia, we rely on a fixed effects model for our analysis. Our 
results show that the influence of parental disability onset on child outcomes varies 
according to the gender of the parent. Maternal disability onset has a positive impact 
on child labour while fathers’ disability onset affects child human capital. Further 
analysis reveals that compared to their brothers, girls’ human capital accumulation is 
more hindered by parental disability onset. 
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1.1.    INTRODUCTION 
While some health issues have little effect on people’s lives, a disability shock 
certainly has the possibility of changing a household’s life path because of longer 
lasting consequences (Anderson et al., 2014). In line with the International 
Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health, disability refers to functional 
limitations 5 . People with disabilities (PWDs) are the world’s largest minority 
according to the United Nations (Bristo et al., 2014; Laddha, 2016); they represent 
15% of the world population and 80% of them live in developing countries (WHO, 
2011). Although they form one of the most marginalized and vulnerable groups in 
society (Mulligan and Gooding, 2009), they have not received all the attention they 
deserve. For instance, none of the Millenium Development Goals (2000-2015) 
explicitly mentioned disabled persons. In an attempt to reverse this trend, the 
Sustainable Development Goals (2015-2030) include PWDs 6 . Across the world, 
disabled people experience more socio-economic disadvantages than their non-
disabled peers. Yet, disability may have pernicious effects not only for PWDs’ 
wellbeing, but also for the lives of their relatives, in general, and their children in 
particular. 
 
In accordance with the household decision model (and generally in developing 
countries) fathers allocate their time between market work and leisure while mothers 
split their time among home production, child rearing, labour market activities and 
leisure. For their part, children divide their time between education, domestic work, 
                                                        
5  A person has functional limitations when, due to health issues, he lacks the physical, cognitive 
or psychological ability to independently perform activities. These functional limitations may be 
innate or not. 
6 In fact, “disability” is explicitly mentioned in five of the 17 goals.  Goal 4:“Guaranteeing equal and 
accessible education by building inclusive learning environments and providing the needed assistance 
for persons with disabilities”. Goal 8: “Promoting inclusive economic growth, full and productive 
employment allowing persons with disabilities to fully access the job market”. Goal 10: “ Emphasizing 
the social, economic and political inclusion of persons with disabilities”. Goal 11: “Creating accessible 
cities and water resources, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems, providing 
universal access to safe, inclusive, accessible and green public spaces”. Goal 17:”Underlining the 
importance of data collection and monitoring of the SDGs, emphasis on disability disaggregated data”. 
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leisure and market work (Brown, Deardorff and Stern, 2002; Edmonds, 2007). Thus, 
when a disability shock affects a parent, the household can be constrained on the one 
hand to reschedule its members’ time use, and on the other hand to redefine its budget 
planning. This time reorganisation can, for example, lead to a reallocation of a child’s 
time from his/her7 other activities to labour, while resource reallocation can involve a 
reduction of the amount of resources dedicated to child health and education. To 
paraphrase Anderson et al. (2014), disability happens to the family and not to PWDs 
alone. In our paper we focus on three dimensions of a child’s life that may be 
affected: labour8, education and health. These outcomes have been chosen for reasons 
presented in greater detail below. 
 
Disability may lead to poverty for the individual through many channels such as 
lower educational attainments 9 , poor health outcomes and unemployment or 
underemployment experienced by the disabled person (WHO, 2011). Since PWDs 
might depend on relatives for their livehood, the handicap can be a source of 
constraint for the disabled’s family in general and his children in particular. The latter 
may have to be (more) involved in market work in order to improve their household 
economic situation or to compensate for the income loss incurred by their disabled 
parents. As stated by Haile and Haile (2012), to make ends meet and avoid putting 
the existence of the family at risk, poor families sometimes have no choice but to 
make their children join the labour market. Such a statement is in accordance with the 
two axioms introduced by Basu and Van (1998) to formalize child labour. According 
to the first one, known as the “substitution axiom”, parental and child work are 
substitutes. The second axiom called the “luxury axiom” stipulates that parents are 
altruistic and push children to join the labour market only if they face financial 
hardships. 
 
                                                        
7 In the rest of this paper, we will use « his » instead of « his/her » in order to lighten the text. 
8 “Labour” here refers to any work carried out by children such as farming, chores, etc. 
9 If there is a disability  onset at early stages of life.  
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Children living with a disabled parent may also have to be (more) involved in 
housework in order to support their mother10 if she has to take care of her disabled 
partner, to substitute for his market work or if she is the one affected by the handicap. 
Work11 per se can be a beneficial activity for the child since it contributes to the 
accumulation of skills that have positive effects during the lifespan. However, work 
can be a harmful activity that should be prohibited if it affects a child’s health 
(mental/physical) or interferes with his education (ILO, 2015).   
 
Besides child labour, this paper is concerned with child human capital12 (educational 
and health outcomes). Since child human capital lays the cornerstone for future 
earnings and general wellbeing (Feeny and Ouattara, 2013; Mont and Nguyen, 2013), 
it seems appropriate to investigate how education and health can be influenced by 
parental disability. Concerning educational outcomes, Mont and Nguyen (2013) 
present three mechanisms through which parental handicap may impact child 
education. First of all, and following the arguments presented above, children may 
have to reallocate their time from school to economic activities following a parental 
disability onset. Secondly, children can also dedicate less time to schooling in order 
to take care of the disabled parent or to substitute for their parents in household 
chores. Finally, disability can reduce parental involvement in a child’s education. 
Regarding health outcomes, parental disability can have direct and indirect effects on 
child health. The direct influence arises because of the genetic link between 
generations (for example the Usher Syndrome is an inherited health condition which 
major symptoms are hearing loss and deterioration of vision) while the indirect effect 
operates through low income and/or a low level of education that prevents parents 
from investing in child health (Currie and Almond, 2011; Kuehnle, 2014). 
                                                        
10 The focus on the mother here is due to the fact that between both of the parents, she is generally the 
one in charge of domestic work and this is particularly true in the african context. 
11 We refer here to any work (domestic work included) performed by the child in accordance with the 
law, thus such work does not have any pervasive effect on the child (i.e. it does not affect his health or 
interfere with his education).  
12   Human capital can be defined as skills embodied in people that influence future monetary income. 
Education and health are its major components (Teixeira, 2014; Weiss, 2015).  
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The literature regarding intergenerational effects of disability tends to focus on the 
impact of child disability on parents’ lives. Studies analysing the consequences of 
parental disability on children’s outcomes remain markedly scarce. Moreover, results 
presented in existing studies, generally, reflect a correlation and not a causal 
relationship since the possible endogeneity of the indicator of disability is not taken 
into account. A correlation between parental disability and child labour, for example, 
does not necessary mean that the first variable causes changes in the second one. In 
fact, it is possible that a hidden factor such as parents’ preferences influences both 
dependent and independent variables and creates a spurious relationship between 
regressands and regressors. For instance, parents with a high intertemporal-discount 
rate may have health-damaging habits making them more likely to suffer from a 
disability on the one hand; and to push their children to focus on labour instead of 
schooling because of these preferences on the other hand (Bratti and Mendola, 2014). 
It is important to identify the causal effect because if child labour is not determined 
by parental disability, interventions to tackle disability (by prevention 13  or 
treatment/alleviation14 of disability) will not necessarily reduce child labour (Currie, 
2009). 
 
Randomized controlled trials and instrumental variables methods are known as two 
possible methods a researcher can use to address endogeneity. The former is costly 
and may be impossible for ethical reasons, while the latter is not obvious since it 
requires a valid instrumental variable that may not be available (Levinsohn et al., 
2013). When panel data are available, an alternative is to use a fixed effects model 
(this methodology and its limits are presented in details in section 1.4.).  
 
 
                                                        
13 For example, prevention of cataracts, that can lead to blindness, through the promotion of a healthy 
lifestyle (examples of risks factors: tobacco use, exposure to sunlight) or the prevention of paralysis 
due to polio by promoting immunization. Source: World Health Organization website.                            
http://www.who.int/topics/cataract/en/;   http://www.who.int/topics/poliomyelitis/en/ 
14 For example, cataracts can be treated by surgery while orthotic devices can alleviate disability for 
some motor-impaired. 
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In this paper we focus on Ethiopia15, a nation located in eastern Africa. The history of 
Ethiopia is filled with long periods of wars, droughts and famines (De Waal, 1991; 
Von Uexkull, 2014). Over time, the Ethiopian government has had to fight on several 
fronts; between 1977 and 1978, the border dispute also known as the “Ogaden war” 
opposed Ethiopia to Somalia. The longest armed conflict of the Ethiopian chronicles 
started in 1961 and opposed this country to Eritrea; the crux of the problem was the 
decision of the former to annex the latter. The war went on until the independence of 
Eritrea in 1991; this date also marked the end of a civil war that started in Ethiopia in 
1974 and ended with the overthrow of the ruling regime. Seven years after their three-
decades of war, Ethiopia and Eritrea were once again involved in fighting that 
stemmed from a border dispute and was shorter than the previous one (1998-2000). 
Besides its warfare, Ethiopia experienced several episodes of droughts and famines. 
The most severe famine occurred in 1983-1985 and killed more than one million 
people (Tafere, 2016).  
 
It is well known that armed conflicts and famines are contributors to disability. Wars 
are sources of injuries and trauma that can lead to disabilities (WHO, 2011). 
Furthermore, malnutrition is a pathway through which famine may generate 
disabilities. There is evidence that nutritional deficiencies during childhood may 
result in mental impairments as well as visual disabilities (Maulik and Darmstadt, 
2007; Susser, Clair and He, 2008; Demissie, and Solomon, 2011). It would have been 
interesting to identify the causes of disability in our study, in order to check if 
disability is due to wars or famines. However, such information was not collected 
during the survey and thus is missing in our data.  
 
We have chosen to focus on Ethiopia because it is characterised by a high prevalence 
of PWDs. With a population of about 97 million, this nation is the second most 
                                                        
15 It is worth noting that Ethiopia is not representative of other african countries. Since each country 
has its specificities, we do not assume in this paper that conclusion drawn from the Ethiopian  context 
can be applied to other countries.  
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populous country in Africa16 and PWDs account for 18%17 of the population (WHO, 
2011); in other words, more than 17 million Ethiopians are classified as disabled. 
Since 2005, Ethiopia has implemented the Productive Safety Net Program; this 
program’s goal is to provide transfers to the population exposed to chronic food 
insecurity. The majority of the beneficiaries have to do some public work in return for 
transfers. However, eligible elderly and PWDs who are unable to work can receive 
transfers without any work requirement (Berhane, Gilligan, Hoddinott, Kumar and 
Taffesse, 2014). According to the most recent report of the Ethiopian Socioeconomic 
Survey (Central Statistical Agency, 2015) 3% of the population receive transfers from 
the program.  
 
The vast majority (85%) of PWDs in Ethiopia live in rural area (MOLSA, 2010). 
Moreover, 95% of disabled Ethiopians live in poor households. Many PWDs either 
depend on income generated by self-employment for their living expenses or are 
reduced to relying on their relatives or begging (ILO, 2013). According to Narayana 
(2012), supplementing or improving household income is the main reason for 
children’s participation in economic activities in Ethiopia. 
 
An exploration of statistics centred on children shows that the incidence of child 
labour in Ethiopia is 27%18, this is twice the proportion observed worldwide (13%). 
According to the International Labour Organization, child labour refers to any market 
or domestic work carried out by children that can affect their health and education. In 
                                                        
16    Source: The World Bank Statistics of 2014 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/Population-
ranking-table   
17 According to the World Disability Report (WHO, 2011), results of the World Health Survey based 
on 55 developed and developing countries show that Ethiopia ranks 15th (backward sort) when 
comparing proportion of PWDs.The percentage of PWDs varies between 4% (Norway) and 36% 
(Swaziland). When comparing only the 15 Sub-Saharian countries of the sample, Ethiopia ranks 6th of 
the nations with the highest disability prevalence. 
18 Statistics on child labour come from the UNICEF website and present the situation of children aged 
5 to 14 years old in 2014. The prevalence of child labour in Sub-Saharan Africa is 25%. Source: 
UNICEF website. 
http://data.unicef.org/child-protection/child-labour.html 
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consonance with this international organisation (ILO, 2011), any hazardous work19, 
done for at least one hour, should indeed be prohibited for those who are less than 18 
years old. The agricultural sector is the sector with the highest proportion of working 
children in Ethiopia (Heissler and Porter, 2013). Agricultural activities may be unsafe 
because they can entail the absorption of toxic pesticides, the use of harmful tools or 
the carrying of heavy loads (USDL, 2012).  
 
The effect of child labour on children’s health or education depends on many factors 
such as work schedule, hours worked and type of work20 (ILO, 2004; De Hoop and 
Rosati, 2014). Our calculations based on the most recent Ethiopian socioeconomic 
survey (ESS2, 2014) reveal that 44% of children aged between 7 and 17 years21 are 
involved in economic activities. Children who work dedicate on average 29 
hours/week to the labour market. Regarding human capital outcomes, 80% of 
children between 7 and 17 years old are enrolled in school while 11% of this age 
group have suffered from illness during the two months preceding the survey. That 
being said, it will be interesting to investigate if parental disability plays a role in the 
incidence of child labour in Ethiopia and whether it hinders child human capital 
accumulation. A better comprehension of the relationship between parental disability 
and the child outcomes of interest (child labour and human capital) in Ethiopia is 
crucial in order to inform the policies addressing child labour and children’s human 
capital accumulation.  
 
The contribution of this paper can be viewed from various perspectives. Firstly, this 
paper adds to the literature on the intergenerational effects of disability. In fact, our 
                                                        
19 According to the ILO, work is identified as hazardous if “ by its nature or the circumstances in 
which it is carried out, it is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children” (ILO, 2011). 
20 For example, one hour spent on fields per week can be harmful for: 1) child health if he is involved 
in tobacco production 2) child education if that activity is carried out at a time when the child is 
supposed to be at school. Thus, there is a need for more detailed information for an accurate analysis 
regarding child labour. Due to the lack of such detailed information in databases, existing studies (ours 
included) rely on economic or domestic activities done by children, regardless of their dangerousness, 
as a measure of child labour.  
21 Those aged between 7 and 17 years since questions about work are only asked of people who are at 
least 7 years old (there is no upper bound). 
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paper is the first to consider the effect of parental disability on a crucial component of 
child human capital ignored by previous studies: health. Furthermore, existing papers 
focus on the probability of a child being enrolled in school as a measure of child 
education. Such a measure can be misleading since being enrolled in school and 
attending classes are two different realities. In a country that has adopted free basic 
education like Ethiopia, it is not surprising to record a high enrolment rate; yet, this is 
not sufficient if it is not coupled with child attendance at school since the latter plays 
a major role in academic achievement. Moreover, a study conducted by UNICEF 
(2010) presents absenteeism as a cause of children’s low performance and repetition 
in Ethiopia. That being said, in this paper we consider absenteeism in addition to 
school enrolment.  
 
Secondly, by providing evidence that parental disability fosters child labour on the 
one hand and represents an obstacle to child human capital accumulation on the other 
hand, this paper provides insight into the factors that public authority can address in 
order to enhance the wellbeing of children and of the society overall.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a literature 
review. Section 3 introduces the source of data used in this study. Section 4 provides 
the methodology. Section 5 presents the results of our analysis and finally Section 6 
concludes. 
 
1.2.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
Little is known about the repercussions of parental disability on child labour, 
children’s educational and health outcomes. This may be explained by the fact that 
the economic literature concerned with the intergenerational effect of disability 
generally focuses on the situation of mothers with disabled children. Studies 
generally conclude that child disability represents a barrier to the labour supply of 
mothers (see Stabile and Allin, 2012, for a more complete literature review). Using 
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data from the USA, Powers (2001) finds a negative impact of child disability on 
maternal employment and the effect is stronger for single mothers. Wasi, van den 
Berg and Buchmueller’s (2012) study, based on an American sample, also 
corroborates this conclusion. Moreover, their results reveal that the effect is more 
pronounced when a disability deprives the child from the ability to take care of 
himself.  
 
Unlike the papers cited above, the analysis of Gupta, Das and Singh (2013) using 
Indian data shows that in urban areas, married mothers of a disabled child are more 
likely to work. According to the authors, this may be explained by the high cost 
(health expenditures included) of living in urban areas. When considering the 
intensive margin of labour supply, they find a negative relationship between this 
variable and child disability; that is, mothers of disabled children spend less time on 
the labour market. However, Gupta et al.’s results do not suggest any significant 
association between child disability and the labour supply behaviour of rural mothers. 
According to the authors, such a non-significant relationship is explained by two 
factors. Firstly, these women are generally involved in agricultural related tasks that 
can be done even with a child beside. Secondly, mothers can rely on their community 
networks (relatives or neighbours) to take care of their children when they are 
working.  
 
Studies focusing on the influence of parental disability on at least one of the 
outcomes of interest in this paper (child labour, education or health) are markedly 
scarce. Raccanello and Garduno (2012) analyse the relationship between parental 
impairments (visual, hearing, etc.) and two child-level outcomes in Mexico: child 
labour and education. Children in their study are aged between 14 and 17 years. 
Using a multinomial logistic22 model they find no evidence that parental impairments 
lead children to leave school in order to join the labour market. Actually, according to 
                                                        
22 Their dependent variable “activity” has 4 categories: 0 if the child neither attends school nor work 
(reference); 1 if the child works and attends school; 2 if the child only attends school; 3 if the child 
only works.  
 44 
the authors, children living with a disabled parent are more likely to drop out of 
school and become idle probably because of a lack of parental supervision. It is worth 
noting that they do not control for endogeneity in their study. Contrary to Raccanello 
and Garduno (2012), Mont and Nguyen (2013) exclude child labour from their 
analysis. Applying Two Stages Least Squares (2SLS) on a Vietnamese sample, they 
find that parental disability diminishes a child’s probability of being enrolled in 
school and of completing the number of grades expected. Furthermore, the effect is 
more pronounced when the disabled parent is the mother. They also find that in terms 
of schooling outcomes, boys are more affected than girls. They use parents’ age and 
the incidence of disability in the district as instruments for parental disability. 
However, the validity of their instruments are questionable. For instance, parental 
disability may not be the only channel through which parents’ age influences child 
school enrolment; indeed, parental age can affect child school outcomes through 
parents’ tastes and preferences that change across time. Regarding disability 
prevalence, districts with high disability prevalence may be mainly populated by 
fatalists who are not convinced of the necessity to invest in child human capital.  
 
Alam (2015) employs a fixed-effects model in his study. Here, disabled are those 
who declare that during the four weeks preceding the survey they were not able to 
conduct their usual tasks for at least one day because of health issues. This is another 
measure of disability found in the literature (Schultz and Tansel, 1997; Mitra et al., 
2016). His data come from four waves of a longitudinal survey conducted in the 
Kagera region of Tanzania (1991-1994) and children are those aged between 7 and 
15. Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates with child fixed effects, he finds 
that only father’s illness23 has a negative effect on child school enrolment. Long-term 
effects are also observed since children with a sick father are less likely to complete 
primary school and thus have fewer years of schooling. The effect of father disability 
on child education occurs through the decrease in household income that prevents the 
                                                        
23 It is worth recalling that in the literature, an illness that prevents someone from conducting his usual 
activities is considered as a disability (see Schultz and Tansel, 1997; Mitra et al., 2016). 
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family from affording school related expenses24. However, there is no evidence that a 
father’s illness leads children to reallocate their time from school to work. Only a 
mother’s illness pushes children to be involved in labour market activities. An 
attempt to understand if the effect of parental sickness differs depending on a child’s 
gender shows that there is no differential effect by child gender for education and 
child labour. 
  
Other existing papers interested in the impact of parental health on child labour or 
child human capital use measures of health shocks other than disabilities. A fixed 
effects model is also used by Bratti and Mendola (2014) who, unlike the previous 
studies, consider older children; that is those aged between 15-24 years in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. They do not find any effect of fathers’ health status on children’s 
outcomes. A person is considered as “ill” if he reports his health condition as poor or 
very poor (instead of excellent, good or fair) over the last 14 months. Their results 
show that only mothers’ health status has a significant impact on child outcomes; in 
other words, it decreases the probability that a child is enrolled in school and 
increases his probability of being employed.  
 
Dillon (2012) also uses child labour and schooling as regressands in his analysis but 
the main difference between his paper and the two previous studies lies in the fact 
that his explanatory variable is the health of any adult in the household including 
parents. His sample is composed of Malian children aged between 10 and 17 years. 
An adult is affected by a health shock if he has been unable to work at least one day 
during the previous month due to illness. He uses a fixed effects model and finds a 
positive relationship between adult male illness and the probability of a child being 
involved in childcare (of their younger siblings). According to the author, when men 
are sick in the household, women have to take care of them and substitute for male 
labour; thus they have less time for childcare. There is no evidence that an adult male 
                                                        
24 In his paper, he uses consumption expenditures as a proxy of  household income and finds that a 
father’s disability has a negative impact on household income. 
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illness increases the number of hours spent by a child in household enterprises. He 
also investigates time spent by children in different activities and finds that men’s 
illness increases hours in schooling and economic activities usually managed by 
women25. However, when women are sick, children spend more time on childcare, 
but there is no evidence of an effect of female illness on child educational outcomes. 
 
The remaining papers presented below are interested in only one of our child 
outcomes of interest, that is child labour or health. Using data from Bangladesh, 
Bazen and Salmon (2010) evaluate the effect of a father’s illness on child (5 to 14 
years old) and maternal work. People experiencing a health shock are those who 
suffered from a chronic disease during the last 12 months or experienced a medical 
treatment during the last 30 days. The authors apply a bivariate probit model and use 
a likehood ratio test to show that father’s health is exogenous26. They conclude that a 
father’s illness increases both child and maternal work. Kebede (2005) is concerned 
with the intergenerational transmission of health in Ethiopia. In his study, children are 
those who are 10 years old or younger and the analysis is carried out using a fixed 
effect model. His results do not show any evidence that income is the transmission 
mechanism between parental health (measured by height) and child health (measured 
by height-for-age z-scores). However, his findings reveal that the pathway between 
parental and child health is direct and explained by genetic inheritance. The 
importance of genetic transmission mechanisms for intergenerational health (health 
measures are asthma, severe headaches, diabetes and hay fever) persistence is 
corroborated by Thompson’s (2014) research on Americans who are at most 17 years 
old.  
 
To summarize this literature review, there is evidence that parental disability may 
represent a barrier to child human capital accumulation on the one hand, and increase 
child labour on the other hand. However, the effect may depend on the gender of the 
                                                        
25 The author does not explain why men’s illness has a positive effect on children’s education though 
such a finding seems paradoxal. 
26 However, the reliability of such a test is questionable (Teele, 2014). 
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disabled parent. It is worth noting that existing papers do consider child health though 
it is a crucial component of human capital. Moreover, school absenteeism is not 
investigated despite its incontestable role in school achievement.  
 
A formal summary of hypotheses drawn from the existing literature (Ravallion and 
Wodon, 2000; Edmonds, 2003; Khanam, 2004) is presented in what follows. Let us 
assume that the household is only composed of parents and their children. Parents’ 
utility U depends on the amount of health related goods and services H consumed by 
the household. A disability shock leads to an increase of H, so that H=H(D). H is 
composed of two elements: H=Hp+Hc. Hc corresponds to the amount of health 
related goods and services consumed by children while Hp corresponds to the amount 
of health related goods and services consumed by parents. U also depends on the 
level of children’s human capital; that is, their health (hc) and education (ec). The 
other factors that determine U are the household’s consumption of non-health/non-
education related goods and services (C) and unobservable variables k, such as their 
social network, that may influence parents’ utility. A child’s health hc depends on Hc, 
C, and unobservable factors g such as accidents. Regarding child education or 
knowledge ec, its level depends on the time dedicated by the child to studies S (so that 
an increase in S has a positive impact on ec) and unobservable factors b like child’s 
skills. That being said, parents’ utility function can be written as follows: 
 
U=U (Hp, hc, ec, C, k)        
Since   hc=h(Hc, C, g) and  ec=e(S, b),  U can be written:   
U=U (Hp, Hc, S, C, k)   or     U=U (H(D), S, C, k)  
 
Let us assume that we are in a context where education is free27 so that parents do not 
have to spend money when it comes to child education. The household’s budget 
constraint can be written as follows: 
                                                        
27 Ethiopia is characterised by free education in primary and secondary school.  For simplication, in 
our model, we assume that there are no school related expenditures  e.g. uniforms, etc.  
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 𝐶 +  𝐻𝑝 + 𝐻𝑐 = 𝑌 + 𝑊 
 
In the equation presented above, Y represents income provided by parents while W is 
the time dedicated by children to economic activities. and wages have been 
normalised to one.  
If we assume that a child’s time is only divided into three components, that is 
economic activities (W), domestic activities (V) and education (S), we will obtain the 
following time constraint for children: W + V + S = 1, where the total time is 
normalized to one. The combination of the budget and the time constraints produces 
the following equation: 
 C + Hp + Hc + S + V = Y + 1. The household’s problem can be stated as: 
 
Max  U=U (Hp, Hc, S, C, k)              subject to: C + Hp + Hc + S + V = Y + 1 
The signs of the first order conditions for Hp, Hc, S and C respectively are the 
following.  
 𝜕𝑈𝜕𝐻𝑝 > 0; 𝜕𝑈𝜕𝐻𝑐 > 0; 𝜕𝑈𝜕𝑆 > 0; 𝜕𝑈𝜕𝐶 > 0 
 
In its pure investment theory, Grossman (1972) stipulates that a poor health affects 
people’s labour supply and thus income. In extension, disability 28 D has a negative 
impact on parental income Y.  
 𝜕𝑌𝜕𝐷 < 0 
Furthermore, in line with the theoretical framework proposed by Mitra et al. (2016), a 
health shock should leads to an increase in household health expenditures and reduces 
the amount of financial resources available for consumption of non-health related 
                                                        
28 D may be viewed as the severity of disability; it is a continuous variable that varies between 0 and 1, 
so that for a non-disabled person D=0. 
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goods and services. Let denotes H the total health expenditures at the household level. 
H=Hc + Hp. Thus, a parental disability (D) will increase H through an augmentation 
of Hp.  In order to cope with the increase of Hp and a decrease of Y (in line with 
Grossman’s model), the household will reduce its investment in child health (ie Hc 
will decrease). Furthermore, children will dedicate more time to work (see 
substitutability and luxury axioms) and reduce the time dedicated to education  S (see 
the time constraint). That is:   𝜕𝐻𝑐𝜕𝐷 < 0 ;  𝜕𝑆𝜕𝐷 < 0 . Thus the effects on hc and ec are:  
 𝜕ℎ𝑐𝜕𝐷 = 𝜕ℎ𝑐𝜕𝐻𝑐 . 𝜕𝐻𝑐𝜕𝐷 < 0 ;  𝜕𝑒𝑐𝜕𝐷 = 𝜕𝑒𝑐𝜕𝑆 . 𝜕𝑆𝜕𝐷 < 0  
 
In line with the luxury and the substitution axioms, parental and child work are 
substitutable but since parents are supposed to be altruist (Basu and Van, 1998), their 
offspring is involved in child labour only if there is no better alternative29. Thus, there 
is a positive relationship between parental disability and child involvement in 
economic (W) and domestic (V) activities.  
        𝜕𝑊𝜕𝐷 > 0; 𝜕𝑉𝜕𝐷 > 0 
 
The signs (of the derivations) presented above are those obtain whether D represents 
a father’s disability or a mother’s disability. According to Becker’s theory on gender 
division of tasks (Becker, 1985), domestic activities in households are mainly carried 
out by females so that they spend less time in the labour market compared to males. 
Thus, in households, males are those who spend more time in the labour market and 
thus are the main household bread-winner.  
That being said, we expect paternal disability to have more negative effect than 
maternal disability on households’ income Y and child human capital (hc and ec). We 
                                                        
29 Thay may also be due to the fact that parents are not aware of  the  potential negative effect of child  
labour on their children’s lives.  
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denote paternal and maternal disability DP and DM  respectively, in absolute terms we 
can write: 
 | 𝜕𝑌𝜕𝐷𝑃| > | 𝜕𝑌𝜕𝐷𝑀|;  |𝜕ℎ𝑐 𝜕𝐻𝑐 . 𝜕𝐻 𝜕𝐷𝑃| > |𝜕ℎ𝑐 𝜕𝐻𝑐 . 𝜕𝐻 𝜕𝐷𝑀|;   |𝜕𝑒𝑐𝜕𝑆 . 𝜕𝑆𝜕𝐷𝑃| > |𝜕𝑒𝑐𝜕𝑆 . 𝜕𝑆𝜕𝐷𝑀| 
 
In accordance with the theories of gender division of tasks and the axioms of luxury 
and substitution, we expect children to be more involved in economic activities when 
the father becomes disabled than when the mother becomes disabled. However, a 
mother’s disability pushes children to be more involved in domestic activities than a 
father’s disability does. That is: 
 | 𝜕𝑊𝜕𝐷𝑃| > | 𝜕𝑊𝜕𝐷𝑀|;  | 𝜕𝑉𝜕𝐷𝑃| < | 𝜕𝑉𝜕𝐷𝑀| 
 
We will now talk about the effects of parental disability on children depending on the 
gender of both the parent and the child. As highlighted by the theory of gender 
division of task, girls are more likely to be involved in domestic activities than boys 
do. Thus, following paternal or maternal disability, boys will be more involved in 
economic activities than their sisters, but the opposite will be observed when it comes 
to domestic activities. We denote WG and VG the time dedicated by girls to economic 
and domestic activities respectively. By the same token, WB and VB correspond to 
time boys spend in the labour market and doing chores respectively. We will have: 
    |𝜕𝑊𝐺𝜕𝐷𝑃 | < |𝜕𝑊𝐵𝜕𝐷𝑃 |;  |𝜕𝑊𝐺𝜕𝐷𝑀| < |𝜕𝑊𝐵𝜕𝐷𝑀|;  |𝜕𝑉𝐺𝜕𝐷𝑃| > |𝜕𝑉𝐵𝜕𝐷𝑃|;  |𝜕𝑉𝐺𝜕𝐷𝑀| > |𝜕𝑉𝐵𝜕𝐷𝑀| 
 
The pure investment theory highlights the fact that investment in human capital 
depends, like any asset, on its return (Delelegn, 2007). This statement corroborates 
the human capital theory (Becker, 1960; Becker and Lewis, 1973) which states that 
parents invest in their children’s human capital because of the returns it is associated 
with. For example, children with a higher level of human capital will be more likely 
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to receive higher earnings in the future. However, due to the gender division of tasks 
mentioned above, boys are more likely than girls to get higher earnings in the future. 
That being said, parents will attach more importance to boys’ human capital 
accumulation than girls’ human capital accumulation; resources and time dedicated to 
human capital accumulation will then be lower for girls compared to boys. Let eG and 
hG denote girls education and health respectively, while eB  and hB correspond to boys 
education and health respectively. In what follows, D represents either paternal 
disability or maternal disability. We can write: 
 |𝜕𝑒𝐺𝜕𝑆𝐺 . 𝜕𝑆𝐺𝜕𝐷 | > |𝜕𝑒𝐵𝜕𝑆𝐵 . 𝜕𝑆𝐵𝜕𝐷 |; |𝜕ℎ𝐺𝜕𝐻𝐺 . 𝜕𝐻𝐺𝜕𝐷 | > |𝜕ℎ𝐵𝜕𝐻𝐵 . 𝜕𝐻𝐵𝜕𝐷 |  
 
It is worth noting that factors like household size, child age and natural disasters may 
have an effect on children outcomes. Households with large size or those who are 
affected by natural disasters are more likely to be poor, thus children living in these 
households are more likely to be put to work and to receive less human capital 
investment. Regarding child age, the older the child, the higher his probability to 
work and the lower his chances to benefit from human capital investment.  
 
The first hypothesis we aim at testing in our analysis is that, due to the drop in 
income following a parental disability onset, children will be more likely to work and 
less likely to attend school or to be healthy. Furthermore, the effect of paternal 
disability will be more pronounced than that of maternal disability. The second 
hypothesis to be tested is that girls’ human capital will be more affected than that of 
boys following a parental disability onset. Moreover, a child assignment to a specific 
type of work will depend on his gender. Following, the literature review, the next 
section will be dedicated to the presentation of the source of data used for our 
analysis. 
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1.3.   SOURCE OF DATA  
The Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey is used to analyse the impact of parental 
disability on child outcomes. These are panel data consisting of two waves (ESS1 and 
ESS2). The first wave (2011/2012) is representative of rural and small town areas in 
the country and is composed of 3969 households. In order for the data to provide 
inference for all of Ethiopia, an urban sample supplement was added to the ESS1 to 
produce the ESS2 (2013/2014) that contains information collected from 5262 
households. Thus, panel data available for our study are mostly composed of people 
living in the rural area where more than two-thirds (70%30) of PWDs are located31. 
Information used in this study was collected during the post harvest period, that is 
between January and March 2012 for the 1st wave (Central Statistical Agency, 2013) 
and from January to February 2014 for the second wave (Central Statistical Agency, 
2015). There is a two-year gap between the waves used for our study. For household 
members who are 10 years old or younger, the survey questions are asked of the 
caregivers. Questions related to market or domestic work concern only people aged 7 
and above. Therefore, our sample of children consists of those aged between 7 and 17 
years32; this upper bound is in accordance with the one adopted by UNICEF when 
defining a child.  
 
The available information about disability in surveys generally comes from self-
declarations. Self-reported disability measures may be criticised because of their 
subjective nature that can lead to measurement error (Oguzoglu, 2012). In fact, socio-
economic characteristics may influence how people evaluate their health. Moesgaard, 
Iburg, Salomon, Tandon and Murray  (2002) for instance conclude that given the 
same level of physician-assessed mobility, women are more likely than men to report 
functional limitations. They also find that compared to poor people, wealthy people 
                                                        
30 Statistics calculated by the author based on ESS2. 
31 Only households living in rural and small towns can be followed during the two waves. So the urban 
area in our sample corresponds to small towns.  
32 That is, we keep only children who can be followed during the 2 waves and who are at least 7 years 
old in the first wave and at most 17 years old in the second wave.  
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have a higher propensity of reporting mobility issues. Disability measures are 
considered as objective when the information about functional limitations comes 
from medical professionals. However, in the absence of objective measures in many 
developing country databases, the use of self-evaluated disability becomes the only 
alternative for a researcher (Mitra, Posarac and Vick, 2013). 
 
In order to check the disability status of respondents, the set of questions 
recommended by the Washington Group on Disability Statistics33 are included in the 
Ethiopian questionnaire. Interviewers are asked to mark one of a set of 4 answers (1- 
No difficulty; 2- Yes, some difficulty; 3- Yes, a lot of difficulty; 4-Cannot perform 
activity at all) after each of the following 6 questions: 1-Do you have difficulty 
seeing, even if you are wearing glasses? 2-Do you have difficulty hearing, even if you 
are wearing a hearing aid? 3-Do you have difficulty walking or climbing steps? 4-Do 
you have difficulty remembering or concentrating? 5-Do you have difficulty (with 
self-care such as) washing all over or dressing, feeding, toileting etc? 6-Using your 
usual language, do you have difficulty communicating; for example understanding or 
being understood?  Following, Mitra and Sambamoothi (2008) and Mont and Nguyen 
(2013), people in our study are considered as non-disabled if their answers following 
all the 6 questions are “No difficulty”, otherwise they belong to the PWDs group.  
 
It is worth noting that when questions like “Do you have a disability” or “Do you 
have a hearing, speech, visual, mobility, and mental disability?” are used as disability 
screening questions in surveys, the assessed prevalence of disability in developing 
countries is low (Palmer and Harley, 2011). Under-reporting may be explained by the 
fact that the term disability carries a stigma. Thus, people tend to deny their disability 
or to hide the fact that they have a disabled relative (Hari, 2016). For example, in 
Zambia, the prevalence of disability changes from 1% when the question is “Do you 
have a disability” to 13% if the Washington Group’ s questions are used (Palmer and 
                                                        
33  “The Washington Group on Disability Statistics was set up by the United Nations Statistical 
Commission in 2001 as an international, consultative group of experts to facilitate the measurement of 
disability and the comparison of data on disability across countries”.  (WHO, 2011; p.26) 
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Harley, 2011); a disability prevalence of 1% is purely unrealistic in the context of a 
developing country. That being said, the United Nations recommend the use of this 
latter measure rather than the former for disability assessment in censuses and 
surveys.  However, it is worth highlighting that the health status assessed using the 
Washington Group’s questions may be anything but a temporary disability. For 
example, if during the a survey a tetraplegic (identified as X) is asked: “Do you have 
difficulty walking or climbing steps?”, his answer will be: “Unable to do it at all”. If 
the question is asked to someone (identified as Y) who is bedridden because of 
Malaria, for example, he too will answer: “Unable to do it at all”. Despite the fact that 
answers provided by X and Y are both correct, it appears that only X is a permanent 
disabled person while Y is suffering from a temporary disability due to poor health 
conditions. However, X and Y will both be recorded as “disabled person” in the 
database generated from the survey questionnaires. Therefore, it clearly appears that 
additional questions need to be added to questionnaires in order to differentiate 
“permanent disabled” from “temporary disabled” individuals. In this research work, 
we will rely on the Washington Group’s questions despite their limitations due to the 
lack of a better measure such as disability assessment by the medical staff.  
 
Survey questions about time use provide information on market work as well as 
domestic work. Children are considered as being involved in domestic activities if 
they spent any time collecting water or firewood the day preceding the enquiry. It 
would have been interesting to include other components of domestic work (such as 
childcare, cooking, cleaning the house, doing laundry, etc); unfortunately, the 
database does not include this information. A longer time horizon is asked of market 
work related questions in the survey. Information collected here is the number of 
hours spent, by children, doing each of the following activities during the seven days 
preceding the survey: household agricultural activities (including livestock and 
fishing-related activities whether for sale or for household use), running non-
agricultural household business for himself or the household, paid work, part-
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time/temporary work. People who dedicated any time to at least one of these 
activities are included in the “workers” group.  
 
In order to capture the effect of parental disability on child human capital, we 
consider 3 binary dependent variables: school enrolment, school absence and health 
issues. The variable “school enrolment” is coded 1 if the child is enrolled in school 
and 0 otherwise34. For those who are enrolled in school, there is a question in the 
survey that allows us to know if children were absent (school absence=1) from school 
for more than one week during the month preceding the survey. Finally, there is a 
question regarding whether people have faced any health problem during the two 
months preceding the survey (health issues=1). The methodology used to analyse our 
data is presented in the following section. 
1.4.   METHODOLOGY 
Consider the specification below that presents the relationship between parental 
disability and child outcomes. Here, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable (work, education or 
health) representing the situation of child i at time t35.  𝛽0  is the constant term, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2  are coefficients associated with the father’s disability status and the mother’s 
disability status respectively. 𝛾 is the vector of coefficients associated with the 
controls. DF=1 if the father is disabled and 0 otherwise36. In the same manner, DM=1 
if the mother is disabled and 0 otherwise. X is a set of controls that include household 
size, the child’s age group and a dummy variable for natural shocks. This latter 
variable indicates if, during the 12 months preceding the survey, the child’s 
household has been affected by a natural disaster likely to be harmful to their 
                                                        
34 The question is: “Are you currently attending school? ”  
35 It is possible that the dependent variable suffers from measurement errors as well, for example there 
may be the tendancy to underreport hours worked by children. As stated by Davidson and Mackinnon 
(2004), measurement error in the dependent variable is generally of no great consequence. In fact, 
measurement error in the dependent variable will increase the variance of the error terms  and this is 
generally not a serious problem. However, measurement error in the independent variables lead to both 
an increase in the variance of the error term as well as the correlation between the independent variable 
and the error term. 
 
36 D is not viewed as a continious variable anymore but as a binary variable.  
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agricultural production (drought, flood, landslides/avalanches, heavy rains preventing 
work, other crops damage). 𝜇𝑖 represents child fixed effects (individual unobservable 
characteristics that are time-invariant such as gender, genetic endowment or ability) 
while  𝜆𝑡 corresponds to time fixed effects (factors unobservable, by the researcher, 
that influence everyone in a specific area at a given time such as policies). 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the 
idiosyncratic error term ie unobservable characteristics that change over time and 
across individuals.  
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1  𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2  𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡  + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Our strategy consists of running fixed-effects regression using Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS). This allows us to control for child fixed effects 𝜇𝑖 as well as time fixed effects  𝜆𝑡 as stated above. However, this method has some limits. The first drawback is its 
inability to control for unobservable heterogeneity that changes across individuals 
and through time. Secondly, the estimation of a coefficient is possible only if the 
associated regressor varies across time. For example, the effect of children’s gender 
on their education cannot be estimated because a child’s gender does not vary over 
time. By the same token, we can estimate the effect of DF on Y only if paternal 
disability status varies over years. Since we do not have a better alternative, we rely 
on the fixed effects model despite its drawback.   
 
OLS with robust standard errors are used to estimate our regressions whether the 
dependent variable is continuous (eg: hours worked) or discrete (eg: probability of 
work). Two arguments are generally made against the use of OLS when the 
dependent variable is binary. The first drawback is the presence of heteroscedasticity 
in the regression. However, this problem can be addressed with robust standard 
errors. The second flaw is that the predicted probability can be outside of the 0-1 
interval. However, the OLS method allows easier interpretation of coefficients than 
logit/probit (Ashraf, 2009). Since the advantages of the OLS method outweigh its 
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disadvantages in our opinion, we will use it in this study. Results of our analysis are 
presented below. 
1.5.   RESULTS 
In this section we present the descriptive statistics as well as the results we got from 
our estimations.  
1.5.1.   Descriptive statistics  
 
The descriptive statistics presented here are based on the first wave of the Ethiopian 
panel composed of 1997 observations37 (Table 1.1). While 16% of the children live 
with a disabled father, 9% have a disabled mother38 . It is worth noting that the 
possibility of an underestimation of the proportion of disabled people in the Ethiopian 
survey cannot be excluded. As stated by Getachew (2011), many people hide or never 
declare a disability because of the stigma associated with such a health condition in 
Ethiopian society. It would have been interesting to disaggregate our sample of 
PWDs, that is generating subsamples according to the type and/or the severity of 
disability. However, our sample of disabled people is not large enough to allow this 
kind of analysis in the present study.  
 
As shown in table 1.1 below, 28% and 34% of children of our sample are teenagers 
(13 to 17 years old) respectively in the first and the second wave. 54% of the children 
have worked (economic activities) during the week preceding the survey, but this 
statistic corresponds to 56% in the second wave. The average number of hours 
worked per week among children rises from 11 to 13 during the two waves; however, 
when we consider only those who work that statistic corresponds to 21 and 25 hours 
                                                        
37 Actually, 3023 children aged from 7 to 17, and living with both of their biological parents could be 
followed through waves; however, we could not keep them all for our analysis due to missing data. For 
example, in the first wave, information about school enrolment status is missing for 801 children. We 
restrict our sample to biological parents/children because, as stated by Case, Paxson and Ableidinger 
(2004), a parent’s altruistic behaviour may depend on the relatedness to the child; that is, he may prefer 
investing in his biological child than an adopted one.  
38 Decomposition by type of disability is presented in Appendixes 1 and 2. 
 58 
respectively. We notice that hours worked are mainly dedicated to agriculture. 
According to our data, during the first wave, working children spend on average 19 
hours/week in the agricultural sector, this is 90% of time spent in economic 
activities 39 . This figure corresponds to 23 hours/week during the second wave. 
During the first wave and the second wave respectively, 45% and 44% of children 
have been involved in water/firewood collection during the day preceding the survey 
and the time spent doing these chores (for those who have effectively been involved) 
is about two hours on average. Concerning educational outcomes, during the first 
wave, 93% of children attend school and 13% of those students have been absent 
from school for more than one week during the month preceding the interview. These 
statistics correspond to 90% and 15% respectively during the second wave. This high 
level of school enrolment is probably explained by the free-fee policy in place since 
1994 for grades one through ten in Ethiopia (World Bank, 2009; Chicoine, 2016). 
Regarding health, the proportion of children with health issues during the two months 
preceding the survey is 13% during the first wave and 15% during the second wave. 
The average household size is seven during both waves. During the first and the 
second wave respectively, 22% and 15% of the children in the sample live in 
households that have been affected by a natural disaster during the 12 months 
preceding the survey. It is worth noting that 90% of the children in our sample live in 
rural areas while 10% are located in small towns whatever the wave considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
39 That is, the remaining 10% is dedicated economic activities other than agriculture.  
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Table 1. 1 
 Descriptive statistics (sample of children) 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 
Variables Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Work 
1=work during the 7 last days 
0=otherwise 
0.541 0.498 0.558 0.470 
Hours work 
Hours worked during the 7 last days (hours>0) 
20.379 14.732 24.456 18.353 
Hours worked during the 7 last days  
(hours≥ 0) 
11.106 14.885 12.830 17.670 
Hours work (agriculture) 
Hours worked during the 7 last days  
(hours in agriculture>0) 
19.419 14.480 23.048 17.713 
Hours worked during the 7 last days  
(hours in agriculture≥ 0) 
9.325 13.957 10.982 16.934 
Chore 
1=wood or water collection yesterday  
0=otherwise 
0.451 0.498 0.443 0.394 
Hours chore 
Hours dedicated to wood/water collection yesterday 
 (hours>0) 
1.899 3.326 1.828 1.537 
Hours dedicated to wood/water collection yesterday 
 (hours≥0) 
.857 2.425 0.352 0.986 
School enrolment 
1=currently attending school 
0=otherwise 
0.930 0.255 0.899 0.338 
School absence 
1=absent from school last month for more than a 
week 
0=otherwise  
0.126 0.332 0.156 0.230 
Health issues 
1= any health problem during the last 2 months 
0=otherwise 
0.131 0.338 0.154 0.305 
Disabled mother  
1=mother is disabled 
0=otherwise 
0.0936 0.291 0.215 0.257 
Disabled father 
1=father is disabled 
0=otherwise 
0.163 0.369 0.346 0.336 
Teenager 
1=[13-17] 
0=[7-12]  
0.279 0.449 0.342 0.500 
Household size 7.143 1.837 7.178 1.908 
Natural shock 
1=household affected by a natural phenomenon  
0=otherwise 
0.216 0.412 0.149 0.356 
Rural  
1=lives in rural area  
0=lives in a small town 
0.903 0.296 0.903 0.296 
Observations 1997  1997  
 
Sample of children aged between 7 and 17.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
 60 
1.5.2.   Regressions  
 
In our sample, 234 and 366 children have a mother and a father respectively who 
experience a disability onset between the two waves. Information available in the 
dataset does not allow us to identify the causes of the disability onset. Furthermore, as 
stated previously, what we call “disability” may be an illness that must not be 
categorised as “permanent disability”. However, we do not have a better disability 
measure and throughout our text we will use the expression “disability onset” to 
identify the observed disease onset. It is worth noting that when we jointly use such a 
measure and a fixed effects model for our analysis, our results may reflect the impact 
of the onset of a temporary disability due to poor health conditions (other than a 
permanent disability) on the outcomes of interest. Thus, we shall keep this in mind 
while interpreting our results.  
 
Effects on child work 
 
The estimation of our regressions shows that having a mother who experiences a 
disability onset increases the likehood for a child to be involved in economic 
activities (table 1.2, column 1). In fact, compared to children whose mother does not 
experience a disability onset, children with a disabled mother have a 9 percentage 
point (pp) higher probability of work (the coefficient is significant at the 10% level). 
Regarding the intensive margin of work, we find that when a mother becomes 
disabled, the number of hours dedicated by her child to economic activities is higher 
than those of his peers whose mother does not experience a disability onset between 
the two waves. In fact, when we consider the entire sample, we notice that children 
whose mothers become disabled spend 3 extra hours/week doing economic activities 
(column 2); this figure doubles when the analysis is restricted to those who have been 
involved in economic activities during both waves (column 3). However, a father’s 
disability onset does not have an impact on child implication in market work.  
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Table 1. 2 
Effect of parental disability onset on child market and domestic work 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Work H_W (H≥0) 
H_W 
(H>0) Chore 
H_C 
(H≥0) 
H_C 
(H>0) 
Disabled 
mother  0.0895
+ 3.064* 6.266* -0.0109 0.0917 -0.567 
 (0.0475) (1.543) (2.600) (0.0431) (0.241) (1.124) 
Disabled  
Father 0.00893 -0.518 -0.910 -0.0132 -0.260 -0.844 
 (0.0424) (1.487) (2.783) (0.0317) (0.180) (0.793) 
Household  
Size -0.00964 0.484 0.803 -0.0230
+ -0.0196 -0.223 
 (0.0150) (0.456) (0.792) (0.0137) (0.0528) (0.211) 
Teenager 0.0380 0.255 0.850 -0.0203 0.0928 0.211 
 (0.0304) (0.963) (1.948) (0.0286) (0.109) (0.405) 
Natural  
Shock 0.0131 -0.509 -0.597 0.0250 0.0603 0.360 
 (0.0337) (1.124) (1.989) (0.0292) (0.148) (0.426) 
Constant 0.648** 6.795* 11.84* 0.872** 1.521** 4.772* 
 (0.111) (3.434) (5.738) (0.102) (0.420) (1.923) 
Observations 3994 3994 1212 3994 3994 464 
R2 0.011 0.005 0.043 0.165 0.040 0.049 
Variation a 
234 M 
366 F 
234 M  
366 F 
76 M  
108 F 
234 M  
366 F 
234 M  
366 F 
35M 
50F 
H_W= hours dedicated to economic activities; H_C= hours dedicated to chores 
Variation a: number of children whose mother (M) or father (F) experiences a disability onset between 
the two waves.  
Child fixed effects estimations. Time fixed effects are included in the regressions. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed after correcting for correlation and 
heteroskedasticity within household clusters.+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
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Therefore, contrary to the hypothesis presented in our literature review, an eventual 
substitutability between parental and child work is not automatic; it depends on the 
gender of the parent. Our results corroborate those of Alam (2015) who found that 
only the female parent’s disability onset has an effect on child work. In accordance 
with Diamond and Fayed (1998) or Limat (2010), such results suggest that between 
the two parents, an eventual substitutability exists only between child and mother 
market work.  
 
Contrary to the predictions drawn from the existing literature, there is no evidence of 
an impact of parental disability onset on a child’s involvement in chores (column 4 to 
6). These results suggest that collecting water or wood are activities generally carried 
out by children whether their parents are disabled or not40.  
 
While the fixed effect model relies on the assumption that there is a correlation 
between  𝜇𝑖 and the explanatory variables, the random effects model assumes that 
such a correlation does not exist (ie the covariance between  𝜇𝑖  and the explanatory 
variables is equal to zero). Thus, a random effects model is suitable for our analysis if 
we are sure that there is no correlation between  𝜇𝑖  and the explanatory variables. 
When we analyse our sample using a random effects model (Appendix 1.3) we 
observe that the effect of maternal disability onset on hours worked that was 
significant when we relied on a fixed effects model become non significant. This 
result suggests that there is a mis-specification of the model when we rely on a 
random effects model41.  
 
In order to check the robustness of our results, we exclude (from our sample) children 
whose parents were disabled during the two waves; that is, the “control” group is 
                                                        
40  Results obtained when we exclude children whose parents have difficulties 
concentrating/remembering (which can be viewed as mental disability; thus we only consider physical 
disability) are presented in appendixes 1.3 and 1.4 and show that, in general, the conclusion does not 
change.  
41 We did a Hausman test that leads us to reject the null hypothesis that the unobserved individual 
fixed effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. The level of significance is 5%.  
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only composed of children whose parents are “non-disabled” during both waves one 
and two. We observe that the coefficients associated with hours worked are close to 
the ones observed in table 1.2 while the coefficient associated with the probability of 
work increases slightly. Furthermore, there is no statistically significant difference 
between these coefficients and those observed in table 1.2 (the threshold of the test is 
5%). Thus, these results42 corroborate the conclusions drawn from table 1.2; that is, 
only a mother’s disability onset contributes to an increase in children’s labour supply.  
 
We also use an alternative measure43 of disability. As Alam (2015), we consider that 
disabled parents are those who have been absent from their usual activities for at least 
one day due to health issues44. Our results, presented in Appendix 1.5 corroborate the 
finding that only maternal disability onset has an effect on child work. Actually, the 
coefficient associated with the intensive margin of labour supply are close to the ones 
obtained in table 1.2 while the coefficient associated with the extensive margin of 
labour supply is non significant. 
 
Effects on child human capital 
 
When it comes to child human capital, we observe that, contrary to the prediction of 
the existing literature, parental disability onset does not necessarily hinder child 
human capital accumulation. In fact, the analysis of the impact of parental health 
shocks on child human capital reveals that there is no evidence that parental disability 
onset has an impact on school enrolment (Table 1.3, column 1). This would be 
because school enrolment is free for students in primary and secondary school in 
                                                        
42 See Appendix 1.5. 
43  Although we present results obtained with this alternative measure, it is worth noting that in 
accordance with the Washington Group on Disability Statistics, this measure is not the recommended 
one when it comes to analysing disability in the context of developing countries. Therefore, in this 
paper we emphasise the measure of disability presented in the first instance.  
44 The question is: “For how many days were you absent from your usual activity due to the health 
problem during the last two months?” 
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Ethiopia45 or because we do not have enough power with these data to identify a 
possible impact. In fact, we conducted a power test and found that the minimal size 
(given the observed means and standard deviations) required to detect a difference in 
the school enrolment of children with a disabled mother and those with a non-
disabled mother is 977 (for each of these two groups). The power of test is 90% and 
we rely on a 5%-level test. Concerning paternal disability, the minimal size required 
is 1507 observations per group.  
 
However, we find that the probability of being absent from school or having health 
issues increases for children whose fathers experience a disability onset while the 
coefficients associated with mother’s disability onset are non significant (columns 2 
and 3). In our sample, children whose fathers do not experience a disability onset 
have a 6pp lower risk of being absent from school than their counterparts. Thus, 
while in our literature review we predicted that both maternal disability and paternal 
disability onset would have a negative effect on child education and child health, the 
results of our regressions reveal that only a father’s disability has such a negative 
impact.  
 
Concerning the impact on health (column 3), our results show that the probability of 
being exposed to illness is 8pp higher for children whose fathers become disabled. 
Our results also reveal that children whose household has been exposed to a natural 
disaster are more likely to miss school46.   
 
 
 
                                                        
45 We also used the alternative measure of disability to assess the effect on child human capital, but we 
got unexpected results. For example, we found that  parental disability onset prevents school 
enrolment. It is difficult to believe  that  a child will not be enrolled in school (in a context where 
education is free) because his parent refrained from working for three days (in our data, this 
corresponds to the average number of days a parent has stopped working due to an illness) for 
example.  
46 Our conclusion regarding the effect of parental disability onset on child outcomes does not change 
when we rely on a logit model with fixed effects (Appendixes 1.6 and 1.7). 
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Table 1. 3  
Effect of parental disability onset on child human capital 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 School enrolment School absence Health issues 
Disabled 
mother  -0.0214 -0.0193 0.0144 
 (0.0321) (0.0370) (0.0395) 
Disabled 
father -0.0335 0.0606
* 0.0838** 
 (0.0250) (0.0278) (0.0285) 
Household 
size -0.000413 0.00423 0.000986 
 (0.00814) (0.00919) (0.00873) 
Teenager -0.0130 -0.0115 -0.00622 
 (0.0176) (0.0209) (0.0217) 
Natural  
shock 0.00546 0.0589
** 0.0353 
 (0.0190) (0.0209) (0.0218) 
Constant 1.003** 0.130+ 0.123+ 
 (0.0581) (0.0686) (0.0658) 
Observations 3994 3312 3994 
R2 0.032 0.038 0.013 
Variation a 234 M 
366 F 
186 M 
292 F 
234 M 
366 F 
Variation a: number of children whose mother (M) or father (F) experiences a disability onset between 
the two waves.  
Only those who are enrolled in school are asked the question regarding school absence.  
Child fixed effects estimations. Time fixed effects are included in the regressions.  
Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed after correcting for correlation  
and heteroskedasticity within household clusters.+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
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An analysis of our sample using a random effects model (Appendix 1.4) shows that, 
contrary to what we observed with a fixed effects model, paternal disability onset has 
a negative effect on school enrolment and no effect on school absence. These results 
suggest that there is a mis-specification of the model when we ignore the presence of 
any potential endogeneity47.  
 
In an attempt to test the robustness of our analysis, we retain only children whose 
parents are non-disabled during both waves as our “control group”. Our results48 
show that the coefficients obtained are close to those presented in table 1.3 and 
confirm the finding that only a father’s disability onset affects children’s human 
capital accumulation. Moreover, no effect is observed on school enrolment whatever 
the gender of the parent.  
 
As stated above, the fixed effects method has some drawbacks.49 However, we can at 
least discuss the direction of the bias introduced by endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2010; 
Greene, 2012). If parental disability status is measured with error there is an 
underestimation of the effect of parental disability (D) on child outcomes except for 
school enrolment (table 1.4, row 1).  
 
Regarding the other source of endogeneity, suppose the omitted variable is the 
intertemporal-discount rate (IDR). If this latter factor was observable and our model 
included no control variables aside from our measure of disability, the regression 
model would have been:   
 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 =  𝛽𝑎 + 𝛽𝑏  𝐷 + 𝛽𝑐  𝐼𝐷𝑅 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟  
                                                        
47 We did a Hausman test that confirms that the fixed effects model is more appropriated for our 
analysis than the random effects model. The level of significance is 5%. 
48 Appendix 1.5. 
49 We also used an instrumental variable method; here, in accordance with Mont and Nguyen (2013), a 
parent’s disability status is instrumented by his age and the prevalence of disability at the district level. 
Results do not show any evidence of the impact of parental disability on child outcomes (Appendixes 
1.8 and 1.9); however it is worth noting, as highlighted previously, that the validity of the instruments 
used is questionable. 
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Since we did not include IDR in our model, the value of ?̂?𝑏in tables 1.2 and 1.3 has 
the form: 
 𝐸(?̂?𝑏) =  𝛽𝑏  +  𝛽𝑐  ∗  [𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝐷, 𝐼𝐷𝑅) 𝑣𝑎𝑟⁄ (𝐷)] 
 
The direction of the bias depends on the signs of 𝛽𝑐  and  𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐷, 𝐼𝐷𝑅). Since parents 
with high intertemporal-discount rate are less likely to invest in their children, we 
expect 𝛽𝑐  to be positive for all child outcomes except school enrolment. 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐷, 𝐼𝐷𝑅) 
will be positive as well since parents with a high intertemporal-discount rate may 
have health-damaging habits making them more likely to suffer from a disability. 
That being said, the value of ?̂?𝑏 in tables 1.2 and 1.3 overstates the effect of parental 
disability onset on all child outcomes except school enrolment if IDR is the omitted 
variable. However, since in our regression controls are included, we are not able to 
identify the direction of the bias (table 1.4, row 2).   
 
To summarize, the direction of the final bias introduced by measurement errors and 
the omitted variable is unknown.  
 
Table 1. 4 
 Direction of the bias 
   School  
  Work Enrolment Absence Health Issues 
 Bias due to:     
(1) 
Measurement Error _ + _ _ 
(2) Omitted Variable 
(IDR) Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 
(3) Total Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 
   Source: Author 
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1.5.3.   Channels 
 
An attempt at exploring the mechanisms of the effect of paternal disability onset on 
health and school absence leads us to evaluate the potential role of household material 
insecurity (measured by food insecurity 50  experienced by the household) in the 
relationships observed51. As shown in the first column of table 1.5, living in a food 
insecure household seems to increase the likelihood of a child being ill by 5pp. 
However, when parental disability status is included in the regression (column 2), the 
effect of material insecurity decreases (4pp) and becomes less significant (from 5 to 
10%). Moreover, further analysis reveals that the difference, between the coefficients 
associated with material insecurity in columns 1 and 2, is statistically significant at 
5%. Furthermore, the effect of paternal disability onset remains robust. These results 
corroborate the conclusion of Kebede (2005) who found that in rural Ethiopia, 
material welfare is not the transmission mechanism between household heads’ health 
and their children’s health. According to his finding, the intergenerational 
transmission of health is explained by genetic endowments.  
 
Results regarding school absence are presented in the third and fourth columns. 
Column 3 shows that material insecurity increases by 8pp the risk of school 
absenteeism. When we control for parental disability status (column 4), we observe 
that the effect of material insecurity remains robust, while the effect of paternal 
disability onset is only significant at 10%. Moreover, there is no statistically 
significant difference between the coefficients associated with material insecurity in 
columns 3 and 4. Such a finding suggests that material insecurity is the main channel 
(or one of the channels through which paternal disability onset affects school 
absence).  
 
                                                        
50 A household is exposed to food insecurity if its answer is “yes” following this question: “In the past 
7 days, did you worry that your household would not have enough food?“ 
51 It is worth noting that the variable “material insecurity” may be endogeneous and in such case, 
coefficients estimated in table table  1.5 would be biased.  
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An attempt to explore the effect of parental disability onset on household material 
welfare (column 5) reveals that only a father’s disability onset determines household 
material welfare. That is, living with a father who experiences a disability onset 
increases by 7pp the risk of a child living in a household exposed to material 
insecurity. This result is not surprising since fathers are generally the main bread-
winner in Ethiopian households (Kifetew, 2006) and disability may prevent them 
from playing this role. That being said, it is apparent from our analysis that, contrary 
to the hypothesis drawn from the existing literature, material resources is not the only 
channel through which parental disability onset affects child human capital 
accumulation.  
 
Table 1. 5 
 Channels of the paternal effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Health issues 
 
School 
absence 
 
Material 
insecurity 
Material 
Insecurity 0.0488
* 0.0420+ 0.0794** 0.0769**  
 (0.0246) (0.0245) (0.0263) (0.0262)  
Disabled 
mother  0.0201  0.00204 0.0195 
  (0.0389)  (0.0382) (0.0504) 
Disabled 
father  0.0844
**  0.0521+ 0.0729* 
  (0.0281)  (0.0284) (0.0368) 
Constant 0.150** 0.132** 0.173** 0.163** 0.147** 
 (0.0170) (0.0175) (0.0167) (0.0181) (0.0238) 
Observations 3990 3990 3304 3304 3990 
R2 0.006 0.014 0.036 0.039 0.008 
The variable “Material insecurity” is coded 1 is the household is food insecure and 0 otherwise. Child 
fixed effects estimations. Time fixed effects are included in the regressions. Standard errors are in 
parentheses and are computed after correcting for correlation and heteroskedasticity within household 
clusters. Analysis is done using a fixed-effect OLS model. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
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In order to deepen our study and have a better understanding of the mechanisms 
involved, we disaggregate our initial sample by creating a subsample composed only 
of girls and another one composed only of boys. Results are presented in the sub-
section below. 
 
1.5.4.   Sex disaggregation  
 
In this sub-section, we firstly analyse the effect of parental disability onset on boys 
and girls’ activities. Results (Tables 1.6 and 1.7) reveal that paternal disability onset 
has no impact on children’s economic activities and this is contrary to the predictions 
drawn from the existing literature, since we did not expect paternal disability to affect 
children’s domestic activities. Available data do not allow us to explain why a 
father’s disability onset reduces the time dedicated by boys to domestic activities. 
However, maternal disability onset has a positive effect on boys’ economic activities. 
That is, it increases the probability of a boy working, and the time spent in the labour 
market. These results suggest that the substitutability between parental and child 
work not only depends on the gender of the affected parent, but also on the gender of 
the child considered. This brings us to the division of tasks between girls and boys in 
the Ethiopian context. Since girls are primarily involved in domestic tasks while boys 
are more farming-oriented (Heissler and Porter, 2013), following maternal disability 
onset, sons will be more likely to substitute for their mother’s economic activity. 
Fathers’ economic activities are probably too difficult to be carried out by children52.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
52 Note that  more than 70% of the children in our sample are below 13 years old.  
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Table 1. 6 
Consequence of parental disability onset on girls’ activities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Work H_W (H≥0) 
H_W 
(H>0) Chore 
H_C 
(H≥0) 
H_C 
(H>0) 
Disabled 
mother  0.0523 1.592 7.472 0.0155 0.103 -0.530 
 (0.0672) (1.999) (4.688) (0.0653) (0.396) (1.647) 
Disabled 
father 0.0366 0.172 1.128 0.00275 -0.117 -0.683 
 (0.0559) (1.772) (5.162) (0.0443) (0.230) (1.247) 
Household 
size -0.0175 0.308 0.363 -0.0190 0.0352 -0.132 
 (0.0198) (0.629) (1.451) (0.0205) (0.0640) (0.295) 
Teenager 0.0527 1.407 1.909 -0.0836+ 0.00102 0.0553 
 (0.0469) (1.461) (3.969) (0.0435) (0.125) (0.466) 
Natural shock 0.0447 -0.864 -6.261 -0.0535 -0.120 -0.216 
 (0.0485) (1.328) (3.785) (0.0407) (0.212) (0.400) 
Constant 0.651** 7.070 14.42 1.028** 1.357** 4.073 
 (0.146) (4.685) (10.36) (0.152) (0.496) (2.694) 
Observations 1906 1906 374 1906 1906 312 
R2 0.022 0.003 0.055 0.224 0.057 0.035 
Variation a M115  F186 
M115  
F186 
M20  
F38 
M115  
F186 
M115  
F186 
M22 
F29 
H_W= hours dedicated to economic activites; H_C= hours dedicated to chores.Variation a: number of 
children whose mother (M) or father (F) experiences a disability onset between the two waves. Child 
fixed effects estimations. Time fixed effects are included in the regressions. Standard errors are in 
parentheses and are computed after correcting for correlation and heteroskedasticity within household 
clusters.+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
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Table 1. 7  
Effect of parental disability onset on boys’ activities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Work H_W (H≥0) 
H_W 
(H>0) Chore 
H_C 
(H≥0) 
H_C 
(H>0) 
Disabled 
mother  0.130
* 4.737* 6.257* -0.0231 0.0947 -0.641 
 (0.0581) (2.165) (3.099) (0.0525) (0.222) (0.674) 
Disabled  
father -0.0192 -1.208 -1.797 -0.0302 -0.418
+ -1.025* 
 (0.0568) (2.156) (2.869) (0.0427) (0.230) (0.500) 
Household 
 size -0.00310 0.616 0.852 -0.0280 -0.0723 -0.502 
 (0.0204) (0.636) (0.884) (0.0175) (0.0805) (0.318) 
Teenager 0.0237 -0.873 0.254 0.0241 0.153 0.440 
 (0.0426) (1.344) (2.248) (0.0372) (0.168) (0.774) 
Natural 
 shock -0.00843 0.0423 1.676 0.0997
* 0.225 1.502 
 (0.0424) (1.640) (2.244) (0.0401) (0.182) (0.905) 
Constant 0.649** 6.599 11.41+ 0.731** 1.678** 6.771* 
 (0.150) (4.755) (6.393) (0.127) (0.645) (2.583) 
Observations 2088 2088 838 2088 2088 152 
R2 0.007 0.013 0.050 0.126 0.033 0.118 
Variation a 
M119 
F180 
M119 
F180 
M56  
F70 
M119 
F180 
M119 
F180 M13 F21 
            H_W= hours dedicated to economic activities; H_C= hours dedicated to chores 
          Variation a: number of children whose mother (M) or father (F) experiences  
            a disability onset   between the two waves.  
Child fixed effects estimations. Time fixed effects are included in the regressions.  
Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed after correcting for correlation and 
heteroskedasticity within household clusters.+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
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It would have been interesting to see how maternal disability onset affects their 
daughters’ domestic activities 53  as a whole (cleaning, childcare, cooking, etc.); 
unfortunately, our database does not provide broader information regarding 
household chores.  
 
Results regarding human capital are presented in Tables 1.8 and 1.9 below. Our 
findings reveal that maternal disability onset does not determine our three outcomes 
of interest, whatever the gender of the child considered. However, when it comes to 
paternal disability onset, we observe that girls represent the most penalised group. In 
fact, daughters of disabled fathers are more likely to miss school (8pp) and to have 
health issues (10pp) compared to their peers (that is daughters whose fathers are not 
disabled).  
 
When we consider the sample of boys, we observe that sons whose fathers become 
disabled are more exposed to health issues (6pp) than their counterparts; nevertheless, 
the coefficient in this case is only significant at the10% level. Further analysis 
(Appendix 1.10) shows that the more time dedicated by boys to economic activities, 
the greater their chances of missing classes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
53 Wood and water collection are not sufficient to represent domestic activities.  
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Table 1. 8 
Effect of parental disability onset on girls’ human capital 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 School enrolment School absence Health issues 
Disabled mother  0.00990 -0.0510 -0.00142 
 (0.0427) (0.0444) (0.0464) 
Disabled father -0.0435 0.0797* 0.102** 
 (0.0295) (0.0365) (0.0376) 
Household size 0.00149 0.00663 0.0148 
 (0.00959) (0.0137) (0.0123) 
Teenager -0.0169 -0.0530 -0.0459 
 (0.0250) (0.0326) (0.0310) 
Natural shock 0.0162 0.0483 0.0328 
 (0.0262) (0.0297) (0.0297) 
Constant 1.012** 0.118 -0.00327 
 (0.0697) (0.101) (0.0957) 
Observations 1906 1634 1906 
R2 0.039 0.038 0.016 
Variation a M115  F186 
M95  
F153 
M115  
F186 
              Variation a: number of children whose mother (M) or father (F) experiences  
               a disability onset between the two waves.  
Only those who are enrolled in school are asked the question regarding school absence. Child 
fixed effects estimations. Time fixed effects are included in the regressions.  
Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed after correcting for correlation and 
heteroskedasticity within household clusters.+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
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Table 1. 9 
Effect of parental disability onset on boys’ human capital 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 School enrolment School absence Health issues 
Disabled mother  -0.0511 0.0105 0.0215 
 (0.0403) (0.0512) (0.0554) 
Disabled father -0.0253 0.0420 0.0648+ 
 (0.0341) (0.0360) (0.0392) 
Household size -0.00213 0.00246 -0.0109 
 (0.0120) (0.0106) (0.0116) 
Teenager -0.00866 0.0248 0.0288 
 (0.0253) (0.0276) (0.0300) 
Natural shock -0.00383 0.0660** 0.0334 
 (0.0248) (0.0239) (0.0294) 
Constant 0.997** 0.137+ 0.235** 
 (0.0851) (0.0800) (0.0851) 
Observations 2088 1678 2088 
R2 0.028 0.045 0.021 
Variation a M119 F180 M91 F139 M119 F180 
             Variation a: number of children whose mother (M) or father (F) experiences a disability  
              onset between the two waves.  
Only those who are enrolled in school are asked the question regarding school absence. Child 
fixed effects estimations. Time fixed effects are included in the regressions.  
Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed after correcting for correlation and 
heteroskedasticity within household clusters.+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
 
 
 
 
 76 
It is apparent from our analysis that parental disability onset influences child human 
capital. Regarding child health, results suggest that sons’ health is more valued than 
daughters’ health when the father becomes disabled. This result may be explained by 
the fact that when the main bread-winner become disabled, households expect boys to 
provide for their material needs in the future. That being said, when it comes to health 
related behaviour54, parents are more likely to favour boys (Garg and Morduch, 1998; 
Barcellos et al., 2014).  
 
Results concerning school absenteeism suggest once again that sons are favoured 
compared to daughters. Girls’ absenteeism might be explained by an increase in the 
time dedicated to domestic activities; as stated above, information about domestic 
activities is very limited and does not allow us to verify our assumption. 
 
To summarize our results, parental disability onset influences child outcomes and the 
effect depends on the gender of the disabled parent. A father’s disability onset 
compromises the child’s human capital accumulation while a mother’s disability 
onset exposes children to child labour. Further analysis reveals that sons are favoured 
compared to daughters when it comes to human capital investment55.  
1.6.   CONCLUSION 
The inclusion of disability in the Sustainable Development Goals marks a historic 
turning point in the lives of people with disabilities who were not explicitly 
mentioned in the Millennium Development Goals (UN, 2014). People living with 
disabilities are more likely than their non-disabled peers to face socioeconomic 
disadvantages that may affect their wellbeing as well as their children’s lives. The 
goal of our paper is to investigate the trade-off between parental disability onset and 
three domains of children’s lives: labour, education and health. We use Ethiopian 
panel data for our analysis and our sample consists of children aged between 7 and 17 
                                                        
54 Since material welfare does not appear to be the channel through which parental disability affects 
child health. 
55 Our results are disability specific.  
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years old. In order to control for individual unobservable heterogeneity and time 
specific effects, we use a fixed effects model. Our results show that the impact of 
parental disability onset on child outcomes depends on the gender of the parent. 
While a mother’s disability onset increases the probability of a child being involved 
in economic activities, a father’s disability onset represents a barrier to child human 
capital accumulation. Disaggregation by gender reveals that, compared to boys, girls’ 
human capital is more hindered by a father’s disability onset56. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that material welfare is the conduit of influence of paternal disability onset 
on child education. Some recommendations can be drawn, from our work, for policy 
makers. Firstly, policies addressing the situation of children living with disabled 
parents need to be paid due attention in Ethiopia. Further research needs to be 
conducted in order to verify, for instance, if women empowerment might eliminate 
the negative effect of fathers’ disability onset on child human capital accumulation. 
Secondly, the ideal disability measurement comes from medical assessment which is 
costly. Failing the affordability of such a measurement, the Washington Group’s 
questions need to be supplemented with questions that can help to differentiate 
permanent disability from temporary disability. For example, individuals can be 
asked if their functional limitation is permanent or temporary.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
56 The difference between the coefficients of boys and girls is statistically significant at 5%.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendixes 1.1 to 1.10 are presented below. 
 
 
Appendix 1.1 
Number of children living with a disabled father by disability type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Seeing Hearing Walking Remembering Self-care Communication 
No difficulty 101 251 252 278 303 322 
 (31.08) (77.23) (77.54) (85.54) (93.23) (99.08) 
Some 
difficulties 201 71 45 44 18 3 
 (61.85) (21.85) (13.85) (13.54) (5.538) (0.923) 
A lot of 
difficulties 20 3 20 3 2 0 
 (6.154) (0.923) (6.154) (0.923) (0.615) 0 
Unable 3 0 8 0 2 0 
 (0.923) 0 (2.462) 0 (0.615) 0 
Total 325 325 325 325 325 325 
 (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
Proportions in parentheses; Figures based on the first wave of the panel data. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
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Appendix 1.2 
Number of children living with a disabled mother by disability type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Seeing Hearing Walking Remembering Self-care Communication 
No difficulty 69 142 147 165 170 185 
 (36.90) (75.94) (78.61) (88.24) (90.91) (98.93) 
Some 
difficulties 111 40 33 22 17 2 
 (59.36) (21.39) (17.65) (11.76) (9.091) (1.070) 
A lot of 
difficulties 7 5 7 0 0 0 
 (3.743) (2.674) (3.743) 0 0 0 
Total 187 187 187 187 187 187 
 (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
Observations 187 187 187 187 187 187 
Proportions in parentheses; Figures based on the  first wave of the panel data. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 87 
Appendix 1.3 
 
 
 
 
Effect of parental disability onset on child activities (Mental disability excluded) 
Fixed effect model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Work H_W (H≥0) 
H_W 
(H>0) Chore 
H_C 
(H≥0) 
H_C 
(H>0) 
Disabled 
mother  0.0883
+ 3.002+ 6.133* -0.00760 0.109 -0.567 
 (0.0483) (1.568) (2.667) (0.0435) (0.247) (1.124) 
Disabled 
father 0.0106 -0.502 -0.751 -0.0120 -0.256 -0.844 
 (0.0421) (1.485) (2.807) (0.0319) (0.182) (0.793) 
Household 
size -0.0101 0.471 0.799 -0.0238
+ -0.0208 -0.223 
 (0.0150) (0.459) (0.812) (0.0138) (0.0532) (0.211) 
Teenager 0.0352 0.208 0.846 -0.0202 0.0955 0.211 
 (0.0304) (0.964) (1.952) (0.0287) (0.109) (0.405) 
Natural shock 0.0155 -0.496 -0.643 0.0249 0.0587 0.360 
 (0.0337) (1.127) (2.000) (0.0293) (0.149) (0.426) 
Constant 0.650** 6.833* 11.78* 0.878** 1.533** 4.772* 
 (0.112) (3.456) (5.852) (0.103) (0.423) (1.923) 
Observations 3974 3974 1204 3974 3974 464 
R2 0.011 0.004 0.043 0.166 0.040 0.049 
H_W= hours dedicated to economic activites; H_C= hours dedicated to chores 
Child fixed effects estimations. Time fixed effects are included in the regressions.  
Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed after correcting for correlation and 
heteroskedasticity within household clusters.+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
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Effect of parental disability onset on child activities  
Random effects model 
 
      Robust standard errors in parentheses 
     Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
       + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Work H_W (H≥0) 
H_W 
(H>0) Chore 
H_C 
(H≥0) 
H_C 
(H>0) 
Disabled 
mother  0.0595
+ 1.748 1.102 -0.00446 0.0197 -0.144 
 (0.0348) (1.150) (1.830) (0.0304) (0.134) (0.471) 
       
Disabled 
father 0.0129 -0.228 -0.837 -0.0240 -0.0517 0.216 
 (0.0285) (0.998) (1.761) (0.0229) (0.111) (0.373) 
       
Household 
size -0.0214
** -0.564** -0.325 -0.0122** -0.0130 0.0619 
 (0.00524) (0.166) (0.313) (0.00442) (0.0160) (0.0925) 
       
Teenager 0.0450** 0.911+ 0.226 0.0416** 0.178* 0.0386 
 (0.0167) (0.549) (1.050) (0.0149) (0.0741) (0.284) 
       
Natural shock 0.0410+ 1.096 0.796 0.0698** 0.314** 0.531 
 (0.0235) (0.841) (1.519) (0.0210) (0.108) (0.436) 
       
Constant 0.726** 13.86** 20.15** 0.780** 1.366** 2.393** 
 (0.0466) (1.447) (2.630) (0.0406) (0.163) (0.709) 
Observations 3994 3994 1212 3994 3994 464 
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Appendix 1.4 
Effect of parental disability onset on child human capital (Mental disability excluded) 
Fixed effects model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 School enrolment School absence Health issues 
Disabled mother -0.0178 0.0110 0.0184 
 (0.0314) (0.0387) (0.0399) 
Disabled father -0.0348 0.0504+ 0.0868** 
 (0.0244) (0.0283) (0.0283) 
Household size 0.000735 0.00450 0.00118 
 (0.00771) (0.00919) (0.00880) 
Teenager -0.0129 -0.00944 -0.00865 
 (0.0176) (0.0209) (0.0217) 
Natural shock 0.00496 0.0609** 0.0362+ 
 (0.0190) (0.0209) (0.0219) 
Constant 0.995** 0.126+ 0.122+ 
 (0.0555) (0.0689) (0.0664) 
Observations 3974 3296 3974 
R2 0.032 0.038 0.014 
Only those who are enrolled in school are asked the question regarding school absence. Child fixed 
effects estimations. Time fixed effects are included in the regressions.  
Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed after correcting for correlation and 
heteroskedasticity within household clusters.+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
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Effect of parental disability onset on child human capital 
Random effects model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 School enrolment School absence Health issues 
Disabled mother  -0.0287 0.00850 0.0167 
 (0.0234) (0.0249) (0.0274) 
    
Disabled father -0.0397* 0.0313 0.0566** 
 (0.0178) (0.0203) (0.0188) 
    
Household size -0.00362 0.000614 -0.00493 
 (0.00331) (0.00364) (0.00313) 
    
Urban area 0.0382** -0.0542** -0.00476 
 (0.0145) (0.0122) (0.0198) 
    
Teenager -0.0940** -0.00647 -0.000717 
 (0.0102) (0.00957) (0.0105) 
    
Natural shock -0.00556 0.0430* 0.0279 
 (0.0151) (0.0174) (0.0191) 
    
Constant 1.002** 0.162** 0.216** 
 (0.0332) (0.0380) (0.0404) 
Observations 3994 3312 3994 
Robust tandard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
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Appendix 1.5 
 
 
Effect of parental disability onset on child activities (children of parents who are 
disabled in both waves 1 and 2 are excluded from the analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Work H_W (H≥0) 
H_W 
(H>0) Chore 
H_C 
(H≥0) 
H_C 
(H>0) 
Disabled 
mother  0.110
* 3.426* 6.486* -0.0176 -0.0745 -1.215 
 (0.0510) (1.673) (2.890) (0.0469) (0.229) (1.151) 
       
Disabled 
father 0.0126 -0.847 -2.168 -0.00355 -0.222 -0.684 
 (0.0445) (1.525) (3.017) (0.0329) (0.187) (0.818) 
       
Household 
size -0.00598 0.603 0.867 -0.0219 -0.0315 -0.241 
 (0.0156) (0.477) (0.846) (0.0146) (0.0557) (0.228) 
       
Teenager 0.0462 0.253 0.469 -0.0295 0.0205 0.165 
 (0.0316) (0.999) (1.991) (0.0298) (0.102) (0.399) 
       
Natural 
shock 0.0104 -0.920 -1.231 0.0210 0.107 0.385 
 (0.0351) (1.175) (2.072) (0.0304) (0.147) (0.439) 
       
       
Constant 0.617** 5.975+ 11.92+ 0.856** 1.568** 4.851* 
 (0.116) (3.594) (6.104) (0.109) (0.447) (2.036) 
Observatio
ns 3714 3714 1102 3714 3714 440 
R2 0.012 0.006 0.046 0.157 0.038 0.055 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Effect of parental disability onset on child human capital (children of parents who are 
disabled in both waves 1 and 2 are excluded from the analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 School enrolment School absence Health issues 
Disabled mother  -0.0270 -0.0244 -0.00448 
 (0.0333) (0.0394) (0.0409) 
    
Disabled father -0.0229 0.0578* 0.0892** 
 (0.0244) (0.0285) (0.0298) 
    
Household size 0.00580 0.00474 0.00237 
 (0.00790) (0.00966) (0.00915) 
    
Teenager -0.00265 -0.00982 -0.00321 
 (0.0177) (0.0218) (0.0223) 
    
Natural shock -0.00401 0.0589** 0.0312 
 (0.0188) (0.0213) (0.0229) 
    
Constant 0.965** 0.125+ 0.118+ 
 (0.0576) (0.0724) (0.0690) 
Observations 3730 3112 3730 
R2 0.034 0.036 0.013 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Effect of parental disability onset on child activities (alternative measure of disability) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Work H_W (H≥0) 
H_W 
(H>0) Chore 
H_C 
(H≥0) 
H_C 
(H>0) 
Disabled 
mother  0.0359 2.998
** 6.028** -0.0157 0.0428 0.205 
 (0.0352) (1.088) (1.908) (0.0267) (0.146) (0.341) 
Disabled 
father -0.0488 -0.0455 2.012 -0.0159 -0.0510 -0.0946 
 (0.0333) (0.997) (1.670) (0.0265) (0.133) (0.664) 
Household 
size -0.00968 0.424 0.514 -0.0222 -0.0210 -0.243 
 (0.0151) (0.460) (0.810) (0.0138) (0.0535) (0.232) 
Teenager 0.0400 0.162 0.470 -0.0149 0.103 0.239 
 (0.0307) (0.969) (1.955) (0.0287) (0.111) (0.439) 
Natural shock 0.0209 -0.422 -1.049 0.0251 0.0500 0.310 
 (0.0341) (1.138) (2.071) (0.0295) (0.153) (0.437) 
Constant 0.659** 6.560+ 12.53* 0.872** 1.498** 4.606* 
 (0.112) (3.489) (6.020) (0.102) (0.405) (1.990) 
Observations 3972 3972 1192 3972 3972 460 
R2 0.011 0.008 0.064 0.169 0.038 0.035 
 
Disabled parents are those who have been absent from their usual activities for at least one 
day due to health issues. 
H_W= hours dedicated to economic activites; H_C= hours dedicated to chores 
Child fixed effects estimations. Time fixed effects are included in the regressions.  
Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed after correcting for correlation and 
heteroskedasticity within household clusters.+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
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Appendix 1.6 
Effect of parental disability onset on child activities (Logit with fixed-effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Work H_W (H≥0) 
H_W 
(H>0) Chore 
H_C 
(H≥0) 
H_C 
(H>0) 
Disabled 
mother  0.531
* 3.064* 6.266* 0.110 0.0917 -0.567 
 (0.230) (1.393) (2.662) (0.281) (0.174) (0.700) 
Disabled 
father 0.0335 -0.518 -0.910 -0.0679 -0.260
+ -0.844 
 (0.166) (1.115) (2.243) (0.229) (0.139) (0.582) 
Household 
size -0.0565 0.484 0.803 -0.0593 -0.0196 -0.223 
 (0.0606) (0.398) (0.799) (0.0765) (0.0497) (0.263) 
Teenager 0.178 0.255 0.850 -0.0289 0.0928 0.211 
 (0.156) (1.014) (1.988) (0.199) (0.127) (0.606) 
Natural 
shock 0.0614 -0.509 -0.597 0.114 0.0603 0.360 
 (0.146) (0.920) (1.705) (0.177) (0.115) (0.464) 
Constant  6.795* 11.84*  1.521** 4.772* 
  (2.928) (5.709)  (0.366) (1.905) 
Observations 1668 3994 1212 1642 3994 464 
R2  0.005 0.043  0.040 0.049 
H_W= hours dedicated to economic activities; H_C= hours dedicated to chores. LR chi2 for 
columns 1 and 4 are respectively 24.24 and 352.67. 
Child fixed effects estimations. Time fixed effects are included in the regressions.  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
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Appendix 1.7 
Effect of parental disability onset on child human capital (Logit with fixed-effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 School enrolment School absence Health issues 
Disabled mother  -0.229 -0.208 0.285 
 (0.418) (0.398) (0.293) 
Disabled father -0.479 1.007** 0.839** 
 (0.324) (0.383) (0.254) 
Household size -0.0541 0.0124 0.0259 
 (0.119) (0.141) (0.100) 
Teenager -0.282 0.186 -0.155 
 (0.329) (0.315) (0.240) 
Natural shock 0.0161 1.386** 0.412+ 
 (0.274) (0.363) (0.213) 
Observations 526 508 782 
LR Chi2 64.49 75.01 27.06 
Only those who are enrolled in school are asked the question regarding school absence. Child fixed 
effects estimations. Time fixed effects are included in the regressions. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
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Appendix 1.8 
Effect of parental disability onset on child activities (Two-Stages Least-Squares) 
 
First Stage: Effect of instruments on parental disability 
 (1) (2) 
 Men Women 
Father's age -0.00280  
 (0.00239)  
Prevalence 2.476** 1.721** 
 (0.325) (0.260) 
Mother's age  -0.00474* 
  (0.00196) 
Constant 0.0704 0.118 
 (0.115) (0.0766) 
Observations 3992 3994 
Standard errors in parentheses. Child fixed effects estimations. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
 
F-statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Work H_W (H≥0) 
H_W 
(H>0) Chore 
H_C 
(H≥0) 
H_C 
(H>0) 
F Statistic 0.505 0.505 0.589 0.505  0.505 0.421 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 School enrolment School absence Health issues 
F Statistic 0.505 2.086 0.505 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
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Second Stage: Effect of parental disability onset on child activities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Work H_W (H≥0) 
H_W 
(H>0) Chore 
H_C 
(H≥0) 
H_C 
(H>0) 
Disabled  
father 1.867 52.18 5.166 0.594 0.329 2.184 
 (1.826) (54.10) (37.28) (1.183) (4.277) (8.139) 
Disabled 
mother  -2.439 -70.06 -16.13 -1.469 -3.177 -4.658 
 (2.480) (73.47) (54.53) (1.606) (5.808) (5.303) 
Household 
 size -0.0227 0.116 0.679 -0.0269 -0.0222 -0.167 
 (0.0263) (0.780) (0.912) (0.0171) (0.0617) (0.300) 
Teenager 0.0647 1.024 1.605 -0.00732 0.117 0.118 
 (0.0644) (1.907) (3.236) (0.0417) (0.151) (0.684) 
Natural 
 shock -0.0707 -2.873 -0.985 0.00151 0.0496 0.370 
 (0.0984) (2.916) (2.552) (0.0638) (0.231) (0.603) 
Observations 3990 3990 1212 3990 3990 464 
R2 -2.340 -1.926 -0.069 -0.422 -0.131 -0.167 
Standard errors in parentheses. Child fixed effects estimations.   
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
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Appendix 1.9 
Effect of parental disability onset on child human capital (Two-Stages Least-Squares) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 School enrolment School absence Health issues 
Disabled father -0.155 -0.0878 -0.982 
 (0.563) (0.299) (1.093) 
Disabled mother  0.182 0.301 1.403 
 (0.765) (0.428) (1.484) 
Household size 0.000377 0.00635 0.00867 
 (0.00813) (0.00929) (0.0158) 
Teenager -0.0143 -0.0139 -0.0217 
 (0.0199) (0.0219) (0.0385) 
Natural shock 0.0102 0.0677** 0.0844 
 (0.0304) (0.0256) (0.0589) 
Observations 3990 3310 3990 
R2 -0.011 -0.028 -1.550 
Standard errors in parentheses. Child fixed effects estimations. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
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Appendix 1.10 
Effect of hours worked on school absenteeism 
 (1) (2) 
 Girls Boys 
Disabled mother  -0.0215 0.0210 
 (0.0473) (0.0528) 
Disabled father 0.0606 0.0438 
 (0.0380) (0.0346) 
Hours worked -0.000108 0.00127* 
 (0.000946) (0.000630) 
Household size 0.00749 0.00199 
 (0.0136) (0.0106) 
Teenager -0.0531 0.0254 
 (0.0327) (0.0276) 
Natural shock 0.0502+ 0.0668** 
 (0.0298) (0.0238) 
Constant 0.114 0.126 
 (0.102) (0.0808) 
Observations 1634 1678 
R2 0.035 0.051 
Standard errors in parentheses. Child fixed effects estimations. Time fixed effects are included in the 
regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed after correcting for correlation and 
heteroskedasticity within household clusters. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ESS. 
 DEUXIÈME CHAPITRE - 
DISABILITY AND LABOUR SUPPLY IN UGANDA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
People living with disabilities have long been ignored in the development agenda 
adopted by the United Nations despite the fact that they form one of the most 
vulnerable groups in the society. Their inclusion in the Sustainable Development 
Goals, adopted recently, represents an attempt to reverse such a trend. Disability 
represents an obstacle for the well being of men and women in general and for their 
professional life in particular. However, it is noteworthy that studies on the impact of 
disability on work are markedly scarce in developing countries and this is mainly due 
to the lack of suitable data. The goal of this paper is to analyse the impact of 
disability onset on labour supply in Uganda. The analysis is carried out using a fixed-
effects model. Results reveal that disability has no effect on the extensive margin of 
labour supply. However, when we conduct a gender-disaggregated analysis, we find 
that only men’s intensive margin of labour supply is affected by a disability onset.  
2.1.   INTRODUCTION 
A disability refers to any impairment, activity limitation or participation restriction 
according to the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health 
(WHO, 2011). Therefore, a disabled person is an individual whose daily activities 
and/or participation in social life are made difficult because of health issues (Doat, 
2010). Despite the fact that people living with disabilities (PWDs), who represent 
15%57 of the world's population, form one of the most vulnerable58 groups in the 
society, they have not received all the attention they deserve in the development 
                                                        
57 The prevalence of disability varies from 12% in high-income countries to 18% in low-income 
countries 
58 Low education, low employment, low income, etc. 
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agenda (WHO, 2011). None of the eight Millennium Development Goals (2000-
2015) alluded to PWDs though 80% of them live in developing countries (Brander, 
2012). The inclusion of PWDs in the Sustainable Development Goals (2015-2030) 
aims to reverse such a trend by giving more visibility to PWDs. In fact, socio-
economic development necessarily involves concrete actions in favour of vulnerable 
segments of the society; therefore it is difficult to achieve it as long as policies and 
programs ignore PWDs (United Nations, 2009). 
 
According to Banks and Polack (2014), the low labour supply of PWDs in developing 
countries generates a loss that varies between 474 and 672 billion dollars annually, 
depending on the country. These losses could be reduced if effective measures were 
put in place to prevent/treat disability on the one hand, and to promote employment 
of PWDs who are unemployed/underemployed on the other hand. 
 
Since it is likely to restrict opportunities for men and women in the labour market59, a 
disability onset exposes the individual to poverty and social exclusion. However, it is 
worth noting that unemployed PWDs are composed of two categories of individuals. 
The first category includes those who are not looking for a job either because their 
health status prevent them from working or because they have access to non-labour 
incomes that enable them to meet their needs. The second category is composed of 
those who are looking for an income-generating activity but have difficulties in 
accessing the labour market. In this second case the situation may be explained, on 
the disabled person's side, either by the lack of suitable qualifications/skills required 
for a given job, or by a lack of financial resources for those who want to set up their 
own business. On the employer’s side, this may be due to several factors: the low 
productivity of PWDs which may represent a financial loss for the firm60, the cost of 
workplace accommodation associated with the hiring of disabled people, 
discrimination due to prejudices towards PWDs, and the lack of vacant posts that 
                                                        
59 Difficult access to employment, preponderance of part-time work, preponderance of jobs in the 
informal sector, low pay, etc. 
60 If they are paid above their marginal productivity. 
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affects non-disabled people as well (WHO, 2011; Lamichhane, 2015). It is worth 
noting that, in the sample used for analysis in the present paper, people mainly rely 
on subsistence agriculture for a living so that an eventual non-participation in the 
labour market of PWDs is more likely to be due to their health status.  
 
Studies that analyse the relationship between disability and work generally conclude 
that there is a negative link between disability and labour supply; that is the labour 
market participation of PWDs is lower compared to their peers. However, we cannot 
rely on the presence of a negative association between our two variables of interest to 
deduce that disability affects labour market participation. In fact, there may exist 
unobservable factors influencing both disability and labour supply, and creating a 
spurious relationship between the two variables. For example, lazy people can 
simulate a handicap or exaggerate the severity of an existing disability in order to 
receive transfers provided by the government, their relatives or their acquaintances. In 
such a case, measures taken by public authorities to prevent, mitigate or cure 
disability in order to improve the labour supply of PWDs cannot achieve the targeted 
results (Currie, 2009). The effectiveness of measures adopted by public authorities 
following researchers' recommendations therefore depends on the accuracy of the 
data analysis (Orphanides, Porter, Reifschneider, Tetlow and Finan, 2000; Oh and 
Shin, 2015). That being said, it is important to take into account unobservable 
heterogeneity when analysing the impact of disability on labour supply. 
 
An exploration of the existing literature shows that research on the link between 
disability and work is rare in developing countries, particularly in African countries 
(Mizunoya and Mitra, 2013); moreover, existing studies do not generally take into 
account the potential endogeneity issues that may exist in such an analysis and lead to 
biased results. To the best of our knowledge, the only published study using a 
methodology that controls for endogeneity using African data is the paper written by 
Schultz and Tansel (1997). They rely on an instrumental variable method. The 
criticism of this approach concerns the validity of the instruments used. For example, 
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Schultz and Tansel (1997) use food prices to instrument disability. These instruments 
are valid if they are correlated with disability but not with labour market 
participation. As stressed by Dow, Gertler, Schoeni, Strauss and Thomas (1997), such 
a condition is rather difficult to fulfill since food prices has an effect on disability 
status as well as labour supply decisions. 
 
Our research aims to address the problem of endogeneity by applying ordinary least 
squares estimation on a fixed effects model (see chapter one for details about this 
methodology, its limits and the reasons we chose it).  
 
Another finding in developing country studies focusing on the link between disability 
and work concerns the dependent variable used, which is generally the extensive 
margin of labour supply (to work or not). Such an analysis hides a reality: even when 
they have the opportunity to be involved in economic activities, PWDs may be 
constrained to reduce the amount of work done (Jones, 2011) and thus end up with 
lower earnings. We take this limitation into account in our paper that aims to assess 
the impact of disability on the extensive as well as the intensive margins of labour 
supply in Uganda. 
 
Uganda is an East African country that experienced a civil war between the 
government force and the rebel group called the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in 
the North of the country. The period of turmoil started in 1986 following the 
overthrow of the Northerner president Tito Okello by the Southerner and current 
president named Yoweri Museveni. Between 2006 and 2008, several peace talks took 
place and ended with a cease-fire in September 2008. The armed conflict exacted a 
heavy toll on the civilian populations; the LRA is accused of atrocities including 
abductions, rapes, killings and mutilations of adults and children (Adelman and 
Peterman, 2014). As stated by Mazurana, Marshak, Gordon, Opio, Atim and McEvoy  
(2016), the Ugandan civil war has caused numerous cases of physical and mental 
disabilities. Even though the database used for our analysis does not provide us with 
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the information about the cause of the disability (e.g: war, accident, etc.), it is worth 
noting that the Northern region presents the highest prevalence of disability in our 
sample (Appendix 2.1). 
 
We have chosen to use Ugandan data for two reasons. Firstly, it is one of the few sub-
Saharan countries that have distinguished themselves with the particular emphasis on 
the PWDs’ rights in general and their professional insertion in particular (Abimanyi-
Ochom and Mannan, 2014). Uganda’s legislation promotes the employment of 
disabled people. For example, the Persons with Disability Act (2006) provides for a 
15% tax cut to private sector employers who recruit at least 10 PWDs for full-time 
jobs 61 . Furthermore, in order to promote their economic empowerment, the 
government provides associations of PWDs with funds (Special Grant for Persons 
with Disabilities) they can use to set up businesses62. Despite the measures adopted 
by policy makers, statistics show that the employment rate of disabled Ugandans 
remains lower than that of the non-disabled (Murungi, 2011; Abimanyi-Ochom and 
Mannan, 2014).  
 
According to the most recent statistics, 16% of the Ugandan population, that is about 
5.1 million people, suffer from physical or mental disability (Republic of Uganda, 
2013a). In addition, 40% of working age PWDs are forced to join the inactive 
population permanently because of their health status. Disabled people in Uganda are 
among the most disadvantaged groups and 80% of them are poor and do not have 
access to a decent63 work (Abimanyi-Ochom and Mannan, 2014).  
                                                        
61 Due to a lack of data, we are not able to control for the role of this Act on the labour supply of 
PWDs.  
62 Since PWDs, in our sample, were not asked if they belong to an association that receives the Special 
Grant, we are not able to analyse the effect of these grants in this paper.  
63 According to the International Labour Organization, a “decent work sums up the aspirations of 
people in their working lives. It involves opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair 
income, security in the workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for personal 
development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and 
participate in the decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all 
women and men”. (This information comes from the International Labour Organization website: 
http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--en/index.htm) 
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It is important here to specify some of the major facts that characterize Uganda. On 
the one hand, it is a country whose population is predominantly concentrated in rural 
areas (77%). On the other hand, the labour market is dominated by the agricultural 
sector (72% of jobs) (Republic of Uganda, 2014). 
 
Secondly, Uganda has been chosen because it possesses a database that contains a 
disability module. Moreover, this database has a panel structure, which represents an 
asset if we do not want to ignore endogeneity. Indeed, as stressed by Mizunoya and 
Mitra (2013), scarcity of databases containing information about disability on the one 
hand, and having a longitudinal structure on the other hand, limits the quantity and 
mainly the scientific quality of studies interested in the impact of disability on work 
in developing countries.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a literature 
review. Section 3 introduces the source of data used in this study. Section 4 provides 
the methodology while Section 5 presents the results of our analysis. Section 6 is 
dedicated to the conclusion. 
2.2.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
Studies interested in the relationship between disability and work are exposed to an 
econometric issue, the so-called endogeneity. This is a problem that may bias the 
results and which has three sources: reverse causality, declaration bias and 
justification bias (Cai, 2010, Schmitz, 2011). 
 
The complexity of the link between disability and labour market participation can be 
observed when analysing the sign (positive or negative) as well as the direction of the 
relationship (reverse causality) between the two variables. We will first analyse the 
sign of the relationship. On the one hand, a disability can increase the demand for 
medical goods or services, leading PWDs to increase their hours of work in order to 
meet their needs. On the other hand, the onset of a disability may constrain people to 
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leave the labour market, to reduce their hours of work or to occupy positions they do 
not like (for example if positions they prefer are incompatible with their health 
conditions).  
 
Secondly, we analyse the direction of the relationship between the two variables. On 
the one hand, labour provides income required for health investment; therefore, work 
reduces the chances of being disabled. On the other hand, some working conditions 
may cause disability. This is a fact observed in developing countries where poverty 
forces many people to accept jobs whether workplace safety is guaranteed or not 
(ILO, 2012). 
 
We now move to the second source of endogeneity: the declaration bias. It is 
associated with the measure of disability that is used. In the existing literature, people 
are considered as disabled in one of these cases: 1) a medical assessment concludes 
that they are disabled, 2) they declare that they have health issues that restrict their 
daily activities in general and/or their economic activities in particular; or 3) they 
report they have a specific disability that (partially or totally) prevents them from 
seeing, speaking, hearing, walking etc. Declaration bias is likely to appear when 
health related information is collected directly from individuals, because of the 
subjectivity of their declarations, which can be influenced by their socio-economic 
characteristics and health standards. For example, research conducted by Moesgaard 
et al. (2002) reveals that for the same level of motor disability, men have a lower 
propensity to declare that they have functional limitations because they have lower 
health standards compared to women. In the context of developing countries where 
disability is a source of shame because of the superstitious beliefs it is associated 
with, people may tend to under-report their disabilities.  
 
Contrary to the declaration bias, the justification bias is always intentional. In the 
literature, the justification bias refers to the attitude of people who report health 
problems in order to rationalize their economic inactivity. Individuals who behave in 
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such a way may be motivated either by the fear of stigmatization or by the desire to 
receive social benefits. It is worth noting that in developing countries, social benefits 
are generally non-existent. Furthermore, in countries where they exist, the allowance 
amount is generally too low to encourage people to leave the labour market just to 
receive these transfers (Handa and Neitzert, 1999). However, this does not eliminate 
the risk of justification bias when analysing data from developing countries since 
people can simulate or overstate a disability in order to receive transfers from 
relatives or to beg (Kassah, 2008; Mina, 2010). The final bias introduced by the 
combination of reverse causality, declaration bias and justification bias is unknown 
(Currie and Madrian, 1997).  
 
A review of the literature reveals that studies concerned with the effect of disability 
on labour market participation conclude that there is a negative relationship between 
the two variables. Differences are observed in the measures of disability chosen and 
the methodology used for data analysis. Research work conducted in the African 
context is rare. Moreover, studies tend to ignore endogeneity; this is the case in the 
papers presented below.  
 
Mitra and Sambamoorthi (2008) use a sample of men living in rural India in their 
study and find that compared to their peers, PWDs have a lower propensity of having 
a job. Disabled people here are those who have functional limitations (difficulty 
seeing, hearing, walking, remembering, communicating) as well as those who are 
limited in their daily life activities (e.g.: self-care, shopping). Trani and Loeb (2012) 
also rely on functional limitations, similar to that used by Mitra and Sambamoorthi 
(2008), in their study based on Zambian data. They are concerned with the 
determinants of employment and conclude that the following are positively associated 
with employment among disabled people: Having a high level of education, being 
wealthy and living in rural areas. The coefficients associated to these three variables 
are non significant when considering non-disabled people. For his part, Zamo (2013) 
focuses his attention on a sample of Cameroonians. He finds a negative association 
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between disability (eg: blindness, deafness…) and the probability of working either in 
the public or the private sector. According to him, the justification bias cannot be a 
problem in his analysis since PWDs in Cameroon do not receive social benefits. 
Therefore, he considers disability as an exogenous variable. 
 
Unlike the three works cited above, the study of Mizunoya and Mitra (2013) 
simultaneously covers several countries. Their analysis based on seven African 
countries reveals that disability is negatively associated with the probability of having 
a job. Differences in employment rates between PWDs and non-disabled people are 
more pronounced among women and are mainly due to unobservable characteristics 
(by the researcher) such as productivity.  
 
It is worth noting that some of the studies presented above do not allude to the 
possible endogeneity that may exist in their study (eg Trani and Loeb, 2012), while 
other mention this econometric issue even if they do not use a methodology likely to 
solve it (eg Mizunoya and Mitra, 2013). According to Mizunoya and Mitra (2013), 
many researchers do not use methodologies that take into account endogeneity 
because of the difficulty of finding longitudinal data and/or valid instruments.  
 
Contrary to the papers presented above, studies described below rely on an approach 
that controls (at least partially) for endogeneity. Bridges et al. (2015) use data 
collected during a medical intervention in a hospital located in Kampala, the capital 
of Uganda. The project consists of distributing orthotic equipment to people who 
suffer from lower-limbs disabilities. They use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design 
approach, which is an instrumental variable method (Khandker et al., 2010). The 
variable that reflects the discontinuity (the day the disabled person arrives at the 
hospital) must be correlated with the probability of receiving the treatment (orthotic 
equipment) but not with labour supply. They find that people in the "treatment" group 
are more likely to participate in the labour market than those who have not received 
the device. A gender-disaggregated analysis reveals that such a conclusion remains 
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valid only for women. However, coefficients are non significant when they consider 
the intensive margin of labour supply. Schultz and Tansel (1997) also rely on an 
instrumental variable approach to conduct their research (Food prices is used as an 
instrument). They use Ivorian and Ghanaian data and find a negative relationship 
between the number of hours worked and the number of days an individual was 
restricted in his usual activities due to health issues. 
 
The other existing papers based on an instrumental variable approach use data 
collected in developed countries and conclude that disability represents a barrier to 
employment (e.g.: Campolieti, 2002; Cai, 2009). The instruments used in the 
literature can be grouped into two categories. The first category contains individual 
variables (Stern, 1989; Campolieti, 2002) such as specific diseases (e.g. 
cardiovascular or respiratory conditions). The second category includes community 
variables (Schultz, 2008, Schultz and Tansel, 1997) such as the accessibility of the 
health system and the prices of specific products (e.g.: food, cigarettes). The validity 
of these instruments may be questioned. For example, a drop in goods prices can 
encourage people to invest in their health; however, it can also contribute to job 
creation64. As pointed out by Currie and Madrian (1999), identification assumptions 
used in studies that analyse the impact of disability on labour supply are debatable. 
 
Given the difficulty of finding suitable instruments, an alternative adopted by some 
authors, who have access to cross-sectional data, is to resort to the matching method. 
The matching method is based on a strong hypothesis: the probability of being 
disabled depends only on the observable characteristics or unobservable variables not 
correlated with the outcome of interest. Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez (2011) apply 
this method to German data. PWDs here are those who have been diagnosed, by  
medical personnel, with a degree of disability greater or equal to 30%65. The authors 
                                                        
64 For a typical good, a reduction in price  creates an increase in the demand for this good ; this can 
lead the producers of this good to hire more workers in order to satisfy the additional demand.   
65 That is, the severity of their disability is assessed and if the degree of their disability corresponds to 
30% or more, there are considered as disabled. In order to have his disability status assessed, people 
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find that disability decreases the probability of work and the impact varies according 
to the degree of disability. However, it is at least three years after the disability onset 
that the negative effect on the number of hours worked is observed. Following 
Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez (2011), Deiana (2013) applies the matching method to 
data collected in 26 European countries. Disabled people are those who have health 
issues that limit their daily activities. He concludes that PWDs have a high propensity 
either to leave the labour market or to move from full-time to part-time jobs. The 
most important effects are seen in countries such as Romania and Cyprus. 
 
Some authors combine the matching method with a difference in difference approach 
when panel data are available. The advantage of this methodology, called difference-
in-difference propensity score matching (DD-PSM), is that it allows the control of 
individual fixed effects and time fixed effects. However, one of the problems faced 
by researchers when using DD-PSM is the reduction in the number of observations 
following matching, which increases the risk of ending up with small samples. In 
fact, individuals who cannot be matched are simply excluded from the analysis. 
Polidano and Vu (2015) use the DD-PSM in their study based on Australian data. 
Their results reveal that disability (measured by activity restrictions) has a negative 
effect on the probability of work. Moreover, it increases the risk of relying on social 
benefits or of belonging to a poor household and these effects persist even three to 
four years after a disability onset. This methodology is also used by Barnay, Duguet, 
Le Clainche, Narcy and Videau (2014) in their analysis based on French data. They 
find that workers of the private sector are more likely than civil servants to lose their 
jobs following a disability onset.  
 
It transpires from this exploration of the literature that research on the link between 
disability and labour supply must take into account endogeneity issues that may 
                                                                                                                                                              
“go through a formal medical procedure conducted by a special independent institution 
(Versorgungsamt ), where he (she) is identified with a particular degree of disability ranging from 1 to 
100%, or 0% in the event that a disability status does not apply.” Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez 
(2011), pp.391. 
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introduce bias in the results. A solution to this econometric problem is to resort to an 
instrumental variable approach. However, given the difficulty of finding valid 
instruments an alternative when panel data are available is to resort to a methodology 
that takes into account (at least partially) unobservable heterogeneities.  
 
A formal summary of hypothesis drawn from the existing literature is presented in 
what follows. An individual’s utility U depends on his consumption of health related 
good and services H and non-health related good and services C. A disability shock 
may increase the amount of H, so we can write H=H(D). U is also influenced by 
unobservable factors k. The utility function can thus be written as follows: U = U 
(H(D), C, k) or  U = U (H, C, k). The maximisation of this utility function is subject 
to a time constraint as well as a budget constraint. In fact, for a given individual, the 
total amount of time available T is divided up between economic activities (L) and 
non economic activities (l); that is T=L+l. Furthermore, the income provided by his 
economic activities Lw (w represents the hourly wage) and unearned income Y (e.g.: 
transfers received) is used for his consumption, so that we can write PHH + PCC = Lw 
+ Y. Here, PH and PC correspond to the price of H and C respectively. The 
combination of these two constraints leads to the following equation: PHH + PCC + 
wl= wT + Y.  The problem to be solved is: 
 
Max U (H, C, k)             subject to  PHH + PCC + wl= wT + Y 
 
The first order conditions are presented in what follows: 
 𝑈𝐻′ = 𝜆𝑃𝐻   and     𝑈𝐶′ = 𝜆𝑃𝐶   =>     𝑈𝐻′𝑈𝐶′ = 𝑃𝐻  𝑃𝐶  
Labour market participation L depends on disability status D but also on factors X 
such as education, gender, etc. L also depends on unobservable factors f such as 
laziness; that is L = L (D, X, f). D can be viewed as a combination of type and 
severity of disability. 
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According to the Grossman’s pure investment theory (1972), people pay attention to 
their health only because health is a determinant of its labour supply. In other words, 
the more an individual experiences a deterioration of its stock of health capital, the 
higher his probability of reducing hours dedicated to economic activities. That being 
said, people can be constrained to leave the labour market if they are suffering from a 
severe disability.  
 
Let D* be the threshold (of disability) for an individual to be forced to reduce the 
time spent in the labour market (without leaving the labour market), while D** is the 
threshold for the individual to be constrained to leave the labour market (D*< D**). 
It is worth noting that in the context of developing countries characterised by poverty, 
people refrain from working only if a severe disability forces them to do so.  
 
That being said, disability does not hinder labour market participation if D< D*. If 
D Î D*,D**éë )  the person can be involve in the labour market but his disability status 
forces him to reduce his working hours.  
 
Factors such as marital status, household size and status in the household (head of the 
household or not) can influence labour supply. Labour supply from people living with 
a partner is expected to be higher than that of single people because the former 
generally have more responsibilities than the latter (in fact they are expected to take 
care of the extended family of both partners). By the same token, household heads 
have a higher labour supply than other family members. Furthermore, compared to 
smaller households, larger households need more material resources to make ends 
meet and hence they have a higher labour supply.  
 
In the context of sub-Saharan countries, agriculture is the main economic activity and 
it is characterised by a gendered division of tasks. Men are involved in activities such 
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as field clearing while women are in charge of less demanding activities such as seed 
sowing. For undemanding/less demanding jobs, the individual may work without 
being forced to reduce his labour supply even when D>D*. Thus when it comes to 
less demanding jobs, there is a threshold Du (with D*<Du and  Du<D**) that 
constrains the person to reduce the time dedicated to economic activities and another 
threshold Duu (Duu >D**) that constraints him to leave the labour market. The first 
hypothesis we aim at testing is that a disability onset reduces the probability for an 
individual to work. The second hypothesis is that since tasks carried on by women are 
less demanding, the effect of a disability onset is more pronounced on men than 
women. Let L denotes labour supply (probability to work or hours worked) while 
indices F and M denotes female and male respectively. We can write: 
 𝜕𝐿𝜕𝐷 < 0; |𝜕𝐿𝐹𝜕𝐷𝐹| <  |𝜕𝐿𝑀𝜕𝐷𝑀| 
 
To summarize, the idea behind these hypotheses is that disability can be associated 
with two thresholds. The first one may force a PWD to reduce his working hours, 
while the second one can constrain him to stop working. However, the threshold 
value or level varies according to the person and the type of work.   Following this 
section dedicated to the literature, we move to the next section where we will describe 
the source of data used for our analysis. 
2.3.   SOURCE OF DATA 
As stated above, the scarcity of research work which analyses the impact of disability 
on labour in African countries is mainly due to the lack of data. Information on 
disability is generally absent from survey questionnaires (Palmer, 2011). Even when 
disability related information is provided, the lack of panel data makes it difficult to 
take into account the possible endogeneity. Uganda is an exception because it has a 
rich panel database that allows us to achieve the objectives of our study. 
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Data used in this paper come from the first two waves of the Uganda National Panel 
Survey (2009/2010 and 2010/2011). This survey is conducted in Uganda by the 
National Bureau of Statistics with the support of the World Bank. The Uganda 
National Panel Survey consists of four waves, but the last two waves (2011/2012 and 
2013/2014) were not taken into consideration in our analysis because they do not 
contain a disability module. In 2009/2010, a representative sample of 2607 
households was surveyed. Households were randomly selected from 322 enumeration 
areas. The 2010/2011 wave includes 2564 households. Surveys were carried out after 
the harvest period (World Bank, 2012). People in our sample are between 15 and 59 
years old. The lower bound is the minimum age required for labour market 
participation. The upper bound is set at 59 years because the retirement age in 
Uganda is 60 (Republic of Uganda, 2013b). 
 
The disability measure used in this paper is the one recommended by the Washington 
Group on Disability (WGD), which is a part of the United Nations. It is a measure 
whose ability to produce internationally comparable statistics has been demonstrated 
(Madans, Loeb and Altman, 2011). Therefore, according to the WGD’s suggestion, 
PWDs in our study are those who declare that they have difficulties with at least one 
of the following functionalities: seeing, hearing, communicating, walking/climbing 
stairs, remembering/concentrating, taking care of themselves (feeding, dressing, 
showering, etc.). It would have been interesting to disaggregate our sample according 
to the severity and the type of disability while carrying out our analysis; however, the 
size of our sample is too small to achieve such a goal in the present study. 
Nevertheless, the decomposition of our sample according to the heterogeneities 
mentioned above is presented in appendices 2.2 to 2.8.  
It is important to highlight that the Washington group measure has some limits (see 
chapter one for the discussion), however we use them in our analysis because we do 
not have a better indicator for disability.  
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In the questionnaire module on economic activity, six categories of workers are 
distinguished: Working for someone else for pay, employer, own-account worker, 
helping without pay in a household business, apprentice, working on the household 
farm or with the household livestock. This last category accounts for 68% of the 
working population in our sample (Appendix 2.9).  
 
The choice of the controls used in our regressions is inspired by the existing 
literature. These variables characterise either the individual (household status, marital 
status) or the household as a whole (household size). Table 2.1 below describes our 
variables. The methodology used for data analysis is presented in the third section. 
 
Table 2. 1 
 Variables description 
Variables Definition 
Dependent variables  
Work 1 = has a job; 0 = otherwise 
Hours worked Number of hours worked 
Explanatory variable  
Disability 1=difficulty seeing, hearing, communicating, walking or 
climbing stairs, remembering or concentrating, taking care 
of one’s self (feeding, dressing, showering, etc.) 
 0= otherwise 
Controls  
Marital status 1= live with a partner, 0= otherwise 
Status in the household 1= household head,  0= otherwise  
Household size Number of people living in the household 
            Source: Author 
 
 
2.4.  METHODOLOGY 
Our strategy consists of running fixed-effects regression using Ordinary Least 
Squares estimation (see chapter one for details about this methodology and its limits). 
Consider the following equation that presents the determinants of labour supply: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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In the specification presented above, i represents a given individual of our sample 
while t corresponds to the wave of the panel that is considered. Y represents the 
labour supply. More precisely, it is the probability of working during the seven days 
preceding the survey if we are interested in the extensive margin of labour supply, 
and the number of hours worked during this time horizon when we analyse the 
intensive margin of labour supply. D is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the 
individual is disabled and 0 otherwise. 𝛼  corresponds to the constant,  𝛽  is the 
coefficient associated to the explanatory variable while 𝛾  represents the vector of 
coefficients associated with the controls X. Controls are: Marital status, status in the 
household and household size. 𝜇𝑖  corresponds to individual fixed effects.  𝜆𝑡  
represent time fixed effects; that is, unobserved factors that vary across time and 
affect all individuals of a given population (Fougère, 2010). For example, the 
likelihood of blindness in sub-Saharan Africa due to black fly stings has decreased 
over time for the entire population following the adoption of measures to eradicate 
onchocerciasis (WHO, 2007). Similarly, the chances of finding or keeping a job, for 
all individuals in a country, depend on the economic situation. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 corresponds to the 
idiosyncratic error term ie the unobservable characteristics that vary across individual 
and through time. Results of our estimations are presented in the next section. 
2.5.  RESULTS 
Our descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.2 below. Our sample is composed 
of 5,126 observations, 84% of people in our sample are employed and dedicate on 
average 28 hours/week to the labour market. These statistics correspond respectively 
to 81% and 26 hours/week during the second wave. People living with a partner  are 
the most represented groups in our sample (56% and 54% respectively). Statistics 
about the disability status reveal that PWDs represent 13% of our sample in the first 
wave. In the second wave 24% of people are declared disabled. During the first wave, 
households are composed of eight members on average and household heads 
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represent 34% of our sample. These figures correspond respectively to nine and 37% 
during the second wave.  
 
Table 2. 2 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Work 84%  81%  
Hours worked66 28 23.36 26 21.35 
Disabled 13%  24%  
Couple 56%  54%  
Household head 34%  37%  
Household size 8 3.34 9 3.67 
Observations 5126  5126  
Variable Mean Standard deviation Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Work 84%  85%  
Hours worked67 28 23.36 29 21.35 
Disabled 13%  25%  
Couple 56%  52%  
Household head 34%  35%  
Household size 8 3.34 9 3.67 
Observations 5126  5126  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
 
As stated above, the health condition we name “disability” may be a temporary 
disability due to poor health conditions (see chapter one for details and for the 
implication of the use of a fixed effects model). Our calculation reveals that 62% of 
PWDs in our sample have their disability since two years or more. 662 individuals in 
                                                        
66 This variable is not conditioned on work, that is we include also people who do not work (hours=0) 
because we are also interested in people whose hours worked change from x hours (x>0) to 0 hours 
because of a disability onset. 
67 This variable is not conditioned on work, that is we include also people who do not work (hours=0) 
because we are also interested in people whose hours worked change from x hours (x>0) to 0 hours 
because of a disability onset. 
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our sample have known a disability onset between the two waves; that is 283 men 
and 379 women. Information available in the database does not allow us to identify 
the causes of this disability onset.  
 
In Table 2.3 below, we present the results of the fixed-effects estimation. When we 
consider our entire sample, results show that disability onset has no effect on the 
extensive margin as well as the intensive margin of labour supply (columns 1 and 2). 
The analysis of gender-disaggregated68 data reveals that this conclusion remains valid 
when the sample is only composed of women. Results from the male sample show 
that hours worked is reduced by 4h/week following the onset of a disability. 
 
According to our hypotheses drawn from the existing literature, results about the 
extensive margin of labour supply suggest that, in general, the disability status of 
people in our sample has not reached a threshold (D** for demanding jobs and Duu 
for less demanding jobs) that constrains them to leave the labour market. These 
results are not surprising since the majority of PWDs in our sample report a moderate 
disability. As stated by Erb and Harriss-White (2002), in an agrarian economy, adults 
refrain from working only in cases of severe disability. Evidence of the non-existence 
of an effect of disability on the probability of working, regardless of the gender, was 
also observed in the case of Malawi (Mizunoya and Mitra, 2013).  
 
Concerning labour intensive margins, like Jones, Davies and Drinkwater (2012), we 
find that disability onset is much more prejudicial to men than to women. This result 
suggests that, in general, disabled men in our sample have reached the threshold D* 
that pushes them to reduce their working hours. For their part, women are involved in 
less demanding jobs/tasks; thus, in general, disabled women in our sample have not 
reached the threshold Du that forces people involved in this type of jobs/tasks to 
spend less time on the labour market.  
 
                                                        
68 Statistics according to the gender are presented in appendixes 2.10 and 2.11. 
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Indeed, there is a division of labour between men and women in agriculture, which is 
the dominant sector in Uganda. According to the literature on the gendered division 
of tasks in the agricultural sector, men are generally responsible for field clearing and 
land plowing, while women are generally in charge of seeding or beating out the 
grain. For example, it would be less practical for a visually impaired person or for 
someone who has difficulty walking to clear a field than to beating out the grain. That 
being said, instead of completely refraining from doing their (agricultural) tasks, it 
may be possible that disabled men tend to reduce their hours of work. Unfortunately, 
the Uganda National Panel Survey does not provide detailed information about the 
tasks (e.g: seeding, field clearing, etc.) performed by the workers; such information 
would have helped us to verify our assumption.  
 
Table 2. 3  
Effect of disability onset on labour supply 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ALL WOMEN MEN 
 Work Hours Work Hours Work Hours 
Disabled -0.00414 -1.292 -0.00301 0.600 -0.00553 -3.799* 
 (0.0124) (1.080) (0.0166) (1.245) (0.0186) (1.790) 
Couple 0.00798 2.978 -0.0209 4.291 0.0460 1.775 
 (0.0464) (2.868) (0.0671) (3.697) (0.0572) (4.410) 
Household 
head 0.0427 2.298 0.0702
+ 3.597 -0.0271 -0.0834 
 (0.0302) (2.295) (0.0367) (2.920) (0.0530) (4.301) 
Household 
size -0.00419 -0.468 -0.00290 -1.071
+ -0.00611 0.156 
 (0.00512) (0.405) (0.00715) (0.562) (0.00640) (0.540) 
Constant 0.856** 29.38** 0.853** 30.10** 0.894** 29.55** 
 (0.0475) (3.699) (0.0676) (4.929) (0.0651) (5.327) 
N= 5126; that is 2653 women and 2473 men 
662 people have known a disability onset between the 2 waves; that is 283 men and 379 women 
Standard errors are robust and clusterized at the household level;  + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
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Controls used in our regression are non significant at 5%. It is important to notice that 
our results are not comparable to those of Bridges et al. (2015) because, unlike us, 
their sample is composed of individuals suffering from a specific handicap and living 
in the capital.  
 
An analysis of our sample using a random effects model (Appendix 2.12) shows that, 
contrary to what we observed with a fixed effects model, disability onset always have 
a negative effect on the intensive margin of labour supply. A negative effect on the 
extensive margin of labour supply is only observed for male. These results suggest 
that we shall take account of any potential endogeneity in our analysis69 
 
In order to test the robustness of our analysis, we excluded people who were disabled 
during both waves from our analysis (so that the “control” group includes only those 
who do not experience any disability shock in the two waves). We observe that our 
conclusion remains valid; that is, only hours worked per week by men are reduced by 
four on average following a disability onset (appendix 2.12). 
 
We also relied on another methodology70 to analyse our data; that is, we combined 
PSM 71  with the fixed effects approach (Appendix 2.12) and results show that 
coefficients associated with our explanatory variable are not significant. It is 
important to notice that by relying on PSM, we end up with very small samples72. 
However, these results should be taken cautiously and they are not directly 
                                                        
69 We did a Hausman test that confirms this. The level of significance is 5%. 
70 We also attempted to use an instrumental variable method. The instruments of disability used here 
are inspired by the study of Mont and Nguyen (2013); that is people’s age and the prevalence of 
disability at the district level. Results (Appendix 2.13) show that these instruments are weakly 
correlated with the disability status on the one hand, and the disability status does not determine the 
probability of work or hours worked on the other hand. 
71  Nearest neighbour matching approach (one  to one, no replacement).  
72 In fact, this methodology requires that only people from the treated group (non disabled in wave 1 
and disabled in wave 2) and the control group (non disabled during the 2 waves) who have similar 
characteristics are included in the analysis. 
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comparable with those presented in table 2.3 since the analysis is only based on 
observations that are in the common support region73.  
 
In an attempt to go further in our analysis, we use an alternative measure of disability 
in our fixed-effects model (see results in Appendix 2.14). Here PWDs are those who 
have to stop their usual activities for at least one day from their usual activities 74 
(during the 30 days preceding the interview) because of health issues (Alam, 2015). 
Results concerning the extensive margin of labour supply corroborate those presented 
previously. That is, the onset of a disability does not determine the probability for a 
person to work. Findings concerning the intensive margin of men’s labour supply 
also remain robust. However, contrary to what we observed in table 2.3, we find here 
that disability onset affects women’s working time. We also analyse the effect of 
these number of days (when people were force to cease their activities) on the labour 
supply and results show that in general when the number of days increases, the labour 
supply is affected75.  
 
Insofar as the Ugandan population is predominantly located in rural areas on the one 
hand and that work in household farms is dominant, we take our analysis further by 
evaluating the impact of disability onset on the agricultural labour supply in rural 
areas (Table 2.4). Indeed, according to our data, 69% of labourers work on household 
farms and 92% of these agricultural workers live in rural areas. 
 
Our results are presented in table 2.4 below and they show that our conclusion about 
the effect of disability onset remains robust. Indeed, disability onset affects only the 
intensive margin of men’s labour supply that it reduces by 5h/week. Significant 
                                                        
73 In the PSM approach, the “common support” refers to the fact that only those of the treated group 
(non disabled in wave 1 and disabled in wave 2) and the control group (non disabled whatever the 
wave considered) who have similar observed characteristics are includes in the analysis. 
74 The question is: “For how many days did you have to stop doing your usual activities due to illness 
or injury during the past 30 days? ” 
75 Appendix 2.16 presents results obtained when we consider only those with a physical disability, that 
is we exclude those who have difficulties remembering or concentrating.  
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controls are household size and marital status. Regarding household size, when it 
increases by one member, the number of hours worked per person decreases by one 
hour per week. This result remains robust even if we split our sample according to  
gender. Such a result corroborates those of Mugume and Canagarajah (2005). In their 
analysis of the determinants of labour market participation in Uganda, these authors 
find that there is a negative impact of household size on members’ labour supply. 
This may be explained by the following fact: For a given cultivable land, large 
households can benefit from a more abundant workforce and thus hours worked per 
individual can be reduced. 
 
Regarding marital status, results are mixed. Compared to single individuals, people 
with a partner spend more time in the labour market. This conclusion is similar to the 
one presented by Bridges and Lawson (2009) who find that in Uganda, being in a 
couple has a positive effect on labour supply. This could be explained by the fact that 
in the African context, married people are given more responsibilities. In addition to 
taking care of the members of their households, married people generally also have to 
help relatives who live outside their home. However, the gender-based analysis 
reveals that marital status only affects women's hours of work. Such a result may 
suggest that men prepare for their future role as household head, long before they 
cohabit with their partners, by adopting a labour supply behaviour befitting of the 
potential main bread-winner.  
 
Regarding the extensive margin of labour supply, we find a negative effect of being 
married on work when we consider the sample as a whole. This result is counter-
intuitive because it seems to indicate that married people, despite the additional 
burdens they have, are less involved in economic activities than their peers. However, 
such a result is no longer valid when the sample is decomposed according to gender.  
 
It is apparent from our analysis that in Uganda, the onset of a disability as measured 
by functional limitations, does not influence the probability of work. Furthermore, 
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only men experience a drop in hours worked following the onset of a disability; and 
the reduction is quite low (less than one hour per day). For more than one reason, 
these findings do not imply that disability is a marginal problem that does not deserve 
the attention of the Ugandan government. Firstly, a reduction in working time of 4 
hours/week76 may seem negligible, however on an annual basis this represents more 
than 200 hours of work lost per disabled person. If the latter figure was multiplied by 
the number of PWDs, the losses incurred at the national level would be large. In fact 
for the 5.1 million of PWDs in Uganda, the total  amount of earnings lost per year is 
estimated to be 424.320.000$77. Secondly, in developing countries, families generally 
rely on men when it comes to meeting material needs. Thus, by reducing men’s 
working time, disability is likely to expose entire families to material insecurity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
76 This represents 13% of hours worked per week by those who are involved in economic activities in 
our sample. 
77 Information about earnings in Uganda, used to estimate the amount of money lost,  comes from the 
Uganda Urban Labour Force Survey of 2015. 
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Table 2. 4  
 Effect of disability onset on agricultural labour supply in rural areas 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ALL WOMEN MEN 
 Work Hours Work Hours Work Hours 
Disabled 0.00780 -0.864 0.00673 1.479 0.00863 -5.247* 
 (0.0247) (1.246) (0.0293) (1.377) (0.0432) (2.380) 
Couple -0.131* 7.668* -0.0968 11.25* -0.167 6.120 
 (0.0650) (3.770) (0.0892) (4.374) (0.106) (6.548) 
Household 
head -0.1000
+ 2.509 -0.109+ 4.113 -0.0461 -5.717 
 (0.0542) (2.929) (0.0656) (3.304) (0.141) (6.237) 
Household 
size 0.00184 -1.349
** 0.00577 -1.298* -0.00190 -1.313* 
 (0.0101) (0.448) (0.0102) (0.572) (0.0159) (0.628) 
Constant 0.886** 28.35** 0.894** 22.85** 0.841** 36.57** 
 (0.0928) (4.350) (0.110) (5.613) (0.157) (5.657) 
         N= 2863; that is 1394 women and 1469 men 
        403 people have known a disability onset between the 2 waves; that is 166 men and 237 women. 
        Standard errors are robust and clusterized at the household level. 
            + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
       Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
 
2.6.CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the impact of disability onset on labour supply has been the subject of 
many research studies in developed countries. However, few studies are centred on 
this topic in developing countries. Furthermore, existing papers tend to focus on the 
extensive margin of labour supply. Our study is based on panel data collected in 
Uganda and its objective is to analyse the impact of disability onset on labour supply.  
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Uganda was chosen because, on the one hand, it is one of the few countries in sub-
Saharan Africa that have distinguished themselves in their willingness to improve the 
living conditions of PWDs; and, on the other hand, it possesses a database that is 
suitable for our analysis since it has a panel structure and contains information on 
disability.  
 
We apply ordinary least squares on a fixed effects model and find that disability onset 
does not influence the probability of working in Uganda. Furthermore, the analysis of 
the intensive margin of labour supply shows that only men’s hours of work are 
reduced following a disability onset. Our paper has some limitations however. Firstly, 
the fixed effects model which has its limits. Secondly, PWDs are put together 
whatever the type and the severity of their health issues; yet it would have been 
interesting to conduct an analysis that does not ignore heterogeneity (severity, type of 
disability) among PWDs if we had a bigger sample of disabled people.  
 
A policy recommendation emerges from our work. A section devoted to disability 
should not disappear from household surveys (this is the case in the two last surveys 
conducted in 2011/2012 and 2013/2014) because the absence of statistics on a 
vulnerable group can only reinforce its invisibility (Abimanyi-Ochom and Mannan, 
2014).   
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendixes 2.1 to 2.16 are presented below.  
 
 
Appendix 2.1 
Percentage of people by disability status and region (Number in parentheses) 
 
Disabled 
 
Region 
No Yes Total 
Central 
85.65 14.35 100 
 
(1241) (208) (1449) 
Eastern 
86.78 13.22 100 
 
(1109) (169) (1278) 
Northern 
83.71 16.29 100 
 
(1064) (207) (1271) 
Western 
93.62 6.38 100 
 
(1056) (72) (1128) 
Total 
87.2 12.8 100 
N 
(4470) (656) (5126) 
Statistics based on the first wave 
               Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
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Appendix 2.2 
 Percentage of people by severity of disability (Number in parentheses) 
Severity Men Women Total 
No difficulty 88.60 85.90 87.20 
 (2191) (2279) (4470) 
Some difficulty 8.49 11.80 10.20 
 (210) (313) (523) 
A lot of 
difficulty 2.22 2.15 2.18 
 (55) (57) (112) 
Unable 0.69 0.15 0.41 
 (17) (4) (21) 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
N (2473) (2653) (5126) 
Statistics based on the first wave 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
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Appendix 2.3 
 Percentage of people by level of difficulty seeing (Number in parentheses) 
 
Seeing Men Women Total 
No difficulty 94.78 91.63 93.15 
 (2343) (2431) (4774) 
Some difficulty 4.53 7.76 6.20 
 (112) (206) (318) 
A lot of 
difficulty 0.61 0.57 0.59 
 (15) (15) (30) 
Unable 0.08 0.04 0.06 
 (2) (1) (3) 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
N (2472) (2653) (5125) 
        Statistics based on the first wave 
        Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
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Appendix 2.4 
Percentage of people by level of difficulty hearing (Number in parentheses) 
 
Hearing Men Women Total 
No difficulty 97.49 97.66 97.58 
 (2411) (2590) (5001) 
Some difficulty 1.98 2.11 2.05 
 (49) (56) (105) 
A lot of difficulty 0.36 0.23 0.29 
 (9) (6) (15) 
Unable 0.16 0.00 0.08 
 (4) (0) (4) 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
N (2473) (2652) (5125) 
Statistics based on the first wave 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
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Appendix 2.5 
 Percentage of people by difficulty walking/climbing stairs (Number in parentheses) 
Walking Men Women Total 
No difficulty 96.56 95.21 95.86 
 (2388) (2525) (4913) 
Some difficulty 2.75 3.77 3.28 
 (68) (100) (168) 
A lot of difficulty 0.57 0.98 0.78 
 (14) (26) (40) 
Unable 0.12 0.04 0.08 
 (3) (1) (4) 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
N (2473) (2652) (5125) 
Statistics based on the first wave 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
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Appendix 2.6 
Percentage of people by difficulty remembering/concentrating 
 (Number in parentheses) 
Remembering Men Women Total 
No difficulty 98.22 97.85 98.03 
 (2428) (2595) (5023) 
Some difficulty 0.81 1.62 1.23 
 (20) (43) (63) 
A lot of difficulty 0.73 0.45 0.59 
 (18) (12) (30) 
Unable 0.24 0.08 0.16 
 (6) (2) (8) 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
N (2472) (2652) (5124) 
Statistics based on the first wave 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
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Appendix 2.7 
 Percentage of people by difficulty taking care of themselves (Number in parentheses) 
Self-care Men Women Total 
No difficulty 99.07 99.47 99.28 
 (2449) (2638) (5087) 
Some difficulty 0.49 0.38 0.43 
 (12) (10) (22) 
A lot of difficulty 0.32 0.08 0.20 
 (8) (2) (10) 
Unable 0.12 0.08 0.10 
 (3) (2) (5) 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
N (2472) (2652) (5124) 
Statistics based on the first wave 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
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Appendix 2.8 
Percentage of people by difficulty communicating (Number in parentheses) 
 Men Women Total 
No difficulty 99.03 99.59 99.32 
 (2448) (2640) (5088) 
Some difficulty 0.44 0.26 0.35 
 (11) (7) (18) 
A lot of difficulty 0.32 0.11 0.21 
 (8) (3) (11) 
Unable 0.20 0.04 0.12 
 (5) (1) (6) 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
N (2472) (2651) (5123) 
Statistics based on the first wave 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
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Appendix 2.9 
 Disability by job type (percentage in parentheses) 
 Disabled  
Type of job No Yes Total 
Wage-earner 419 41 460 
 (11.21) (7.35) (10.71) 
Employer 15 0 15 
 (0.4) (0) (0.35) 
Own account worker 628 132 760 
 (16.8) (23.66) (17.69) 
Household business 101 12 113 
 (2.7) (2.15) (2.63) 
Apprentice 10 3 13 
 (0.27) (0.54) (0.3) 
Household farm 2,564 370 2,934 
 (68.61) (66.31) (68.31) 
Total 3,737 558 4,295 
 (100) (100) (100) 
Statistics based on the first wave 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
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Appendix 2.10 
Percentage of people by disability status  
Disabled Men Women Total 
No 88.60 85.90 87.20 
Yes 11.40 14.10 12.80 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
N (2473) (2653) (5126) 
Statistics based on the first wave 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
 
 
 
Appendix 2.11 
Percentage of people by disability status and gender 
Sex Not disabled Disabled Total 
Men 49.02 42.99 48.24 
Women 50.98 57.01 51.76 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
N (4470) (656) (5126) 
Statistics based on the first wave 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
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Appendix 2.12 
 
 
Effect of a disability onset on labour supply (people who are disabled during both 
waves are excluded from the sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ALL WOMEN MEN 
 Work Hours Work Hours Work Hours 
Disabled -0.00410 -1.301 -0.00310 0.581 -0.00542 -3.795* 
 (0.0124) (1.080) (0.0166) (1.247) (0.0186) (1.791) 
       
Couple -0.00661 1.649 -0.0319 3.740 0.0266 0.110 
 (0.0491) (2.921) (0.0742) (4.060) (0.0569) (4.205) 
       
Household 
head 0.0348 2.795 0.0628
+ 4.980 -0.0265 -1.053 
 (0.0312) (2.382) (0.0376) (3.065) (0.0547) (4.308) 
       
Household 
size -0.00308 -0.355 -0.0000117 -0.881 -0.00683 0.171 
 (0.00534) (0.431) (0.00744) (0.608) (0.00660) (0.559) 
       
Constant 0.860** 29.44** 0.839** 29.12** 0.912** 31.21** 
 (0.0499) (3.837) (0.0720) (5.358) (0.0671) (5.270) 
Observations 9692 7732 4996 3910 4696 3822 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Effect of disability on labour supply (Random effects model) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ALL WOMEN MEN 
 Work Hours Work Hours Work Hours 
Disabled -0.0138 -4.635** 0.000493 -2.218* -0.0409** -7.140** 
 (0.0103) (0.736) (0.0133) (0.889) (0.0154) (1.154) 
       
Couple 0.176** 4.660** 0.218** 4.063** 0.142** 6.799** 
 (0.0102) (0.617) (0.0142) (0.848) (0.0206) (1.701) 
       
Household 
head 0.108
** 9.369** 0.167** 7.120** 0.109** 7.274** 
 (0.00739) (0.550) (0.0136) (0.994) (0.0203) (1.708) 
       
Household 
 Size -0.00128 -0.0794 -0.00173 -0.153 0.000336 -0.108 
 (0.00163) (0.114) (0.00208) (0.126) (0.00192) (0.166) 
       
Constant 0.718** 22.52** 0.688** 22.63** 0.724** 23.92** 
 (0.0164) (1.059) (0.0221) (1.357) (0.0219) (1.562) 
Observations 10252 8155 5306 4145 4946 4010 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
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Propensity Score Matching Approach 
 
 
Determinants of disability 
 (1) 
 Disabled 
  
Couple 0.185* 
 (0.0751) 
  
Household head 0.360** 
 (0.0656) 
  
Household size 0.00368 
 (0.00961) 
  
Constant -1.802** 
 (0.103) 
Observations 5126 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
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Effect of disability onset on labour supply (Propensity Score Matching Approach) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ALL WOMEN MEN 
 Work Hours Work Hours Work Hours 
Disabled 0.0139 2.281 0.0142 1.304 0.0159 2.447 
 (0.0273) (2.430) (0.0409) (3.531) (0.0346) (3.433) 
Couple 0.0802 10.74 0.111 14.13 0.0185 2.532 
 (0.126) (6.745) (0.0897) (9.046) (0.248) (4.261) 
Household 
head -0.00581 1.709 -0.000969 3.398 0.00701 -12.90
** 
 (0.0993) (7.641) (0.103) (8.514) (0.0344) (3.152) 
Household 
size -0.0319
* -0.536 -0.0448* -1.088 -0.0128 0.188 
 (0.0151) (0.864) (0.0179) (1.059) (0.0233) (1.418) 
Constant 1.017** 31.39** 1.069** 25.33* 0.954** 53.11** 
 (0.144) (9.612) (0.138) (11.88) (0.250) (10.07) 
Observa-
tions 582 582 324 324 258 258 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
After the estimation of the determinants of disability (previous table), a propensity score is 
calculated for each individual, then individuals are matched according to the closeness of 
their propensity scores (nearest neighbour approach, no replacement). Finally, only those in 
the common support area are kept for the analysis of the effect of disability on labour supply.   
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Appendix 2.13 
 Results of the Two-Stage Least Squares regressions 
 
First Stage: Effect of instruments on the disability 
 Dependent variable: disability status 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ALL WOMEN MEN 
Age -0.00197 -0.00738+ 0.00325 
 (0.00280) (0.00421) (0.00370) 
Prevalence 0.125+ 0.150 0.0977 
 (0.0658) (0.0962) (0.0891) 
Constant 0.166+ 0.350* -0.00420 
 (0.0897) (0.138) (0.116) 
Observations 5126 2653 2473 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
 
F statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ALL WOMEN MEN 
 Work Hours Work Hours Work Hours 
F-Statistic 1.338 1.607 0.758 1.458 2.240 1.663 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
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Second Stage: Effect of disability on labour supply 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ALL WOMEN MEN 
 Work Hours Work Hours Work Hours 
Disabled -0.532 80.27 -0.0870 13.59 -0.347 40.66 
 (0.705) (57.36) (0.820) (32.48) (0.521) (46.72) 
Couple -0.00043 2.282 -0.0224 4.559 0.0398 0.366 
 (0.0440) (4.526) (0.0586) (3.814) (0.0546) (5.067) 
Household 
head 0.0256 5.446 0.0668 4.272 -0.0289 0.259 
 (0.0463) (4.703) (0.0563) (3.417) (0.0652) (5.621) 
Household 
size -0.00338 -0.661 -0.00269 -1.145
* -0.00601 0.230 
 (0.00480) (0.553) (0.00624) (0.473) (0.00622) (0.590) 
Observa 
Tions 5126 5126 2653 2653 2473 2473 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
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Appendix 2.14 
Effect of disability onset on labour supply (alternative measure of disability) 
Disability status is a binary variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ALL WOMEN MEN 
 Work Hours Work Hours Work Hours 
Disabled -0.0129 -3.126** -0.0117 -2.613** -0.0147 -3.778** 
 (0.00938) (0.739) (0.0126) (0.935) (0.0138) (1.162) 
Couple 0.00701 2.663 -0.0226 3.841 0.0453 1.601 
 (0.0457) (2.899) (0.0696) (3.782) (0.0519) (4.367) 
Household 
head 0.0445 2.371 0.0730
+ 3.974 -0.0278 -0.946 
 (0.0311) (2.344) (0.0375) (2.946) (0.0545) (4.406) 
Household 
size -0.00360 -0.492 -0.00267 -1.078
+ -0.00504 0.109 
 (0.00521) (0.413) (0.00732) (0.574) (0.00640) (0.551) 
Constant 0.856** 30.39** 0.857** 31.27** 0.891** 30.94** 
 (0.0474) (3.766) (0.0698) (5.024) (0.0630) (5.420) 
Observa 
tions 5126 5126 2653 2653 2473 2473 
Standard errors in parentheses;      
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
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Appendix 2.15  
Effect of disability onset on labour supply (alternative measure of disability) 
Disability status is a continuous variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ALL WOMEN MEN 
 Work Hours Work Work Hours Work 
Number of 
days -0.0033
** -0.454** -0.00128 -0.391** -0.005** -0.525** 
 (0.00123) (0.0960) (0.00183) (0.105) (0.00159) (0.173) 
Couple 0.00592 2.632 -0.0232 3.756 0.0425 1.608 
 (0.0456) (2.925) (0.0698) (3.831) (0.0511) (4.389) 
Household 
head 0.0464 2.487 0.0730
+ 4.036 -0.0241 -0.670 
 (0.0310) (2.363) (0.0376) (2.976) (0.0535) (4.420) 
Household 
size -0.00354 -0.494 -0.00275 -1.086
+ -0.00490 0.117 
 (0.00521) (0.414) (0.00732) (0.576) (0.00636) (0.551) 
Constant 0.858** 30.28** 0.856** 31.30** 0.894** 30.58** 
 (0.0473) (3.776) (0.0699) (5.042) (0.0623) (5.432) 
Observa 
tions 5126 5126 2653 2653 2473 2473 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
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Appendix 2.16  
Effect of disability onset on labour supply (mental disability excluded) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ALL WOMEN MEN 
 Work Hours Work Work Hours Work 
Disabled 0.00310 -1.023 -0.00124 0.836 0.00910 -3.509+ 
 (0.0125) (1.163) (0.0175) (1.306) (0.0173) (1.952) 
Couple -0.0141 3.362 -0.0209 5.195 0.00555 1.790 
 (0.0407) (2.885) (0.0686) (3.711) (0.0434) (4.414) 
Household 
head 0.0421 2.437 0.0735
+ 3.928 -0.0243 -0.126 
 (0.0310) (2.342) (0.0383) (3.015) (0.0533) (4.292) 
Household 
size -0.00404 -0.472 -0.00176 -1.106
+ -0.00681 0.163 
 (0.00532) (0.420) (0.00754) (0.584) (0.00639) (0.552) 
Constant 0.870** 29.21** 0.845** 29.77** 0.924** 29.66** 
 (0.0475) (3.805) (0.0709) (5.089) (0.0633) (5.395) 
Observations 5054 5054 2435 2435 2619 2619 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNPS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TROISIÈME CHAPITRE - 
DISABILITY AND LONG TERM COPING STRATEGIES IN INDONESIA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A disability shock exposes households to material insecurity due to the burden of out-
of-pocket expenditures it is associated with, but also because of the labour income 
losses it can involve. An exploration of the literature reveals that studies on the 
impact of disability on household welfare in Low and Middle Income Countries are 
scarce. Moreover, due to a lack of data, existing papers are limited to short-term 
analysis, relegating the knowledge regarding long run mechanisms to a black box. In 
order to fill this gap, we rely on a unique Indonesian longitudinal dataset whose 
observations are followed through 17 years. The goal of this study is to analyse the 
coping mechanisms adopted by households with disabled members. The results of our 
estimations, based on a fixed effects model, reveal that households accommodate 
such a health shock by decreasing their non-health related expenditures. The negative 
effect observed on education expenditures reveals that disability of households’ adult 
members represents a threat to human capital accumulation of younger generations. 
Household reliance on external coping strategies is highlighted by the increase of 
transfers received from relatives. 
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3.1.   INTRODUCTION 
The onset of a disability within a household is likely to harm its welfare through 
pernicious effects on its material resources. An increase of health expenditures is the 
most obvious and direct output observed following such a health shock. Moreover, 
the household may observe a decrease in its labour income if the ailing person is an 
adult and/or if an adult household member has to play the role of caregiver for the 
disabled person (WHO, 2011).  
 
Different strategies can be adopted by the household in order to lessen the negative 
impacts of a disability shock. Some of these strategies can be considered as internal to 
the household since they do not require any external intervention; here we can 
include: The reduction of consumption, the selling of assets and the augmentation of 
household labour supply in order to increase household’s earnings. External strategies 
are: Borrowings from acquaintances or financial organisations and the reliance on 
transfers provided by relatives, government as well as non-governmental 
organizations (Yilma et al., 2014). Since material insecurity can trigger a snowball 
effect, from policy perspectives it is important to understand how materially 
vulnerable are households following a disability of their members. 
 
An exploration of the literature reveals that papers about the coping mechanisms of 
households in Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs) following household 
disability shocks are scarce. Actually, existing papers on the one hand are concerned 
with other measures of health shock than disability; on the other hand, they focus 
their analysis on the short and middle run. Regarding the latter point, the study of 
Beegle and al. (2008) constitutes the exception. Using Tanzanian data it shows that 
households who experience an adult’s death are exposed to a consumption reduction 
in the short run but no significant effect is observed in the long term. However, the 
authors leave it to future research to analyse coping mechanisms rendering long-term 
consumption insurance possible. That being said and as underlined by Mitra and al. 
 152 
(2016) or Dhanaraj, Srinivasan, Mahambare, Ramach, Kumar, Kumar and Sankar 
(2015), there is a need for studies that use long-term data. The contribution of this 
paper is to fill this gap observed in the literature by relying on longitudinal data, that 
covers 17 years, to analyse households’ coping strategies following a disability 
shock. Our data come from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS).  
 
Indonesia is a country located on the Pacific Ring of Fire (an area with intense 
tectonic activity), which is exposed to recurrent natural disasters such as: 
Earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, floods and landslides. Table 3.1 below 
presents the occurrence of natural disasters between 1980 and 2014 in Indonesia.  
 
Table 3. 1 
 Occurrence of natural disasters in Indonesia between 1980 and 2014 
Type of Disaster Number of 
Occurrence 
Death 
(Person) 
Total Affected 
(Person) 
Economic 
Damage 
(Indoneasian 
Rupiah) 
(U$’000)
Flood 154 6,408 8,357,541 6,378,016,000 
Earthquake and 
Tsunami 
85 179,441 8,505,943 11,479,576,000 
Landslide 49 2,081 397,783 121,745,000 
Volcanic Activity 42 729 930,153 530,190,000 
Wildfire 9 300 3,034,478 9,329,000,000 
Storm 6 27 15,188 1,000,000 
Drought 6 1,266 1,083,000 89,000,000 
Total 351 190,252 22,324,086 27,928,527,000 
Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency (2015) 
 
As highlighted by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (2015), these disasters 
are responsible for injuries and trauma that may result in disabilities. In an attempt to 
analyse the health burden of one the strongest earthquakes experienced by Indonesia 
(the Sumatra earthquake that occurred on the 30th September 2009), Sudaryo, 
Endarti, Rivany, Phalkey, Marx and Guha-Sapir (2012) found that disability scores 
were significantly higher among injured compared to non-injured people. It would 
 153 
have been interesting to analyse the role played by natural disasters in the disability 
shock in the present paper; unfortunately, the IFLS does not provide information 
about the cause of disability. 
 
According to the World Report on Disability (WHO, 2011), the prevalence of 
disability in Indonesia is 21%78. Such a statistic is higher than the one observed at the 
world level, which is 15%. Starting in 2006, a pilot programme was launched in five 
provinces (out of 27) and extended to five new provinces in 2008. Although the goal 
was to provide people suffering from a severe disability with a cash transfer, a tiny 
proportion of the targeted population has actually been covered by the programme79 
(Adioetomo et al., 2014). Indonesia is in the process of the implementation of a 
national health insurance program since 2014 whose objective is to cover the entire 
population including People living with a disability (PWDs) by 2019.  
 
Social protection for PWDs is a mean that may lighten the financial repercussion of 
disability on the household. Actually there is much evidence (Tibble 2005; Zaidi and 
Burchardt 2005; Braithwaite and Mont 2009) showing that compared to their non-
disabled counterparts, households with disabled people face extra costs that include 
expenditures on items like medical care or access to information. Such a conclusion 
has also been validated in the case of Indonesia (Adioetomo et al., 2014). However, 
as highlighted by Adioetomo et al. (2014), social protection programmes in Indonesia 
fail to explicitly take into account those additional costs experienced by households 
with disabled members. 
 
As noticed above, in parallel with these extra expenditures, households may be 
confronted with a drop of their earnings. Disability represents a barrier to labour 
supply and thus affects the amount of income the household can rely on for living. 
                                                        
78 Statistics based on a 2007 Survey.  
79 IFLS does not provide information about this cash transfer so, we are not able to identify households 
that receive such a transfer in our sample. 
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Recent statistics from Indonesia show that 56% of people80 with a moderate disability 
work while the proportion drops to 26% for the group with a severe disability; the 
proportion is 64% for those without disabilities (Adioetomo et al., 2014). The burden 
in earnings drop may also increase if family members involvement in caregiving 
activities lead them to sacrifice their labour market activities (Bales, 2013). 
 
The goal of this study is to understand to what extent disability affects households in 
Indonesia in terms of health expenditures and labour income. Our aim is also to 
explore coping mechanisms adopted by households to deal with the disability shock. 
Contrary to the few existing studies in the LMICs context, that have limited their 
analysis to a short-term analysis due to a lack of data, this paper will focus on the 
long-term. Impacts of disability on households may be stronger in the long run than 
in the short term since borrowing appears to be the most recurrent coping strategy in 
LMICs in general (Islam and Maitra, 2012; Bales, 2013; Mohanan, 2013) and in 
Indonesia in particular (Gertler et al., 2009; Genoni, 2012). In fact, households who 
rely on borrowing as a coping strategy may have to face high interests repayments in 
the long term leading them to worse material insecurity than in the short term (Mitra 
et al., 2016; Dhanaraj et al., 2015).  
 
Our paper is structured as follows: The second section presents the literature review 
and the third section exposes data used for our analysis. The fourth section concerns 
the empirical strategy while the fifth section focuses on the results. The conclusion is 
presented in the sixth section.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
80 People who are at least 15 years old.  
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3.2.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
In accordance with the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and 
Health (ICF) 81  developed by the WHO, functional limitations and activities 
limitations (e.g: difficulty walking, eating) are used as measures of disabilities in 
existing studies depending on data availability. An exploration of the literature on 
households coping strategies following a disability shock reveals that the debate 
revolves around households’ ability to insure consumption. Based on American data, 
Stephens’ (2001) study reveals that following a disability shock, households are able 
to insure their consumption in the short term because of the small drop in household 
income. However, beyond this time horizon the hypothesis of consumption insurance 
is invalidated reflecting households’ vulnerability in the long run. The evidence of the 
increasing deterioration of households’ welfare in the long term is confirmed by 
Meyer and Mok82 (2013); however, unlike Stephens (2001) they find a small drop in 
short-term consumption.  
 
Studies based on LMICs are scarce and do not rely on long-term data; they are 
presented in what follows. Bales (2013) and Mitra et al. (2016) focus on Vietnam. 
These authors agree that Vietnamese households insure their consumption despite an 
increase of health expenditures due to disability. However, a difference is observed in 
the coping mechanisms adopted. While in the first paper transfers (formal as well as 
informal) received help the household deal with the effects of the shock, in the second 
one, a set of strategies are adopted such as asset selling, loan uptaking and school 
expenditure reduction.  
 
Contrary to the previous authors, Islam and Maitra (2012) investigate the Bangladesh 
context and conclude that access to microcredit plays a great role in consumption 
                                                        
81 According to ICF, PWDs are those who, due to health conditions, suffer from impairments (e.g : 
blindness, deafness), activities limitations (e.g : difficulty eating, walking…) or participation 
restrictions (e.g : facing discrimination in transportation, employment)  (WHO, 2011) 
82 Their results are also based on American data.  
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insurance. Actually, those who are not affiliated to microfinance institutions (MFI) 
have to sell their livestock in order to insure their consumption while MFI 
membership prevents households from livestock depletion. For their part, Heltberg 
and Lund (2009) are interested in Pakistani data; their results reveal that households 
with a disabled member are more exposed to food insecurity. However, it is worth 
noticing that, despite the risk of recall bias (Ravallion, 2014; Mitra et al., 2016), 
Heltberg and Lund use a retrospective module for information about disability shocks 
and coping strategies. Actually households are asked if they experienced a disability 
shock during the three previous years and what kind of strategies they adopted 
following such a shock.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, only three papers are interested in the coping 
mechanisms of households facing disability shocks in Indonesia. Gertler and Gruber 
(2002) find that a disability shock decreases household earnings and prevents it from 
insuring the consumption of its members and the effect increases with the severity of 
disability. However in a later study that attempts to deepen the previous paper, 
Gertler et al. (2009) found that access to microfinance allows affected households to 
insure their consumption because of loans and savings opportunities. For his part, 
Genoni (2012) does not find any significant effect of disability on household non-
medical expenditures. An attempt to determine which mechanisms allow the 
household to insure its consumption despite the health shock reveals that households 
rely on transfers from non co-residents family members instead of wealth depletion.  
 
The rest of papers presented below are based on other LMICs and use measures of 
health such as illness, injury, death or Body Mass Index (BMI). Some authors find 
that households are not able to insure their non-health consumption following a health 
shock. This is the case for Wagstaff  (2007), Wagstaff and Lindelow (2014) and 
Somi, Butler, Vahid, Njau and Abdulla (2009). 
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Among studies that find evidence of consumption insurance, resort to borrowing 
appears to be the recurrent strategy (Mohanan, 2013; Sparrow, Poel, Hadiwidjaja, 
Yumna, Warda and Suryahadi, 2014; Yilma et al., 2014; Dhanaraj et al., 2015; Khan, 
Bedi and Sparrow, 2015). The other external (to the household) strategy is transfers 
from relatives (Sparrow et al., 2014). Internal strategies vary from assets selling 
(Grimm, 2006; Yilma et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2015) to savings depletion (Yilma et 
al., 2014) or an increase of labour supply (Grimm, 2006).  
 
An issue that arises when analysing the impact of disability on the outcomes of 
interest is endogeneity that can have three sources: Error in the measurement of 
disability, reverse causality and variable omission. Concerning the first source, 
measures of disability in household surveys generally come from self-reporting and 
thus can be influenced by the respondent’s socio economic status. Reverse causality 
arises because besides the effect of disability on household income or expenditures, 
for example, there is evidence that those two variables can also determine the level of 
disability in the household. Concerning variables omission, there are some 
unobservable variables such as preferences that can influence disability and the 
outcomes of interest simultaneously. 
 
The use of a quasi-experimental method or of instrumental variables is recommended 
to control for endogeneity. However, since it is not obvious to find valid instruments 
on the one hand, and that data allowing researchers to rely on quasi-experimental 
methods are not always available on the other hand, many researchers rely on a fixed 
effects method in the presence of endogeneity. Studies presented above generally use 
a fixed effects method; few of them are based on a quasi experimental method 
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(Mohanan, 2013)83 or an instrumental variable setting (Islam and Maitra84, 2012; 
Genoni85, 2012). 
 
To summarize our literature review, it appears that studies concerned with the impact 
of a disability shock, in particular, and health shock, in general, agree on the increase 
of health expenditures following such a health shock, most of them conclude that 
households are able to insure their short term consumption following health shocks. 
Borrowing appears to be the most recurrent strategy adopted.  
 
A formal summary of hypothesis drawn from the existing literature. The household’s 
utility U depends on its consumption of health related goods/services H and the 
consumption of non-health related goods/services (C). U may also be influenced by 
unobservable factors k. That is U = U (H, C, k). Since a disability shock may lead to 
an increase of H, we can write H=H (D), so that U is written U=U(H(D), C, k). 
Household members face a budget constraint as well as a time constraint. Regarding 
the first constraint, it can be written as follows: PHH + PCC  = Lw + Y. In this 
equation PH and PC   represent the price associated to H and C respectively. Y 
represents household non-earned income, w is the hourly wage while L corresponds 
to the time spent in the labour market. Concerning the time constraint, individuals 
have to split their time between economic activities and non-economic activities so 
that T=L+l. The combination of these two constraints results in:  
 PHH + PCC + wl= wT + Y. The household has to maximise its utility: 
  
Max U (H, C, k) subject to: PHH + PCC + wl= wT + Y. 
 
The first orders conditions result in what follows: 
                                                        
83 The exogenous shock is a bus accident.  
84 Microcredit receipt is instrumented by the probability that the household is eligible in a program 
village. 
85  Disability is instrumented by the interaction between changes in prices of health services and 
individual demographic characteristics (age and gender).  
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𝑈𝐻′ = 𝜆𝑃𝐻  and     𝑈𝐶′ = 𝜆𝑃𝐶   =>     𝑈𝐻′𝑈𝐶′ = 𝑃𝐻 𝑃𝐶  
 
In line with the theoretical framework proposed by Mitra et al. (2016), a disability 
shock can affect both income and households’ consumption. In other words, at the 
household level, a disability shock is associated with an increase in health 
expenditures as well as a decrease in labour income. Affected households can rely on 
several coping strategies to make ends meet. They can choose to increase their 
income (eg: more labour supply) or to reduce their non-health consumption. These 
effects are presented below. 
 
We assume that following a disability shock, the direct effect is generally an increase 
of the health related expenditures H, so that we can write ¶H¶D > 0 . If the disabled 
people are adults, their labour supply L can be affected leading to a decrease of the 
earned income Z=Lw, that is ¶Z¶D < 0 .   
 
Due to the increase of health related expenditures H and/or the decrease of earned 
income Z following a disability shock, households have to adopt strategies in order to 
survive. The strategy can consist of a decrease of non-health expenditures C and/or an 
increase of the material resources necessary to finance household consumption. C is 
an aggregate that is composed of food expenditures F, education expenditures E and 
non-food expenditures NF (other than H and E). So we have  
 𝜕𝐶𝜕𝐷 < 0;  𝜕𝐹𝜕𝐷 < 0; 𝜕𝐸𝜕𝐷 < 0; 𝜕𝑁𝐹𝜕𝐷 < 0 
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 The increase of material resources could be possible through transfers TF86 (¶TF¶D > 0
), asset (A) selling  ( ¶A¶D < 0) or an increase of household labour supply and thus 
labour income ( ¶Z¶D > 0)
87.  
 
There are other factors that have an influence on household expenditures and 
consumption. For example, large households as well as married people are more 
likely to have higher consumption expenditures than their counterparts, and thus have 
to rely on a higher labour income or on transfers. Households with a large proportion 
of children are more likely to have higher education expenditures than those with a 
low proportion of children. Furthermore, households with old household heads are 
more likely than their counterparts to have low labour income and rely on 
remittances.  
 
The first hypothesis to test is that following a disability shock or an increase of the 
severity of disability in the household, the amount of health related expenditures 
increases (H). Regarding labour income, we expect it to decrease; our assumption is 
that the increase of labour supply will not generate enough money to compensate the 
loss of the income that used to be earned by the disabled family member.  
 
The second hypothesis is that households reduce all of their non-health related 
consumption (F, NF, E).  
 
The third hypothesis is households will experience an increase in the following: 
borrowing, transfers, asset selling.  
 
                                                        
86 TF s included in Y.  
87 It is worth recalling that the effect on labour income could be either positive or negative.  
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Following this exploration of the existing literature, we will present the source of data 
used to conduct our analysis in the next section. 
3.3.   SOURCE OF DATA 
Our panel data come from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS). This is a 
longitudinal socioeconomic survey composed of five waves that covers 21 years. The 
target was to follow the original households as well as their split off through years. 
The first wave (IFLS1) was realised in 1993 and was based on a sample of 
individuals living in 7224 households and representing 83% of the Indonesian 
population.88 Information for the second wave (IFLS2) was collected four years later 
(1997) from the original households sample as well as split off households. IFLS3 
and IFLS4 were respectively fielded in 2000 and 2007. The last wave called IFLS5 
reflects 2014’s data. IFLS retention rates vary from 95% to 91% through the waves.  
 
In the present paper, we are not able to use data from the first wave because 
individual questions (notably the health module) were asked only for a selected 
number of household members; this prevents us from knowing with certainty the 
disability status of all household members. The fourth wave is also excluded from our 
analysis since information about disability is only asked for those who are at least 40 
years old. Thus, our analysis uses information collected in 1997, 2000 and 2014. 
Households in our sample have been followed for 17 years. We do not include split 
off households in our sample either since individual questions are asked for a selected 
number of people in these households. Our sample consists of 2359 households who 
are present through the three waves of interest89.  
                                                        
88 That is the population of the first wave represents 83% of the Indonesian population, since the 
sample includes only 16 of the 27 provinces in the country.   
89  In split-off households, questions on disability status are only asked for a selected number of 
household members, so that we cannot identify the prevalence of disability in these households. That is 
why we have excluded them from our sample. That being said, our sample is representative of old 
generations since young generations are those who leave the original households to form split-off 
households.  
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Following Gertler and Gruber (2002) and Gertler et al. (2009), we use information 
about Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) to build a disability index. ADLs have been 
used by the medical staff since 1960’s in the diagnosis of disabilities (Wallace, 
Herzog, Ofstedal, Fonda, Steffick, Langa, Fisher, Fultz, Weir and Faul, 2004). In the 
Indonesian survey, household’s members who are at least 15 years old are asked for 
their ability: 1) to carry a heavy load (like a pail of water) for 20 meters; 2) to draw a 
pail of water from a well; 3) to walk for 5 kilometres; 4) to sweep the house floor 
yard; 5) to bow, squat, kneel ; 6) to stand up from a sitting on the floor without help ; 
7)  to stand up from sitting position in a chair without help. Each of these ADLs 
related questions has a three-point answer scale: (1) easily; (2) with difficulty; (3) 
unable to do it. Based on these answers and following Gertler and Gruber (2002) and 
Gertler et al. (2009), we build a disability index.  
 
It is worth highlighting there are drawbacks associated to the use of ADLs as a 
measure of disability (see chapter one for a discussion about the limits of the 
measurement). However, we use them in our study because we do not have access to 
a better disability measurement.  
 
We build the disability index following three steps. Firstly, for each adult in the 
household, we calculate an individual total score by obtaining the sum of their 
answers to the ADLs questions; that is someone who says he has difficulty to bow, 
squat, kneel, will have a score of 2 for that specific ADL, if instead he says he is 
unable to sweep the house floor yard, he will have a score of 3 for that specific ADL 
and so on. The minimum total score someone can have for the seven ADLs 
considered is 7 (someone who does not have difficulty performing each of the seven 
ADLs ie whose score is one for each ADL) and the maximum is 21 (someone who is 
unable to do all the seven ADLs). The formula used to calculate the individual total 
score is presented below: 
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Individual total score: 
Answers: (1) easily, (2) with difficulty, (3) unable to do it. 
Score= Σ answers 
 
The second step consists of building an individual adult ADLs index by dividing the 
difference between the actual score and the minimal score by 14 a figure that 
represents the difference between the maximum and the minimum scores. In order to 
obtain a percentage, Individual ADL indices are multiply by 100. Thus, individual 
ADLs indices vary between 0 to 100 reflecting the severity of the disability.   
 
Individual ADL index 
Individual ADL Index = [(Score – MinScore) / MaxScore – MinScore]*100 
 
The last step corresponds to the construction of an ADLs index at the household level 
(HH ADL index); we divide the sum of individual ADLs index (of all adults in the 
household) by the number of adults in the household. This can thus reflect the level of 
household adult disability.  
 
HH ADL index 
HH ADL Index = Σ individual ADL index/# adults 
 
3.4.   METHODOLOGY 
We use a fixed effects approach for our data analysis. The specification below is used 
to analyse the impact of disability on material outcomes. 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1  𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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Where t and i represent respectively a given wave and household. Y successively 
represents the monthly value of each of the following outcomes: Labour income, 
transfers received from relatives, assets, health expenditures, and non-health 
expenditures. This last variable includes food expenditures, spending on education 
and other non-food expenditures. D is the indicator of the level of disability in the 
household; in other words D is the household ADLs index (HH ADL index). X is a 
set of controls: Household size, share of household members under age 15 years, 
share of household adult male members (those over age 14) and characteristics of the 
household head (age, marital status, level of education).  𝛽0 ,  𝛽1  and 𝛾   represent 
coefficients to be estimated.  𝜇𝑖  and  𝜆𝑡  are respectively the household fixed effects 
and the time fixed effects, while 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term. Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) are used to estimate our regressions (see chapter one for details about 
this method and its limits).  
3.5.   RESULTS 
In this section we present descriptive statistics before examining regression results. 
Since we are concerned with the long-term effect of disability, households who live 
with disabled members in only one or two waves are excluded from our analysis. 
Thus, households that have, for example, a strictly positive ADLs index in 1997 and 
2000 but not in 2014 are not considered as having experienced disability in the long 
term. Our descriptive statistics (Table 3.2) show that between the first and the last 
wave of our panel, the severity of disability increases (9 to 15%) while health 
expenditures90 rise; such a scheme may be explained by population aging (UNFPA, 
2014). Concerning the other outcomes of our study, in general, we observe an 
increase of their value between 1997 and 2014 reflecting decrease in poverty over 
time (World Bank, 2016).   
 
                                                        
90 Inflation rate has been taken into account ; thus, the value of income, expenditures and assets are in 
real terms.   
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The decrease of household size (from 5 to 4 between 1997 and 2014) or the reduction 
of the proportion of children (26 to 19%) on the one hand and the increase of the 
adult male share (33 to 35%) or the rise of the head’s age (51 to 56 years old) on the 
other hand are a reflection of a fact: over time, individuals grow up/get old, die or 
leave the dwelling.  
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Table 3. 2  
 Descriptive statistics 
 1997 2014 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Health 91763.3 350439.2 120862.8 722737.5 
Food 1547737 2308545 1181279 996549 
Non_Food 648131 1331322 1039910 2336486 
Education 266647 720857.3 275525.2 545633 
Consumption 2462515 3201540 2496038 3022175 
Remittances 230974.7 533741.2 6377221 3.63e+07 
Labour_Income 1818767 2398326 2001267 4600482 
Assets 1.59e+08 4.83e+08 1.69e+08 2.64e+08 
HH ADL index 9% 10.100 15% 14.611 
HH size 5 2.174 4 1.915 
Adult Male Share 33% .175 35% .233 
Head age 51 13.626 56 13.739 
Head education     
None 19% .388 16% .355 
Primary 53% .499 44% .494 
Secondary 23% .421 31% .455 
Above secondary 5% .214 9% .282 
Child Share 26% .207 19% .199 
Head married 82% .382 71% .455 
Observations 2359  2359  
Income, expenditures and assets are expressed in Indonesian Rupiah. Inflation rate 
 has been taken into account; thus, the value of outcome are in real terms 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from IFLS. 
 
While primary education is the most represented level of education whatever the year 
considered, we notice an increase in the proportion of household heads with a post 
secondary level of education (5 to 9%). This is explained by the fact that over time 
old/deceased household heads are replaced by a younger generation with a higher 
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level of education. The proportion of married heads drops by 11% because of a 
partner’s death. It is worth recalling that in our study we do not include split-off 
households (ex: young people leave their parent home to form their own family) 
which represent 62% of the households interviewed in the last wave of the survey. 
That being said, our sample is mostly composed of older generations and this may 
explain the increase in households ADLs index over years. Furthermore, as 
highlighted previously, what we name “disability” may be either a temporary or a 
permanent disability.  
 
An exploration of the database at the individual level (table 3.3) reveals that several 
patterns can be observed regarding the variation of health status across years. For 
example, out of the 8467 adults of our sample, 1090 who declared a functional 
limitation in waves two and three did not have any functional limitation in wave one. 
2842 were suffering from functional limitations in wave three but not in wave one or 
three. We also have 739 people who declared a functional limitation during the first 
and the third wave of the survey, but not during the second wave. That being said, the  
functional limitation declared by people during the survey may be either a temporary 
disability or a permanent disability.  
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Table 3. 3 
Variation of individual disability status across waves 
Disability status by wave   
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Observations Proportion 
No  Yes  Yes 1090 12.87 
No  No  Yes 2842 33.57 
No  No  No 2219 26.21 
No  Yes  No 303 3.58 
Yes  Yes  Yes 938 11.08 
Yes  Yes  No 117 1.38 
Yes  No  No 219 2.59 
Yes  No  Yes 739 8.73 
Total 8467 100 
       Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from IFLS. 
 
The output of our regressions tends to confirm the predictions drawn from the 
existing literature. Our results (Table 3.4) show that the level of medical expenditures 
(column 1) for a household increases with the severity of disability. When the HH 
ADLs index increases by 1%, medical expenditures increases by 2.37%. Thus, the 
positive sign we predicted above is confirmed by the results. Such a conclusion 
corroborates those found by other researchers based on data from developing as well 
as developed countries (Mitra, Findley and Sambamoorthi, 2009; Burton and Phipps, 
2009; Mitra et al., 2013). Another effect of disability on the household is the decrease 
of labour income as shown in the seventh column of table 3.4 below. An increase in 
the HH ADLs index by 1% leads to the reduction of labour income by 1.19%; this 
confirm the sign predicted above. There are actually several studies that reveal that 
disability has a negative impact not only on the disabled’s labour supply but also on 
the caregivers labour supply (Jolly, 2013; Polidano and Vu, 2015; Lemmon, 2015).  
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Contrary to Genoni (2012), our results do not show any evidence of non medical-
consumption smoothing. Thus, this reflects the fact that, even if in a short term 
households are able to insure their non-medical consumption despite the presence of 
disability, in the long term the inversion of such a trend is observed. This may be 
explained by the pernicious effect of debt accumulation for households in the long 
run (Barbier, López and Hochard, 2016), since we saw in the literature review that 
borrowing91 appear to be the main coping strategy of affected households.  
 
The evidence of households’ inability to maintain consumption expenditures 
following a disability shock is robust even after a disaggregation of non-medical 
spending (food, non-food, education expenditures). The highest effect is observed on 
educational expenditures (column 4) followed by food expenditures (column 2). 
When the HH ADLs index increases by 1%, the education and food expenditures 
decrease respectively by 1.42 and 1.37%. 
 
 It then appears that disability represents a threat to investments in child human 
capital and may expose households to food insecurity as shown in previous studies 
(WHO, 2011; Mitra et al., 2016). We also observe a decrease in the level of 
household assets suggesting that asset depletion is one of the means adopted by 
households after a disability shock, as stated in our literature review. Household 
reliance on external coping strategies is highlighted by the increase of transfers 
received from relatives92. 
 
Concerning controls, we find that the higher the proportion of adult male share in the 
household, the higher the non health related consumption expenditures (column 5), 
                                                        
91  We could not check the effect of disability on borrowings in this paper for two reasons: 1) 
information about loans does not appear in all the waves, 2) when it exists the question regarding loans 
is not uniform through waves and thus not comparable.   
92 We have also done an analysis where the interaction between remittances and disability is one of the 
regressors (Appendix 3.1). Results show that the higher the remittances, the higher the possibility for 
households affected by disability to maintain their consumption.  
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labour income and value of assets. This makes sense since the highest contribution in 
household earnings in Indonesia comes from adult males (Sohn, 2015). In contrast to 
what we observed for the adult male share, households with a high proportion of 
children are more likely to spend more money on education, but less on other non-
food goods, they receive less remittances and have a lower level of earnings and 
assets.  
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Table 3. 4 
 Estimation of the effect of disability on expenditures, income and assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Health Food Non Food Education Consumption Remittance Labour 
 
Assets 
ADL index 
 
0.0237** -0.0137** -0.00840** -0.0142* -0.00817** 0.00658* -0.0119** -0.00517* 
 (0.00602) (0.00328) (0.00159) (0.00705) (0.00138) (0.00321) (0.00300) (0.00226) 
HH size 0.223** 0.128** 0.144** 0.621** 0.131** 0.0236 0.201** 0.132** 
 (0.0393) (0.0110) (0.00964) (0.0560) (0.00746) (0.0218) (0.0147) (0.0161) 
%  Male 0.536 0.571** 0.0624 0.199 0.306** 0.221 0.645** 0.550** 
 (0.421) (0.200) (0.110) (0.553) (0.0905) (0.224) (0.191) (0.172) 
Head Age 0.00202 -0.00450* -0.00886** -0.0362** -0.00606** 0.0131** -0.00984** 0.00526* 
 (0.00600) (0.00182) (0.00156) (0.00864) (0.00116) (0.00357) (0.00247) (0.00238) 
Primary -0.0492 0.0339 0.0791 0.0368 0.0763+ 0.0624 -0.0398 0.0255 
 (0.206) (0.0767) (0.0516) (0.256) (0.0411) (0.103) (0.0838) (0.0712) 
Secondary -0.370 -0.0896 0.00932 0.400 0.00905 -0.0857 -0.0590 0.00172 
 (0.267) (0.0851) (0.0701) (0.360) (0.0544) (0.141) (0.118) (0.0970) 
Above -0.123 0.114 0.195+ 1.754** 0.286** -0.192 0.293+ -0.0131 
 (0.465) (0.109) (0.109) (0.608) (0.0816) (0.267) (0.150) (0.141) 
% Children 0.529 0.0706 -0.533** 8.064** -0.137+ -0.597* -0.526** -0.208 
 (0.434) (0.163) (0.108) (0.579) (0.0829) (0.236) (0.162) (0.165) 
Married 0.279 0.454** 0.306** 0.898** 0.297** -0.100 0.0660 0.268** 
 (0.188) (0.0802) (0.0498) (0.256) (0.0402) (0.105) (0.0718) (0.0705) 
Constant 4.926** 13.31** 12.19** 3.785** 13.81** 10.21** 13.11** 16.73** 
 (0.701) (0.266) (0.178) (0.900) (0.142) (0.376) (0.258) (0.259) 
Obs 
 
6916 6923 6922 6921 6923 5441 6049 6877 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Outcomes in Log. Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from IFLS. 
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In general we notice a positive association between household size and each of the 
considered outcome showing that household expenditures increase with the number 
of people who share the dwelling; and household material resources increase with the 
household size since households are mainly composed of adults. In accordance with 
the human capital theory which predicts a positive relationship between education 
level and earnings and draws attention on the intergenerational transmission of human 
capital (Psacharopoulos, 2014), our results reveal that an increase in the education 
level of the household head (who is the main bread winner) appears to be beneficial 
for labour income, non-health related consumption as well as education expenditures. 
Further analysis shows a negative correlation between the household’s head’s age and 
his education level and this may explain why the older the head of the household, the 
lower the levels of non-food consumption and education expenditures.  
 
When the head is married, household expenditures and material resources in general 
increase. Further analysis (not shown in the table) suggests that education endowment 
appears to play a role in this relationship since there is a positive correlation between 
being married and having a higher level of education; married household heads are 
also younger than household heads without a partner. 
 
An analysis of our sample using a random effects model (Appendix 3.1) reveals that 
the magnitude of the effect of a variation in the severity of disability  (that is in 
absolute terms) on the outcomes of interest are slightly higher than what we observed 
when we relied on a fixed effects model. This suggests that there is a mis-
specification of the model when we use a random effects model.93  
 
As stated previously, the fixed effects model used in our study has some limitations 
that are likely to introduce biases in our results. Faced with the inability of finding a 
                                                        
93 We did a Hausman test that leads us to this conclusion. The level of significance is 5%. 
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better methodology 94 , we will at least discuss about the direction of the bias. 
Measurement errors will lead to an underestimation of the effect of disability in cases 
where the true value of the estimated coefficient is positive and an overestimation of 
the effect if the true value of the coefficient is negative (Wooldridge, 2010; Greene, 
2012). Regarding reverse causality, two cases can be considered (Bloom, Zhu and 
Unlu, 2010). If the sign of the potential effect of the outcome Y on the disability 
index D is similar (resp. opposite) to the sign of the effect of D on Y, therefore 
disability’s coefficients presented in table 3.4 are overstated (resp. understated). Thus, 
apart from health expenditures and remittances, the effect of disability on all the 
outcomes in table 3.4 maybe overestimated.  
 
Our last point concerns omitted variables. The direction of the bias generated by 
omitted variables is unknown. That being said, it is hard to have a precise idea of the 
direction of the final bias generated by these three sources of endogeneity in our 
analysis.  
 
In order to check the robustness of our results, we use an alternative measure of 
disability. It is built as follows: We take the maximum score (1, 2 or 3), whatever the 
ADL considered, associated with each adult member. That is, someone who is unable 
to do at least one of the ADLs has a score of 3, while a score of 1 is given to the 
person who does all the ADLs easily. Finally, a score of 2 is given to the individual 
who declares he has difficulty doing any of the ADLs (but is not unable to do any of 
the ADLs). We sum these scores at the household level then divide the result by the 
number of adults in the households. The results confirm the increase of health 
expenditures and the decrease of labour income following a disability shock. The 
hypothesis of long-term consumption insurance is rejected (see Appendix 3.3).  
                                                        
94 We have done an analysis where HH ADLs indices are replaced by their lagged values (Appendix 
3.2). Coefficients are non significant; thus reverse causality is a possible source of endogeneity in our 
main regressions.   
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3.6.   CONCLUSION 
The question of consumption insurance appears to be at the core of the debate in the 
literature about households coping mechanisms following a disability shock. An 
insight into the LMICs context shows that studies generally conclude that in the 
short-run, households are able to insure their non-health consumption. This is made 
possible by a reliance on external as well as internal strategies such as borrowing, 
transfers or asset depletion. Due to a lack of data, the veil has not been lifted 
concerning long-run mechanisms. This paper is a contribution to the literature in that 
respect. Using a longitudinal dataset from Indonesia, we are able to follow 
households for almost 20 years.  
 
Our analysis, based on a fixed effects model, allows us to conclude that disability 
shocks expose households to an increase in health expenditures and a drop in total 
labour income. Despite an increase in transfers received from relatives, households 
face asset depletion as well as a decrease of their non-health expenditures. Further 
analysis shows that none of the components of this latter aggregate are spared from 
the corollaries of disability shocks. That is, food expenditures, spending on education 
and other non-food expenditures experience a drop. It is worth noting that educational 
expenditures are associated with the highest decrease; this constitutes a threat to 
human capital accumulation. The consumption insurance hypothesis which is 
validated in the short run by previous studies is thus rejected when considering the 
long run. This shows that households tend to adopt adverse coping strategies that may 
sustain short-term consumption while compromising their long-term welfare (Bird 
and Prowse, 2009). It is worth noting that when we rely on our disability measure and 
on a fixed effects model for our analysis, the results may reflect the effect of any 
health condition but disability on the outcome of interest.  
 
Following the fact that households with disabled members are more exposed to 
material insecurity than their counterparts and given the low coverage of PWDs by 
 175 
benefits and the low amount of these benefits, a recommendation can be drawn for 
policy makers. It is important to assess if an increase of the amount of disability 
benefits as well as an expansion of the coverage (i.e. all eligible PWDs receive 
benefits) could lighten the burden of households affected by disability and is cost-
effective.  
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 181 
Appendix 3.1 
 
Estimation of the effect of disability on expenditures, income and assets (Random effects model) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Health Food Non Food Education Consumption 
Labour 
Income 
 
Assets Health 
ADL 
Index 0.0233
** -0.0125** -0.00937** -0.0212** -0.00853** 0.00789** -0.0146** -0.00709** 
 (0.00448) (0.00288) (0.00145) (0.00535) (0.00125) (0.00254) (0.00220) (0.00203) 
HH  
Size 0.217
** 0.168** 0.164** 0.656** 0.152** 0.0883** 0.209** 0.146** 
 (0.0275) (0.00852) (0.00767) (0.0364) (0.00592) (0.0138) (0.00995) (0.0123) 
% Adult 
Male  
 
-0.207 0.323+ -0.141 -0.286 0.144+ 0.0185 0.369** 0.221 
 (0.320) (0.169) (0.0962) (0.398) (0.0835) (0.163) (0.135) (0.143) 
Head 
 Age 0.000171 -0.00601
** -0.00498** -0.0309** -0.00419** 0.0253** -0.00913** 0.0113** 
 (0.00421) (0.00140) (0.00134) (0.00592) (0.000954) (0.00233) (0.00163) (0.00191) 
Primary 0.536** 0.209** 0.313** 0.842** 0.211** 0.218** 0.204** 0.217** 
 (0.143) (0.0521) (0.0445) (0.175) (0.0345) (0.0695) (0.0561) (0.0568) 
Secondary 0.801** 0.472** 0.837** 2.120** 0.543** 0.757** 0.773** 0.783** 
 (0.168) (0.0537) (0.0528) (0.210) (0.0394) (0.0891) (0.0670) (0.0697) 
Above 1.423** 0.799** 1.434** 3.658** 1.034** 1.088** 1.384** 1.485** 
 (0.253) (0.0695) (0.0731) (0.298) (0.0527) (0.143) (0.0794) (0.0958) 
% 
Children -0.322 -0.217
+ -0.763** 8.645** -0.298** -0.629** -0.923** -0.670** 
 (0.346) (0.125) (0.0983) (0.431) (0.0744) (0.180) (0.127) (0.145) 
 182 
Head 
married 0.267
+ 0.223** 0.142** 0.663** 0.177** -0.214** 0.0668 0.170** 
 (0.138) (0.0512) (0.0406) (0.184) (0.0323) (0.0707) (0.0523) (0.0573) 
Constant 5.222** 13.04** 11.67** 2.590** 13.49** 8.994** 12.93** 16.11** 
 (0.494) (0.165) (0.137) (0.558) (0.102) (0.256) (0.194) (0.186) 
Observa 
Tions 6916 6923 6922 6921 6923 5441 6049 6877 
   Robust  standard errors in parentheses 
  + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 We used the logarithm of outcomes in our regressions. 
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from IFLS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 183 
Estimation of the effect of disability on expenditures, income and assets 
(Interaction between ADL index and remittances included as a control) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Health Food Non Food Education Consumption Labour Income Assets 
ADL index 0.0157 -0.0211+ -0.0123 -0.0263 -0.0175** -0.0251 -0.0119 
 (0.0338) (0.0121) (0.00796) (0.0420) (0.00617) (0.0168) (0.0140) 
Remittances 0.133* -0.00255 0.0321* -0.0511 0.00539 -0.0230 0.0465* 
 (0.0553) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0711) (0.00960) (0.0192) (0.0199) 
(ADL index) x 
(Remittances) 0.000807 0.000846 0.000363 0.00138 0.000870
+ 0.00119 0.000484 
 (0.00278) (0.000973) (0.000672) (0.00362) (0.000515) (0.00144) (0.00119) 
HH size 0.214** 0.127** 0.141** 0.690** 0.135** 0.214** 0.142** 
 (0.0459) (0.0124) (0.0117) (0.0647) (0.00895) (0.0181) (0.0185) 
% Adult Male  
 0.612 0.818
** 0.102 0.458 0.376** 0.427+ 0.515* 
 (0.480) (0.246) (0.134) (0.667) (0.111) (0.255) (0.208) 
Head age -0.00307 -0.00299 -0.00991** -0.0409** -0.00672** -0.0107** 0.00507+ 
 (0.00695) (0.00207) (0.00178) (0.0106) (0.00135) (0.00275) (0.00286) 
Primary -0.147 0.125 0.0904 0.113 0.114* -0.00149 0.0541 
 (0.232) (0.0875) (0.0609) (0.301) (0.0497) (0.107) (0.0863) 
 184 
Secondary -0.423 -0.0411 -0.0152 0.654 0.0171 0.0277 0.0607 
 (0.307) (0.101) (0.0837) (0.429) (0.0677) (0.142) (0.119) 
Above -0.0886 0.195 0.145 1.755* 0.289** 0.414* 0.0504 
 (0.556) (0.132) (0.130) (0.736) (0.0970) (0.200) (0.175) 
% Children 0.641 0.312 -0.584** 7.083** -0.129 -0.589* -0.302 
 (0.504) (0.191) (0.127) (0.720) (0.0999) (0.230) (0.198) 
Head married 0.354 0.452** 0.277** 0.617* 0.270** 0.0374 0.186* 
 (0.215) (0.0912) (0.0586) (0.305) (0.0470) (0.0886) (0.0808) 
Constant 4.312** 12.96** 12.01** 4.759** 13.69** 13.15** 16.12** 
 (1.053) (0.373) (0.254) (1.339) (0.195) (0.411) (0.386) 
Observations 5435 5437 5437 5437 5437 4723 5405 
Robust  standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
We used the logarithm of outcomes in our regressions. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from IFLS. 
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Appendix 3.2 
Estimation of the effect of disability on expenditures, income and assets 
(Lagged value of disability used in the fixed effect model) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Health Food Non Food Education Consumption Remittance Labour Income Assets 
ADL index -0.00659 0.00203 0.00142 0.00145 0.0000621 -0.00316 0.00931* -0.00179 
 (0.00959) (0.00398) (0.00281) (0.0149) (0.00202) (0.00687) (0.00450) (0.00381) 
HH size 0.141** 0.140** 0.174** 0.675** 0.146** -0.0472 0.223** 0.152** 
 (0.0492) (0.0175) (0.0130) (0.0761) (0.0107) (0.0323) (0.0216) (0.0217) 
% Adult 
Male  0.368 0.771
** 0.202 0.316 0.431** 0.363 0.747** 0.590** 
 (0.467) (0.237) (0.131) (0.675) (0.111) (0.291) (0.261) (0.207) 
Head age 0.0150* -0.00523* -0.00818** -0.0365** -0.00538** 0.0163** -0.0112** 0.00730* 
 (0.00687) (0.00247) (0.00188) (0.0107) (0.00147) (0.00462) (0.00323) (0.00286) 
Primary -0.334 0.0564 0.0857 0.0114 0.102 0.160 0.0640 0.00775 
 (0.276) (0.124) (0.0727) (0.365) (0.0629) (0.155) (0.133) (0.103) 
Secondary -0.560 -0.0930 0.00470 0.311 0.0349 0.165 0.0645 0.0935 
 (0.347) (0.130) (0.0966) (0.507) (0.0831) (0.197) (0.171) (0.130) 
Above -0.252 0.0985 0.211 1.955* 0.333** -0.368 0.363+ 0.0702 
 (0.558) (0.158) (0.134) (0.769) (0.107) (0.337) (0.191) (0.180) 
 186 
% Children 0.729 0.223 -0.656** 7.869** -0.123 -0.262 -0.746** -0.307 
 (0.512) (0.193) (0.134) (0.736) (0.105) (0.314) (0.212) (0.200) 
Head 
married 0.279 0.502
** 0.275** 0.793* 0.289** -0.0849 0.0354 0.207* 
 (0.219) (0.0951) (0.0598) (0.317) (0.0479) (0.131) (0.0971) (0.0851) 
Constant 6.223** 12.44** 11.96** 3.746** 13.27** 10.10** 12.68** 16.20** 
 (0.974) (0.301) (0.250) (1.453) (0.187) (0.630) (0.365) (0.355) 
Observations 4570 4575 4574 4573 4575 3656 3961 4552 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
We used the logarithm of outcomes in our regressions. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from IFLS. 
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Appendix 3.3 
 Estimation of the effect of disability on expenditures, income and assets (alternative measure of disability) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Health Food Non Food Education Consumption Remittance Labour 
 
Assets 
ADL index 0.312* -0.0887+ -0.0364 -0.171 -0.0493+ 0.152* -0.142* -0.0454 
 (0.124) (0.0473) (0.0321) (0.178) (0.0279) (0.0651) (0.0575) (0.0472) 
HH size 0.230** 0.133** 0.149** 0.618** 0.134** 0.0320 0.197** 0.133** 
 (0.0408) (0.0107) (0.0101) (0.0583) (0.00771) (0.0225) (0.0149) (0.0165) 
% Male  0.373 0.694** 0.142 0.302 0.380** 0.193 0.710** 0.591** 
 (0.419) (0.202) (0.110) (0.549) (0.0920) (0.224) (0.194) (0.172) 
Head age 0.00420 -0.00621** -0.00999** -0.0375** -0.00710** 0.0133** -0.0107** 0.00469* 
 (0.00600) (0.00186) (0.00154) (0.00858) (0.00116) (0.00357) (0.00250) (0.00237) 
Primary -0.0559 0.0375 0.0813 0.0406 0.0785+ 0.0600 -0.0383 0.0266 
 (0.206) (0.0771) (0.0516) (0.256) (0.0413) (0.102) (0.0843) (0.0714) 
Secondary -0.379 -0.0852 0.0119 0.405 0.0117 -0.0893 -0.0575 0.00365 
 (0.268) (0.0853) (0.0703) (0.361) (0.0547) (0.141) (0.118) (0.0972) 
Above -0.115 0.121 0.201+ 1.752** 0.291** -0.179 0.283+ -0.0121 
 (0.466) (0.109) (0.109) (0.610) (0.0815) (0.267) (0.149) (0.140) 
% Children  0.385 0.119 -0.511** 8.145** -0.110 -0.661** -0.465** -0.185 
 (0.439) (0.166) (0.109) (0.580) (0.0841) (0.237) (0.165) (0.166) 
Head married 0.307 0.440** 0.298** 0.882** 0.288** -0.0894 0.0585 0.263** 
 (0.189) (0.0798) (0.0498) (0.256) (0.0402) (0.106) (0.0723) (0.0706) 
Constant 4.557** 13.37** 12.20** 3.979** 13.84** 9.995** 13.26** 16.77** 
 (0.736) (0.264) (0.184) (0.958) (0.149) (0.391) (0.259) (0.270) 
Observations 6916 6923 6922 6921 6923 5441 6049 6877 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01;  
We used the logarithm of outcomes in our regressions.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from IFLS.
 DISCUSSION 
 
La survenue du handicap au sein d’un ménage est susceptible de nuire au bien-être de 
l’ensemble de ses membres. L'objectif de notre thèse, composé de trois articles, est 
d'analyser les conséquences socio-économiques auxquelles sont exposées les personnes 
handicapées, dans des pays en développement, mais aussi les membres de leur ménage en 
général et les enfants en particulier. Nos résultats révèlent, de manière générale, que le 
handicap est susceptible d'avoir des effets pervers sur la vie de l’ensemble des membres du 
ménage.  
 
Le modèle à effets fixes dont nous nous servons pour mener notre analyse présente des 
limites. En effet, il ne tient pas compte de l'hétérogénéité liée aux caractéristiques non 
observables qui changent selon l’individu et à travers le temps. De plus, l’estimation de 
l’impact d’un régresseur n’est possible que si ce dernier varie au cours du temps. Face à la 
difficulté à trouver des instruments valides, nous ne pouvions avoir recours à une meilleure 
méthodologie. Néanmoins, dans les trois articles, nous utilisons des méthodologies 
alternatives pour vérifier la robustesse de nos analyses; les résultats qui en découlent 
doivent cependant être pris avec précaution.  
 
Il est toutefois important de souligner que puisque nos données proviennent d’une région 
du monde où le handicap demeure un sujet tabou, le risque de sous-déclaration est élevé 
lors de la collecte des informations relatives au handicap. C’est pourquoi les résultats 
présentés dans cette thèse peuvent être biaisés. Par ailleurs, les mesures du handicap 
utilisées dans cette thèse ne permettent pas nécessairement de distinguer un handicap 
temporaire d’un handicap permanent. L’enquête ougandaise est une exception le 
questionnaire permet d’identifier l’année de la survenue du handicap. Malgré les limites 
présentées par la méthodologie ainsi que les indicateurs du handicap, nous les utilisons dans 
notre thèse parce que d’une part nous n’avons pas accès à une meilleure méthodologie, et 
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d’autre part les bases de données disponibles ne contiennent pas de meilleures mesures 
telles que l’évaluation du handicap par le personnel médical.  
 
Une autre limite de notre analyse est que nous ne tenons pas compte de l'hétérogénéité entre 
les personnes handicapées, en raison des limites de nos bases de données. Autrement dit, 
nous considérons les handicapés comme un groupe homogène, et ne faisons pas de 
différenciation selon la sévérité ou le type de handicap. Une telle différenciation pourrait 
pourtant fournir des informations plus précises et plus ciblée quant aux mesures à adopter 
par les pouvoirs publics pour alléger le fardeau que représente le handicap pour les 
ménages et la société dans son ensemble.   
 
La recherche sur les conséquences socio-économiques du handicap dans le contexte des 
pays en développement a besoin d’être approfondie et étoffée. Toutefois, un tel objectif ne 
pourra être atteint tant que les questions sur le handicap sont exclues des enquêtes telles 
qu’elles se présentent actuellement. Les pouvoirs publics sont donc invités à prendre les 
mesures nécessaires pour inverser cette tendance et donner plus de visibilité aux personnes 
handicapées. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
Cette thèse a pour objectif d’analyser les conséquences socio-économiques du handicap 
dans le contexte des pays en développement. Cet objectif général se subdivise en trois 
objectifs spécifiques qui font l’objet des trois articles qui constituent cette thèse. Le premier 
article évalue l’impact du handicap des parents sur le travail et le capital humain des 
enfants en Éthiopie. Le deuxième article analyse l'effet du handicap sur l'offre de main-
d'œuvre en Ouganda tandis que le dernier porte sur l'évolution à long terme du revenu et 
des dépenses des ménages suite à la survenue du handicap en Indonésie. Nous avons 
recours à un modèle à effets fixes pour l’analyse de nos données.  Il convient toutefois de 
souligner que la mesure du handicap utilisée dans les trois articles a ses limites. Elle ne 
permet pas toujours de distinguer l’individu qui souffre d’un handicap temporaire de celui 
qui souffre d’un handicap permanent, d’où la recommandation qui suit. A défaut d’évaluer 
le handicap des individus par le personnel médical lors des enquêtes, il est important 
d’améliorer la section du questionnaire qui est relative au handicap. Par exemple, on 
pourrait introduire une question qui permet de savoir si la limitation fonctionnelle est 
permanente ou non.  
 
Concernant notre premier article, les résultats révèlent que l’impact du handicap des parents 
sur la vie des enfants varie en fonction du sexe du parent affecté. Tandis que le handicap du 
père compromet l'accumulation du capital humain de l’enfant, celui de la mère favorise la 
participation de sa progéniture aux activités économiques. Une désagrégation de notre 
échantillon selon le sexe de l'enfant, révèle que l’accumulation du capital humain est 
beaucoup plus sacrifiée chez les filles que chez les garçons lorsque le père est handicapé. 
Par ailleurs, nous constatons que la pauvreté est le canal à travers lequel le handicap du 
père affecte l'éducation des enfants.  
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Ces résultats montrent qu’une attention particulière devrait être accordée aux politiques 
axées sur la situation des enfants de parents handicapés en Éthiopie. Des études plus 
poussées sont nécessaires pour savoir si des mesures telles que l'autonomisation des 
femmes, par exemple, peuvent favoriser l'accumulation de capital humain pour les enfants 
en général et les filles en particulier quand le père est handicapé.  
 
 L'analyse empirique menée dans notre deuxième article nous conduit à conclure que le 
handicap ne semble pas avoir un effet sur la probabilité de travailler. Cependant, lorsque 
nous considérons la marge intensive de l’offre de travail, nous constatons que seules les 
heures de travail des hommes diminuent du fait du handicap. 
 
Une recommandation découle de l’analyse des données ougandaises : la tendance à exclure 
la section consacrée au handicap des enquêtes existantes, au fil du temps, devrait cesser car 
elle contribue au renforcement de l'invisibilité des handicapés. 
 
Pour ce qui est du dernier article, les résultats de nos estimations montrent que les ménages 
affectés par le handicap font face à une augmentation des dépenses de santé ainsi qu'à une 
baisse du revenu du travail. Par ailleurs, ces ménages sont contraints de se séparer d’une 
partie de leurs biens et de diminuer leurs dépenses non médicales. Des analyses plus 
poussées révèlent qu'aucune des composantes de ce dernier agrégat n’échappe aux 
répercussions néfastes du handicap. En d’autres termes, chacun des postes suivants connait 
une diminution: les dépenses alimentaires, les dépenses d'éducation et les autres dépenses 
non-alimentaires. Il est important de mentionner que les dépenses d'éducation connaissent 
la diminution la plus importante; ce qui représente une menace pour l'accumulation du 
capital humain des enfants. 
 
Ces résultats suggèrent que les stratégies d'adaptation adoptées par le ménage pour 
maintenir sa consommation à court terme sont néfastes et compromettent la consommation 
à long terme. Par ailleurs, nous constatons que le montant des transferts reçus par le 
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ménage est une fonction croissante de la sévérité du handicap. Il est de ce fait important 
que les pouvoirs publics tiennent compte des dépenses additionnelles que font les ménages 
affectés par le handicap lors de la détermination du montant des allocations sociales. Il 
faudrait toutefois que l’efficience d’une telle mesure soit évaluée.  
 
Notre travail de recherche présente certaines limites. Premièrement, compte tenu de la 
faible taille de notre échantillon, notre analyse ne tient pas compte de l'hétérogénéité au 
sein de la population handicapée. En effet, dans nos régressions, les handicapés forment un 
groupe homogène quel que soit le type ou la sévérité du handicap.  
 
Deuxièmement, face à la difficulté à trouver des instruments valides, nous utilisons un 
modèle à effets fixes qui n’est pas exempt de critiques: il contrôle les effets fixes 
individuels ainsi que les effets temporels, mais ignore l’endogénéité liée aux 
caractéristiques non observables qui changent selon l’individu et au fil du temps. De plus, il 
ne permet pas l’estimation d’un paramètre si le régresseur qui lui est associé est constant au 
cours du temps. C’est pourquoi, nous avons des suggestions pour les recherches futures. 
Premièrement, il est souhaitable qu’elles aillent au-delà de ces limites en utilisant des 
méthodologies 95  aptes à produire des résultats entièrement débarrassés du problème 
d’endogénéité. Deuxièmement, elles devraient tenir compte de l’hétérogénéité (type, 
sévérité du handicap) qui règne dans la population handicapée.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
95  Par exemple, réaliser une expérience randomisée consistant à guérir des personnes handicapées (ex : 
intervention chirurgicale chez des personnes aveugles suite à une cataracte)  et en évaluer les conséquences 
socio-économiques.  
